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Abstract 
 
Pakistan has the largest contiguous supply-based irrigation system in the world, most 
notably in Punjab where arid conditions prevail. While sound management of irrigation is 
necessary for agricultural development, irrigation systems in Punjab have long shown low 
performance and efficiency. In order to improve irrigation systems’ management and 
performances, in line with the global trend of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), the 
Government of Pakistan initiated governance reforms. This study investigated the 
performances in water supply and services at system level, and the performances and 
technical efficiency at the farming system’s level. Two case study schemes under 
contrasted governance conditions were selected in Punjab Province, Pakistan. One is a 
Farmer-Managed Irrigation Scheme (FMIS, in Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme), and the 
other is a Government-Managed Irrigation Scheme (GMIS, in Upper Pakpattan Canal 
Irrigation Scheme). The Mapping System and Services for Canal Operation Techniques 
(MASSCOTE) approach was used to assess the irrigation scheme-level performances 
through rapid appraisal procedure, questionnaire survey and field observations. Farm 
survey, crop budgeting and techno-economic analysis were used to assess farming systems 
performances. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was used for assessing the technical 
efficiency of farms. The CROPWAT model was used to assess the crops’ irrigation water 
requirements. Volume of annual groundwater withdrawal was estimated by the number of 
irrigations with tube wells and time required for each irrigation under diverse cropping 
system at scheme level. Under the hypothesis that land size had a strong impact on farm 
performances and efficiency in Punjab, farms were classified as per landholding size for 
analysis. 
 
Organizational structures for irrigation management of FMIS and GMIS are properly 
established and have good institutional support and jurisdiction accordingly. However 
implementation of rules and enforcement systems points weaknesses in the governance 
systems of both irrigation schemes. Assessment of governance indicators show that FMIS 
is performing better than that of GMIS in terms of transparency level, monitoring of water 
resource, responsiveness and provision of respect and well treatment by authorities of 
water users’ associations (WUAs), farmers organizations (FOs), and area water board 
(AWB). In average, farmers’ organizations (FOs) are able to solve ~ 12 cases of water 
disputes and < 7 cases of water disputes annually.   
 
This study identifies and documents many weaknesses in the water supply system and 
elements towards modernization and improved operation are suggested of both schemes in 
terms of canal operation, financial aspects, management units and infrastructure. Although 
most internal indicators related to water delivery services and canal operations are well 
below par in both systems, the overall performance of FMIS is better than that of GMIS. 
However, the sensitivity of offtake structures is higher in FMIS (with average 3.25 m
-1
 and 
median 2.76 m
-1
) than in GMIS (with average 2 m
-1
 and median 1.83 m
-1
). As a results 0.1 
m change in the water level in the main canals leads to 32.5% variation in the discharge of 
secondary canals in FMIS and 20.1% in GMIS. Operational, management and maintenance 
(MOM) expenditures are 5 US$/ha in FMIS and 4 US$/ha in GMIS however, MOM 
expenditures are higher than the collected fees for irrigation service in both schemes. Cost 
recovery ratio is 0.33 in FMIS and 0.67 in GMIS. Revenue collection performance is 62% 
in FMIS and 85% in GMIS. Fee collection rate has been sharply declining over the years in 
FMIS, following IMT, with a standard deviation of 22.6% annually. Nevertheless, water 
delivery services have improved in FMIS in terms of reliability and equity from secondary 
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to tertiary canals and at farm level while GMIS shows more equitable service at main to 
secondary canals and more flexibility at secondary to tertiary canals and at tertiary to 
farms. In both schemes, a significant gap is observed between water supplies and actual 
irrigation water requirements at farm level with multiple cropping systems. Access to 
groundwater allows farmers to match their needs, especially in GMIS; overall, canal 
irrigation only cannot sustain any intensification-diversification to improve incomes from 
crop production. Agricultural output is higher in GMIS (4,013 US$/ha) than that in FMIS 
with 2,271 US$/ha. Similarly, agricultural water supply per unit of water supply is higher 
in GMIS (0.357 US$/m
3
) than that in FMIS with 0.267 US$/m
3
. 
 
The results at farm level reveal a strong positive correlation between farm size, crop 
diversification, cropping intensification, income; large farms perform better in both 
schemes, while landholding size is larger in GMIS than in FMIS. In spite of its low 
profitability, wheat production remains a key strategic choice in both schemes; it is quite 
specialized, requires low amounts of inputs, especially irrigation water, which is crucial in 
small farms with minimum direct access to groundwater due to minimum ownerships of 
tube wells and expensive ground water markets. Poor financial basis and lack of extension 
services contribute to hinder intensification in smaller farms. Conversely, maize and rice fit 
well in the diversification and intensification strategies leading to higher farm income per 
hectare, although only large farms grow these crops, especially in GMIS. Farm efficiency 
analysis does not show a clear effect of farm size on technical efficiency along the whole 
size range; yet, smaller farms systematically show poorer results in mobilizing production 
factors to generate income. Specific sources of inefficiency are identified: pesticide use in 
FMIS and land-renting in GMIS. 
 
Overall, productivity, intensification and farm size are closely interlinked in a general 
context of poor functioning of irrigation system and institutional reforms. The study 
concludes that collective action on canal management, implemented through IMT in FMIS, 
has not been conducive to key improvements; it cannot solve all pending, structural issues. 
Infrastructural and institutional issues, and farms’ low capabilities (lack of tube wells, low 
capital, small size) and performances still prevail. Public intervention on, inter alia, 
institutional strength, land size, financial support, extension, and marketing are necessary 
in FMIS as well as in smaller farms while modernization and service-oriented approaches 
should be implemented in both transferred and non-transferred irrigation schemes. Policy 
makers should also consider the access to and management issues of groundwater in the 
future strategies of IMT. A new sharing criteria and contribution model by both external 
and internal players has to be developed.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
Water management has become a key global development issue especially considering that 
agriculture in many countries of the world depends on surface canal irrigation systems to 
boost production. Surface canal irrigation systems serve about 250 million ha of 
agricultural lands worldwide (Renault et al. 2007). In the case of Pakistan, water and arable 
land are among the country’s major natural resources. As a matter of fact, about 25% of the 
total cultivated land area of Pakistan avails of surface canal irrigation systems. However, 
the performance of several irrigation canals is low in terms of management of water 
resource, services provided to irrigate agriculture lands, and financial management in terms 
of costs of infrastructures that could provide effective water delivery services. Surface 
canal irrigation systems are particular important for arid to semi-arid regions such as the 
Indus plains in Pakistan. Water resources of Pakistan have therefore been serving as 
driving force in the uplift of the country’s economy primarily through agriculture. Pakistan 
has the largest contiguous irrigation systems in the world, with long history of extension 
with respect to the surface area improvements in order to efficiently provide water services 
(MWP, 2002) especially to the country’s agricultural areas. Nevertheless, it is dismal to 
note that full potential of irrigation as a key contributor to agricultural development may 
have not been achieved (World Bank, 2007). 
The irrigated agricultural lands in Pakistan largely depend on the Indus River System for 
surface water owing to the country’s arid climate. Its agriculture sector, which consumes 
approximately 97% of water, is the largest user among other competing sectors in the 
country (Committee on Foreign Relations, 2011), and accounts for 24% of the GDP. 
Although the sector employs 48.4% of the country’s total labor force, still about 22.3% 
population is living under the poverty line, while 65% of the population living in rural 
areas is directly or indirectly connected with agriculture for their livelihoods (ADB, 2009). 
As a result of the construction of large number of irrigation mechanisms (canal networks) 
since the country’s independence, the irrigated area of Pakistan had increased from 8.35 
million ha in 1947 to 17.14 million ha in 2000 (PILDAT, 2003).  
In most Asian countries, where agricultural production contributes largely to their 
respective national economies, irrigation management is one of the most important 
concerns. Pakistan, which is becoming a water scarce country, its massive agricultural 
development and continuous population growth contributed to increased water utilization. 
In spite of the country’s most extensive irrigation system, water remains the most limiting 
factor in the sustainable development of its agriculture agricultural sector. Briscoe & 
Qamar (2005) mentioned that “Pakistan is now essentially at the limit of its surface water”. 
Committee on Foreign Relations (2011) further reported that country’s existing agriculture 
system has become more water-intensive but more inefficient in addressing the increased 
water demands for irrigation. In order to improve agriculture production in arid to semi-
arid conditions, better management of the available water for irrigation has become very 
crucial for success which will even be more important in future (Bossio et al. 2011). In the 
new paradigm of water management, water scarcity is not the only reason for crisis but it is 
good governance which is crucial to address policy failure in the past and the present 
(Pahl-Wostl et al. 2011).   
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The existing Indus Basin Irrigation System, which was constructed at the start of the 19
th
 
century, does not operate on the actual water requirement of crops in the command area. 
Water is allocated to canals based on their design capacity which were initially designed 
for 65% of cropping intensity in the Indus Basin River System. The intensified 
requirements for irrigation water by farmers and the decreasing capacity of water deliveries 
from the canals resulted in more limited availability of water per unit of irrigated land over 
time. Farmers had been observed to adopt some ill-practices such as free riding, paying 
bribes and using political powers in a bid to receive favor in terms of increased water 
supplies from canals (Rinaudo, 2002). Further, in order to fulfill the higher requirements of 
irrigation water by agriculture after the green revolution in Pakistan, dependency of 
farmers on ground water has been increased as a conjunctive use. Seckler et al. (1999) 
argued that access to groundwater is instrumental role in food security. Shah et al. (2000) 
reported the overexploitation of groundwater and its increasing pumping costs arising from 
deepening of water table in Pakistan. Therefore, improving the management and efficient 
use of irrigation water should be urgently undertaken as this is vital to the country’s 
economy (Seckler et al. 1999; Committee for Foreign Relations, 2011). 
The Indus Basin Irrigation System encounters major water related issues that have critical 
social, economic and environmental implications. At the current situation, referring to 
mismanagement of canal water, more than 60% water is lost from canal heads to root 
zones (Bosshard & Lawrence, 2006) although it is a major source of recharging 
underground water table; increasing the demand due to agricultural development but 
decreasing water availability, and weakening the infrastructures as a result of inefficient 
operations and maintenance, over-exploitation, discriminatory canal water deliveries, 
inefficient irrigation service delivery and weak governance which in part is due to lack of 
users’ contributions and collective actions. So, the full potential of irrigation as key 
contributor to agricultural development is not fully taken advantage of (World Bank, 
2007).  
Prior to Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), Poor functioning of the irrigation system 
in Pakistan has been a source of major concern for the last few decades. In fact, at some 
point in time this issue had been the subject of considerable external assistance and internal 
policy reforms. Consequently, in accordance with the global “Irrigation Management 
Transfer” process, and on the proposal of World Bank with heavy investment, the 
Government of Pakistan introduced institutional restructuring measures in irrigation and 
drainage subsectors to promote necessary improvements through the promulgation of the 
Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Act 1997. Under these reforms, governing system has 
been changed and management at secondary and tertiary canal levels had been handed over 
to the Farmers Organizations (FOs) and Water Users Associations (WUAs) respectively in 
pilot areas (Latif and Pomee, 2003). The new irrigation policy put emphasis on 
participatory approach of irrigation management by transferring of management 
responsibilities from government to users. The main vision of the institutional reform is 
“to provide adequate, equitable and reliable irrigation supplies to the cultivatable lands of 
Punjab, aiming at enhancing agricultural productivity", and eventually through such 
reforms resource governance could be improved.  
 
In order to address the issues and to overcome the constraints, public policy considers the 
Irrigation Management Transfer as one solution to improve performance through 
governance reforms by rectifying the water delivery systems and minimizing the level of 
ill-practices in the irrigation sector of Pakistan. This is considering the rule that “effective 
water governance improves water management, enhances capacity of people, degree of 
 3 
empowerment, social mobilization and equity” (UNDP, 2004). Despite the efforts exerted 
on irrigation development and management, the performance of government-managed 
irrigation sector is still unsatisfactory (Barker and Molle, 2005). However, it is considered 
that community-centered institutions can make a difference by enhancing the self-
governing capacities of the people (Raza et al. 2009). Under such, there will always remain 
a challenge for community-centered institutions to increase irrigation water supply to 
enhance agricultural production throughout the Pakistan (Muhammad, 2008).  
1.2 Problem statement 
Researches efforts have been undertaken on institutional decomposition and analyzing 
institution-performance interaction by Saleth and Dinar (2004) among others, but most of 
those studies did not explicitly measure the exogenous influencing factors. Similarly, Lam 
(1998) among others, analyzed the institutional performance of the irrigation sector but he 
did not consider the influence of institutional aspects on the sector, considering that the 
social and political context determines the institutional arrangements which in-turn affects 
performance of irrigation system in terms of cost recovery, canal operation and collective 
role of farmers. In the context of effective operation of canal water deliveries, it is critically 
important to analyze the irrigation systems with multidimensional options such as the 
external environment of the irrigation system including produce market, banks for credit, 
public sector, institutions, and service providers (Perret and Touchain, 2002). While good 
mechanism for relationships and coordination among stakeholders of the water resource is 
necessary, it is also significant to enhance governance as it provides the road map towards 
sustainable development (Ayer and Callway, 2005). The questions regarding model of 
irrigation institutions and role of the state should therefore be answered with reference to 
the changing socio-economic and political situations. In order to address these critical 
challenges, it is necessary to analyze the interaction of irrigation institutions with the 
economic, social and political diversity as well as its ultimate effects on the performance of 
irrigation systems.  
 
Current information had been directed towards the weakening performance of gravity-
based irrigation systems. The main causes of poor performance include inadequacies in 
institutional capacity (technical and human resources); insufficiency of database to be used 
for planning and developing large irrigation projects; poor and disjointed irrigated-
agriculture support services; and the intractability of many interconnected institutional, 
technical and socioeconomic aspects of overseeing average and huge irrigation systems 
(David, 2004). However, as a common but major challenge, insufficient water delivery 
services have caused various consequences at farm level such as poor crop productivity 
and changes in cropping systems, mistrust among all stakeholders, corruption in water 
delivery services, and water related conflicts among farmers. Farmers will not be willing to 
pay for irrigation service fee when services remain unreliable as these could comprise the 
obstacles for development and sustainability of the water services-providing institutions of 
the Indus Basin Irrigation System. 
 
Crop yields and income of farmers in Pakistan are lower than the international benchmarks 
and even much lower than the neighboring country India, which has almost similar 
biophysical and climatic conditions and water resources as Pakistan (Briscoe and Qamar, 
2005). An explicit goal of water-management should be to increase productivity of 
available supply of water. Improved water management helps enhance the reliability of 
water supplies that influence farmers to invest more in terms of farm practices and 
agricultural inputs that ultimately lead to high productivity per unit of water consumed 
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(Molden et al. 2003). In this regard, the quantification of crop productivities in relation 
with the quality of water services offered by governance mechanisms should be taken as an 
important concern in a bid to improve the economic outputs of irrigation systems. It is 
therefore important to uncover the ways of enhancing agricultural production through a 
careful assessment of the performance of existing irrigation systems and quantify such 
performance with respect to the efficiency of irrigated farms. 
 
Most researches on water focus on improving water productivity, irrigation efficiency, 
crop management or hydraulic infrastructure, issues that are extremely important and thus, 
deserve much attention. However, governance issues in contrast, do not receive the same 
kind of attention as those aforementioned (Molle, 2009). Prior studies have not also 
focused much on policy changes (IMT) and governance models (institutional settings) for 
irrigation management and their performance both at scheme and farm levels under 
contrasted governance systems. It is still a major concern and thus, should be considered as 
an important research area for better understanding of the impacts of governance change on 
the different aspects of irrigation management and for policy adjustments in the future.  
1.3 Research questions 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the following questions are addressed in this study: 
 
1) What are the governance modes in the two irrigation schemes of Punjab, under two 
different institutional systems? 
 
2) What are the comparative performances in water supply functions of these two selected 
irrigation schemes under different governance systems?  
 
3) What are the comparative technical and economic performances of farms with respect to 
these schemes? 
1.4 Objective of the study 
The overall objective of this study is to assess the performance of irrigation systems, and to 
identify and discuss the potential effects of governance mode onto the performance at both 
system and farm levels in Punjab, Pakistan.  
 
The specific objectives are: 
 
1) To analyze and describe the contrasted governance modes at play in the selected case 
study schemes, and more generally, the ongoing irrigation management reforms (IMT) 
taking place in Pakistan. 
 
2) To assess and analyze the performance of the selected irrigation schemes in terms of 
water supply system and delivery services. 
 
3) To assess and analyze the performance and efficiency of the irrigation farms with 
respect to the selected irrigation schemes. 
 
4) To develop recommendations on the management of both types of systems and on future 
transfer programs. 
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1.5 Scope of the study 
This study intends to provide information on the performance of selected irrigation 
schemes of Pakistan in the particular context of the contrasting governance systems. The 
scope of the study therefore includes: 
 
1) Punjab Province, which has the largest irrigated area in the whole of Pakistan, divided 
into Bari, Rechna and Chaj Doabs. However, this study is confined to the Burala Canal 
command in “Rechna Doab” and Upper Pakpattan Canal command in “Bari Doab” as part 
of the Indus Basin Irrigation System. Nonetheless, the results of this research study could 
be generalized to reflect the situation of the whole irrigation systems within Punjab 
Province. 
 
2) For the performance assessment of the irrigation systems, this study made use of 
primary and secondary data including qualitative and quantitative data.  
 
3) Major part of the study is based on indicators designed by the author. However, 
MASSCOTE approach was also applied to obtain an insight assessment of the performance 
of the irrigation systems under a particular context of contrasted governance modes in 
Punjab.  
1.6 Study limitations 
Some limitations of this study could include: 
 
1) The inability of the study to compare the two governance systems from the performance 
view point due to insufficient number of case studies and the very recent changes in the 
systems. The study therefore focused only on drawing some recommendations from the 
analysis and in identifying the issues and factors related to poor performance and 
efficiency of both systems. 
 
2) While this study emphasized only on water supply systems at scheme level and 
production systems at farm level, other external supporting systems such as credit, inputs, 
supplies, and marketing systems were not considered due to time limitations in scholarship 
period and limited financial support. Although, aforementioned external supportive 
services are very important to measure for agricultural development under diverse and 
unequal access to these services by farmers particularly in Pakistan. 
 
3) Secondary data collected from offices of various departments, on which analysis was 
based on, could be biased and may not depict the exact and true picture of the systems. 
Moreover, the primary data were based mainly on the perceptions and memories of the 
farmers and interviewees.  
 
4) Changes in the governance system impact on the performance of the irrigation systems 
over time but the study attempted to be synchronic in its research design.  
 
5) Groundwater was calculated based on the number of irrigations applied to crops by tube 
wells keeping in view the general cropping calendar at whole scheme level on annual basis 
however field to field crop situation may differ. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
Fresh water is a limited natural resource, and with the passage of time, competition 
between irrigated agriculture and other users of water has been increasing. While irrigated 
agriculture provides food and other agricultural products to the rapidly increasing 
population, the utilization of water resources should be improved in order that such 
resources could continue fulfilling the water requirements of the ever increasing 
population. In this connection, Playan and Luciano (2006) emphasized on the need for 
modernization of irrigation systems. While it is expected that the world’s population will 
increase to 8100 million by 2030, the demand for food as well as water from the different 
water sectors will also increase. To fulfill the increasing demand for food, an increase of 
49 percent in production due to irrigation and 81 percent in terms of irrigated areas must be 
achieved by 2030 (Playan and Luciano, 2006). In developing countries, irrigated areas had 
doubled from 1962 to 1998 but such rapid increase in irrigation area may no longer be 
possible in the coming years because of water scarcity. Therefore, water productivity 
which refers to the quantity of crop produced per unit amount of water used should be 
enhanced by increasing crop yield and reducing losses of irrigation water. In describing the 
modernization and optimization approaches to improve outputs, Playan and Luciano 
(2006) cited that in previous decades, modernization of irrigation system put more 
emphasis on the improvement of irrigation structures without considering that 
modernization of irrigation management could give much better economic returns than just 
structural improvements. However, Molden et al. (2003) found roots of water scarcity in 
the management, ill-functioning of policies and institutions. Pahl-Wostl et al. (2011) also 
emphasized to improve water governance on the face of global water scarcity. In the large-
scaled Indus Basin Irrigation system of Pakistan, maintenance and rehabilitation of old 
infrastructure, management-induced water scarcity, poor governance, and deficit crop 
productivities are common concerns.   
2.1 Concepts, principles and issues of water governance  
The most commonly used definition of water governance was given by the Rogers and 
Hall (2003) as follows: “Water governance refers to the range of political, social, 
economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water 
resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society”. 
The concept of water governance has wider meaning in bigger contexts but it refers 
broadly to the way water supply services are delivered, i.e. whether the efficiency and 
equity of distribution are ensured, whether the delivery process is transparent, accountable, 
participatory and responsive, and whether the citizens are empowered and the powers are 
delegated to enhance their welfare (Ballabh and Balooni, 2002).  
Since the Dublin Conference in 1992, the concept of water governance had been raised and 
had since then gained meaning. Such concept had also been reinforced by a number of 
agreements such as those that were reached during the 2000 World Water Forum in Hague, 
the Bonn 2001 Freshwater Conference, and in the UN 2000 Millennium Assembly as well 
as the Global Water Partnership (GWP) Framework for Actions in 2000 and the 2000 
Hague Ministerial Declaration.  
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The said concept also incorporates many of the ideas that make governance a rich theory as 
it endorses a range of actors and agents to manage the water resource which is much 
broader than the government. Moreover, the concept of water governance covers a range of 
dimensions of water resources as well as delivery services at various levels of society 
making it broader than the management functions of individual authorities. Under such 
governance systems, the unique concern of marginal groups such as the poor and small-
scale water users, and water users with less access to the water resource, are addressed 
while access of society to water is mediated by recognizing the actors and agents, agencies 
and power, and resources through necessary mechanisms and processes at different 
hierarchy of the society (Rogers and Hall, 2003). 
Significance of governance in water resource management 
The definition of water governance should be distinguished from government, governance 
and management. While government implies the formal structures through which the State 
runs water-related affairs, management comprises the allocation and delivery of water 
resources by recognizing the actual mechanisms and processes. Governance includes both 
government and management which encompass the peoples’ access to water. 
A common situation occurs when water and infrastructure are available and cultivation 
techniques are known, and yet people do not have ready access to water. For example, lack 
of water is often not the cause of head–tail problems. Another example is when poor 
people are excluded from infrastructure developments and do not have equal access to the 
beneﬁts that could be derived from any project. Management-induced scarcity has a variety 
of causes which include poor infrastructural development and maintenance, and more often 
than not, finding its roots in the inappropriate or ill-functioning policies and institutions 
(Molden et al. 2003).  
The performance of irrigation systems depends on management as a whole including the 
management of information and control of people (working in irrigation organization and 
farmers) as well as of other inputs besides water. While management revolves around 
water and its control, management without control and objectives does not always result in 
possible success (Mohan, 1986). For such reason, Pahl-Wostl et al. (2011) emphasized 
among others on the significance of water governance and reported that water scarcity is 
no longer a natural resource crisis as it turned out that the actual crisis lies with governance 
because of policy failure. 
Principles of good governance principles in irrigation systems 
Ostrom (1990) first established that an irrigation system is a common pool resource (CPR) 
which means that it could be subjected to collective action. Indeed, the suitable and 
efficient use of CPRs requires participation, negotiation, tradeoffs, collective action, and 
the principles of good governance. Ostrom (1990) proposed eight principles for governing 
the commons in irrigation systems. As presented in Table 2.1, the eight principles of 
governance can be considered for benchmarking governance situation in any given 
irrigation system. Moreover, as shown later in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this dissertation, 
the results and discussions have been organized taking into consideration important aspects 
of governance. 
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Table 2.1. Design principles of governance illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions 
 Principle Description 
1 Define clear group boundaries Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw 
resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as as 
well as the boundaries of the CPR itself. 
2 Match rules governing the use 
of commons goods to local 
needs and conditions 
Appropriation of rules, restricting times, place, technology, 
and/or quantity of resource units are related to local 
conditions and to provision of rules requiring labour, 
materials, and/or money. 
3 Collective-choice arrangements Most individuals affected by the operational rules can 
participate in modifying such operational rules. 
4 Monitoring Monitors those who can actively audit CPR conditions and 
appropriators’ behavior, and are accountable to the 
appropriators or are the appropriators.  
5 Graduated sanctions Appropriators who violate the operational rules are likely to 
be assessed with graduated sanctions (depending on the 
seriousness and context of the offense) by other 
appropriators or by officials accountable to these 
appropriators or by both.  
6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-
cost local arenas in resolving conflicts among appropriators 
or between appropriators and officials.  
7 Minimal recognition of rights to 
organize 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions 
are not challenged by external government authorities. 
8 Nested enterprises Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict 
resolution, and governance activities are organized in the 
multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Source: Ostrom, 1990 
Irrigation governance in Asia and global context 
 
Since agriculture is the backbone of national economies for many developing countries, 
this makes the water sector very critical to increase crops productivity especially for the 
Asian countries. While describing the Asian irrigation water projects in the past few 
decades, despite various efforts exerted, the irrigation sector has been showing 
unsatisfactory performance with respect to the economic development of many Asian 
countries (Barker and Molle, 2005).  
In the global context, water institutions have unprecedentedly been undergoing changes 
and that such changes in water institutions have been following the same patterns and 
trends. The bureaucratic approaches in national irrigation systems contribute significant 
roles in the operation and maintenance, however in South Asia and elsewhere, these 
approaches failed to achieve an efficient performance of the systems (Chambers, 1988). 
Therefore, it is necessary to make improvements in the structure of government agencies in 
order that irrigation systems are appropriately managed. It is towards this end that many 
developing countries such as Bangladesh, India, Philippines, and Nepal have opted to 
adopt the irrigation management transfer scheme (Vermillion, 1991; Shah et al. 2000). 
Nevertheless, government-managed irrigation systems have seemingly shown less efficient 
performance than the farmers-managed irrigation systems (Lam, 1998; Shivakoti and 
Ostrom, 2002). Based on some empirical evidences, farmers-managed irrigation systems 
contribute to higher agricultural productivity as well as higher income to the farmers 
(Shivakoti and Ostrom, 1993). Moreover, in terms of effectiveness of organizations, the 
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users-managed irrigation systems have been more efficient than those systems controlled 
by the non-users (Shivakoti, 1992) resulting on the one hand, in poor implication of diverse 
rules, regulations, responsibilities and roles in carrying out the policies of irrigation 
systems. On the other hand, the performance of these organizations had been lower than 
the expectations, which could be due to the fact that persons working in these 
organizations either have inadequate or no experience and are probably not trained, and 
such organizations must have been operating under poor conditions and also under 
financial constraints. 
Evans (1996) revealed among others, the importance of power between State and society 
as the key potentials for the development in several collective action domains. In the Asian 
countries, positive impacts have been recorded on the good relationships among the State, 
institutions and local water users leading to better performance of irrigation schemes 
(Moore, 1989 and Lam, 1996). The roles and responsibilities of the State in irrigation 
management play very important part in the development of the State’s agricultural sector. 
In the case of farmers-managed irrigation system (FMIS), institutional aspects are needed 
for its proper and effective performance (Shivakoti, 1995). Although policy-related 
problems could occur such as those that aim to increase irrigation effectiveness, proper 
development of physical components in the infrastructures of FMIS could considerably 
address such problems that could lead to improved productivity of agricultural crops (Joshi 
et al. 1998). However, many existing organizations have not exhibited any remarkable 
improvements in terms of developing their physical capital for the irrigation systems. 
People’s involvement and participation had been advocated in the irrigation systems of 
Thailand, where integrated conventional practices and indigenous managerial rules 
promote the management of irrigation systems with the local resources properly mobilized 
while operations and maintenance are enhanced. In line with possible changes in the 
economic development of Thailand, the trends to mobilize the resources are also adjusted 
accordingly. Moreover, in the irrigation systems of Thailand, users prefer paying cash for 
availing of the benefits from the systems’ operations and maintenance rather than 
contributing labour and manpower (Shivakoti, 2000). 
Some scholars argued that socio-economic and political development in most parts in Asia 
contributed significantly towards new trends in irrigation management (Moore, 1993). Fast 
growing economies had not only changed the mode of water delivery but also broadened 
the vision for sustainable utilization of irrigation water. As of now, focus of irrigation 
systems is not only in assuring water delivery but also in looking towards water-related 
conflict resolutions (Lam, 1998; 2001). However, this situation has changed the cost 
benefit determinants of different stakeholders in the irrigation setup due to the fact that 
agriculture is becoming less productive. From the farmers’ points of view, contributing 
funds and efforts to improve irrigation systems has been less beneficial and in most parts 
of Asia, collective action is missing especially in the new urban farm lands. Similarly, with 
the economic development where governments are putting more investments in other 
sectors of the economy such as in the industries, the interest of the government in irrigation 
development investments has diminished. 
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Irrigation governance and performance of Indus Basin River System 
 
Irrigation system of Pakistan is characterized by poor and unreliable water services, and 
according to current information, most issues are directed towards the unsatisfactory 
performance of the irrigation system of Punjab as a major part of the Indus Basin River 
System. The main causes of such poor performance include inadequate institutional 
capacity, insufficient database for planning and mechanisms for the development of large 
irrigation projects, poor quality of construction, mistakes in the design, and intractability of 
institutional, technical and socioeconomic aspects (David, 2004).  
Efficiency of physical water supplies in the Indus Basin Irrigation System has an important 
concern in the economic development of Pakistan. The irrigation system of Punjab which 
can only attain 35-40% delivery efficiency from the canal head to the crop root zones 
because of the age of the facilities and poor maintenance (Tarar, 1995) had been advocated 
as the main reason for the low water supply at the end users of the canal system. 
Furthermore, the unavailability of accurate and reliable information on the distribution of 
irrigation water in the various parts of the canal commands has been considered as the 
major constraint in the efficient management of the scarce water resources (Ahmad et al., 
2004). In fact, almost 20-30% daily fluctuations have been reported in the discharge of the 
irrigation canals within the irrigation system of Punjab (Sarwar et al. 1997). 
In Pakistan, irrigation water supply is distributed to the farmers through a rotational turn 
system known as “warabandi” which is normally based on fixed seven days rotation, 
meaning that farmers are allowed to use the entire flow of water from the outlet once in a 
week, the time allocated by the country’s Irrigation Department based on the size of land 
holdings. However, under such arrangement, many farmers are confronted with difficulties 
in irrigating their entire land due to the insufficient allocation of water (Qureshi et al. 
2008). In this research study, various parameters have been used to investigate the physical 
situation of the water supply for irrigation such as water sufficiency, water delivery and its 
related problems, and agricultural productivity. 
In an assessment study of the performance of canal irrigation system of the Indus Basin of 
Pakistan, Nabi (2009) identified the causes of poor performance of canal irrigation system 
in Punjab, Pakistan. He constructed a problem-cause diagram with the active participation 
of various stakeholders such as the farmers, staff of the Irrigation Department, and FOs 
among others. The first ten problems were then ranked according to their order of 
importance (No. 1 as the most serious, No. 2 is the next most serious, and so on). The 
results shown below have been ranked in accordance with their importance. 
 1. Unequal distribution of water to users 
 2. Tampering of outlets 
 3. Poor operation and maintenance of distributaries and minors by FOs 
 4. Water theft 
 5. Deposition of silt 
 6. Poor conditions of banks of main canal/distributaries/minors 
 7. Illegal outlets 
 8. Very high losses of water in the conveyance due to seepage 
 9. Poor operation and maintenance of physical structures  
 10. Ungated offtake points  
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The delivery efficiency of the irrigation system of Punjab is only 35-40% from the canal 
head to the crop root zones due to the age and poor maintenance of the facilities. This is 
the main reason for the low supply of water at the end users of the canal system. In 
addition, accurate and reliable information on the distribution of irrigation water are not 
available within the irrigation systems of Pakistan. These are also the main constraints that 
impede the effective management of scarce water resources (Mobin-ud-Din, 2004). 
Moreover, it has also been investigated that 20-30% water fluctuations occur daily in the 
discharge of the irrigation canal (Sarwar et al. 1997). 
2.2 Institutional reforms in irrigation systems of Pakistan 
Pakistan has the largest contiguous irrigation network in the world, irrigating nearly 80 
percent of its farm lands but the country’s water sector is faced with serious challenges. 
Water institutions in Pakistan are entangled in a complex setting where formal irrigation 
acts and water organizations operate side-by-side with an intricate set of informal social 
institutions, considering that “good water governance has the prerequisites of good 
institutions, good policies and good practices set in place, which need to be inculcated into 
the water supply system” (Bandaragoda and Firdousi, 1992). Water institutions1 that define 
the rules of water development and utilization in terms of policies, laws and administration 
have to be concurrently reoriented to reflect the changing supply-demand and quantity-
quality dynamics of the water resources (Tiwari, 2006). While discussing the institutional 
and organizational issues for irrigation development in Asia, Coward (1980) emphasized 
on the governance matters, mobilization of internal resources and role of central 
bureaucracy to facilitate the water users through locally defined patterns and procedures.  
The Government of Pakistan has been making efforts since 1995 to reform its one and half 
century-aged irrigation system by linking the beneficiaries (water users) in the different 
units of irrigation management. Among the foremost objectives of institutional reforms are 
to promote improved operation and maintenance of the irrigation sector, to balance 
revenues and expenditures, to maintain reasonable drainage system, and to enhance crop 
production through efficient use of water (Lashari et al. 2003). 
 
Over the last decade, experiences in the restructuring of water institutions seem to suggest 
an emerging global consensus on the key principles of institutional reforms, which could 
include:  
 Development of an appropriate Public Private Partnership (PPP) in the delivery of 
water supply services, including the small-scale providers 
 Decentralization of service responsibility to the lowest appropriate levels of 
government to respond to local conditions 
 Establishment of autonomous utilities with commercial orientation and financial 
viability for service delivery 
                                                 
1
 According to Bromley (1989), North (1990) and Ostrom (1990), water institutions can be considered as 
“rules that together describe action situations, delineate action sets, provide incentives, and determine the 
outcomes both in individual and collective decisions related to water development, allocation, use, and 
management”. Water institutions also feature the characteristics of being subjective, path dependent, 
hierarchical and nested both structurally and spatially, and embedded within the cultural, social, economic 
and political aspects like all other institutions.  
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While recognizing the problems in canal water management and irrigated agriculture, the 
Government of Pakistan introduced major institutional reforms in its irrigation sector in 
1997 (Shah et al. 2000) through Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). IMT can be define 
as transfer of responsibility and authority for management of irrigation systems from 
government agencies to private-sector organizations that that are meant to represent the 
interest of users. Later in the early 1980s, the legislation was passed by four provincial 
governments establishing the WUAs. The reforms undertaken during the 1990s had been 
very encouraging for long-term institutional development as these were aimed at shifting 
the decision-making roles from the federal and provincial agencies to decentralized 
autonomous public utilities and user organizations (Saleth et al. 2005). Specifically, the 
Government of Punjab decided to adopt further institutional reforms in its irrigation sector 
since 1997 when the Punjab Provincial Assembly passed the “Punjab Irrigation and 
Drainage Act”. Under this Act, the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) was 
set up at provincial level with representations from the public sector and farmers. The 
institutional framework of the reform consists of four entities:  
 
1. Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) at provincial level  
2. Area Water Board (AWB) at canal command level  
3. Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) at distributary level 
4. Water Users’ Associations (WUAs) at tertiary canal level 
After institutional reform (IMT), certain functions, operational powers and responsibilities 
were transferred to FOs which is given in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Comparative review of operational functions transferred to FOs after IMT 
Functions Before IMT After IMT 
Fixation of water charges IPD IPD 
Assessment of water charges Staff of IPD FO 
Collection of water charges Staff of Revenue 
Department 
FO through WUAs 
Assessment of expenditures for O&M 
at second canal level and below  
IPD FO 
Responsibility of O&M IPD FO 
Incentive system No Yes but not clear 
Dispute settlement IPD FO and WUA 
Penalties on late payment Complicated Yet to be implemented 
Source: IPD, 2003 and discussion with stakeholders 
It is clear from Table 2.2 that FOs are not fully empowered as only limited roles were 
transferred such as assessment and collection of water charges (ISF), O&M, and settlement 
of disputes among farmers. FOs are still lacking in terms of powers for penalties to 
defaulters, water rights, control on the flow of main canal, capacity to deal with nepotism 
and monitoring etc.   
Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) are the basic management units responsible to operate and 
manage the irrigation and drainage infrastructure within its jurisdiction. The process of 
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institutional reforms commences with community development at village level by making 
the farming communities aware of the concept of Participatory Irrigation Management 
(PIM) and its initiatives, and organizing themselves into FOs (Raza et al. 2009). Moreover, 
the Water Users’ Association (WUA) which is a participatory organization and farmers-
based manages the local irrigation water system, the members of which are supposed to be 
elected by the local farmers. Nevertheless, WUAs play the important role in the effective 
management especially in raising the efficiency of the irrigation system along with the 
improving incomes and serving the deprived farmers (Huang et al. 2008). 
Thus, the direction and contents of the reforms could be among the most formidable 
challenges in recent times with debate focusing on institutional restructuring and 
enhancing efficiency gains. However, questions had been raised on the access of the poor 
to irrigation water, affordability of irrigation, and the mechanisms for developing pro-poor 
regulations. Nonetheless, the inclusion of water access target as part of the Millennium 
Development Goals of Pakistan underscores the sector’s close link to social equity. It is 
therefore a challenge for policy planners to ensure that future regulations should aim to 
address both efficiency and social welfare objectives in the water sector balancing the 
stakeholders’ interests. It is equally very important for a developing country to assess and 
address the challenges in the irrigation systems in order to attain distributive justice to its 
population (Tiwari, 2006).   
In recent years, institutional arrangements governing the water sector have also been 
undergoing remarkable changes where privatization or public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
have been increasingly recommended to address the enormous challenges confronting 
water supply and management services. Such arrangements have gathered momentum in 
view of the relatively poor performance of the public sector and it had been argued that the 
role of the State should be that of facilitator rather than as provider. The nature and 
direction of these institutional changes vary from country to country but in Pakistan, 
institutional reforms had been carried out through the ratification of its water laws, 
promotion of integrated water resources management (IWRM), creation of basin and users-
based organizations, decentralization to promote stakeholders/users participation, 
establishment of public-private partnerships (PPPs), creation of water rights system, and 
reorientation of the prices of water as well as the corresponding services (Tiwari, 2006). 
Globally, water institutions are also collectively undergoing unprecedented changes by 
revisiting the interactive roles of water policies, water laws and water administration 
(Saleth and Dinar, 2000). These institutional reforms provide better options and 
management frameworks for the improvement of water resource management at local level 
by encouraging local water users to take part in the decision making process. Thus, current 
institutional reforms in irrigation sector promote the collective actions among the 
stakeholders and encourage the participation of water users in water management and in 
the decision making process, resulting in empowerment, trust development, and knowledge 
sharing.  
 
 
 
 
 14 
2.3 Socio-economic indicators and their impacts on water management 
The issue of water management is complex and is integrated with the social, economic and 
environmental aspects of water basins for sustainability (Cai et al. 2001).  
Social capital and its role towards effective water management 
 
The concept of “social capital” has been defined by a number of scholars in various 
perspectives. Coleman (1994) stated that “social capital as defined by its function, is not a 
single entity but a variety of different entities having characteristics in common: all 
consisting of some aspects of a social structure, and facilitating certain actions of 
individuals within the structure”. However, Isham and Kähkönen (1999) defined social 
capital in a different way by stressing that “social capital refers to the institutions, 
relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social 
interactions”. Therefore, social capital is not just the sum of the institutions that underpins 
a society but it is the glue that holds the institutions together and improves their collective 
actions, particularly in water delivery services. 
There is no doubt that many researches considered the concept of strong social capital as 
social trust affiliated in the social networks that correlates with diverse and enviable policy 
outcomes. Putnam (1995) mentioned that social capital have “forceful, even quantifiable 
effects on many different aspects of our lives” such as fewer crime rates, less corruption 
and effective governance. While studying the impact of social capital on the performance 
of irrigation systems, Lam (1998) argued that high level of mutual trust among water users 
is closely associated with the efficient performance of the irrigation system. He also 
emphasized that performance of the irrigation systems could be enhanced by improving the 
mutual trust among water users in order to counter the irrigators’ practice of offering 
incentives to free-riders and other users who do not act in accordance with the operational 
rules and regulations of the water sector. He added however that there is no standard rule 
to measure mutual trust especially in terms of concrete values. 
It should be understood that water institutions are not actually formal organizations 
considering that within such institutions are informal rules with respect to norms, traditions 
and symbolic meanings associated with water. Although these informal rules are not 
codified, legitimized and enforced through formal structures (e.g. the State) but these are 
results of the self-organizing dynamics of social interaction that possesses minimum 
legitimacy and continuity, and are being observed as structures. Moreover, water laws, 
water administration, and water policies could also be formal as well as informal rules. In 
local water management for instance, informal rules are often more powerful than the 
formal ones, especially that water rights can be effective without being written down as a 
law but could be referred to in other sources of legitimacy. Furthermore, water could also 
have spiritual or religious values that define its usage rules. In many cases, the use of water 
is determined more by awareness patterns of the population rather than by the sanctions 
imposed. Therefore, it is necessary to systematically include such informal rules, 
arrangements, and traditions as part in any water analysis studies (Sehring, 2006). 
Various local institutions in farm communities have significantly promoted the 
development of social networks of interactions in favour of their personal as well as 
collective remunerations. Social networks are engaged in developing some rules, norms 
and operational frameworks that cater to the institutions’ benefits. These institutions could 
also comprise the water users’ organizations capable of developing their rules and 
 15 
regulations, organizing management committees and regular annual meetings, creating 
levels of associations, and charting the responsibilities of the different actors and water 
users. Such actions are intended to support the development of an environment of trust 
towards the ownership of water resources by the communities as well as in the resource 
mobilization, acquisition, allocation and distribution of water for irrigation purposes. These 
activities also constitute the cognitive social capital in the management of irrigation 
systems by the water users (Pradhan, 2002). 
Participation and collective action in irrigation management 
 
Arnstein (1969) declared that the seminal text on citizens’ participation provides some 
basic ideas about the involvement of stakeholders in development projects. Later, the trend 
of involving stakeholders in natural resource planning and management gained significant 
attention globally (Buchy and Hoverman, 2000; House, 1999). In the current scenario of 
development and social responsibility, public participation has been considered as 
cornerstone of an emerging governance paradigm (Hirschman, 1982). ADB (1973) 
highlighted the importance of participation in the success of an irrigation project as;  
“The success of irrigation project depends largely on the active participation of and 
cooperation of individual farmers. Therefore, a group such as farmers’ associations 
should be organized, preferably at the farmers’ initiatives or if necessary, with initial 
government assistance, to help in attaining the objectives of the irrigation project. 
Irrigation technologies alone cannot satisfactorily operate and maintain the system”.   
Many scholars defined such participation as “the involvement of people in different areas 
of irrigation management” considering that farmers’ participation in irrigation 
management is very vital for the sustainability of any irrigation system. In the context of 
enhancing farmers’ participation, many developing countries put more focus on PIM and 
IMT for the sustainable management of irrigation water and infrastructure development. 
The role of the farmer as an individual and in the collective efforts (referred to collective 
action
2
) is equally important in enhancing the efficiency and performance of irrigation 
system which could lead to the sustainability of the system.  
 
Social justice, ethical practice, economic efficiency, equity, decision quality, shared 
responsibility, extended democracy, environmental concerns and other formal approaches 
are some of the factors that provide justification to support the involvement of 
communities in development projects at different levels of planning and governance. The 
growing institutional interests in governance issues in recent years had promoted 
accountability in all actions and inclusive processes, ensured quality of decision making 
processes, enhanced responsibility in information sharing, and facilitated trust 
enhancement. As a matter of fact, public participation in the development projects of 
irrigation systems has already been generating better outcomes recently (Pereira et al. 
2003). 
Direct interests, solidarity, trust, expectations, and awareness are the major components of 
participation. Thus, increased participation in irrigation system also increases the people’s 
control over the resources. Farmers’ participation can be useful especially in identifying 
problem areas and solutions necessary in decision making. Their participation can also be 
                                                 
2
 Collective action means “action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) 
in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests” (Marshall, 1998). 
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effective in monitoring and evaluating the systems’ delivery situation especially in the 
context of demand and supply of irrigation water. Similarly, since physical involvement of 
farmers is very vital in any irrigation setup, the role of the FOs is necessary to motivate 
their farmer-members to participate in the irrigation activities, and promote sense of 
ownership for them to be responsible for whatever actions they take with respect to the 
utilization of the resources.   
Furthermore, participation in irrigation set up is very important as it could ensure the 
sustainability of plans and policies related to irrigation systems as well as farmers’ 
participation at all stages of the planning and implementation. Moreover, such participation 
could also make the irrigation systems cost effective on the part of the government as cost 
could be reduced through active participation and sharing of responsibilities among the 
stakeholders. In addition, participation not only enhances the performance and service 
quality in O&M but also promotes self-sufficiency of farmers along with the sustainability 
of the system. In this regard, Meinzen-Dick (2007) suggested some key factors that could 
affect the participation of farmers in irrigation management. These could include water 
scarcity, size of WUAs, social capital, socio-economic heterogeneity of users, leadership, 
distance to market, and government policies.  
At the global level, thousands of irrigation systems that are being managed by local people 
exist and are working at different levels, but the major problem identified in these systems 
is lack of ownership (rights to access and use resources and infrastructure). Therefore, 
there is a strong need to develop a strong sense of ownership among the stakeholders 
including those who are managing these systems. Once ownership of the systems is 
acknowledged, those concerned would recognize that they are accountable of all actions 
being undertaken especially with respect to the management of the systems. 
Institutional reforms and its linkages with livelihood of farmers 
Institutional reforms in irrigation system had changed the mechanism of water governance 
at various levels of water management. According to the official website of UNDP, there 
are four different dimensions of water governance. These are social, economic, political, 
and environmental sustainability, all of which can impact on rural livelihoods particularly 
for those who are mostly excluded from access, decision making process, and operation 
and management aspects of irrigation water management.   
In a report on “water governance and poverty”, UNDP (2004) stated that effective water 
governance improves water management and enhances the capacity of the stakeholders. In 
addition, the degree of empowerment and access to water could be improved, while social 
mobilization and equity are promoted. Effective governance could also find the ways and 
means of improving the livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable people by providing them 
the opportunities to enhance their financial capability and also their capacity to participate 
in the various levels of water management. As a result, cost recovery is improved while 
sustainability of water services is ensured. In this regard, the decentralized Water Users 
Associations (WUAs) could serve as effective forum for helping the small-scale and poor 
farmers. 
2.4 Relationships and coordination mechanisms among institutions 
In order to strengthen the governance of natural resources at global and national levels, 
Ayer and Callway (2005) presented a two-fold requirement among a series of 
recommendations in their book on “Governance for Sustainable Development”. They 
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mentioned that many institutions at local, national and international levels continue to 
conduct their activities in their respective sectoral silos without considering possible areas 
of interlinks and the ultimate impacts on other sectors. This kind of silo mentality 
undermines the sustainable management of resources which actually requires integrated or 
joint management approach. Meanwhile, in an integrated mechanism of management, the 
involvement of a range of institutions, stakeholders and the civil society, and other interest 
groups are necessary for the effective use, protection and necessary improvement of the 
resources. Moreover, Ayer and Callway (2005) also emphasized on the need to share local 
experiences in responding to the impacts of global and national policies and efforts. In the 
same manner, they argued that poor coordination is a major barrier towards good 
governance of the natural resources while sharing of experiences would establish a 
feedback mechanism and promote learning at local level. 
The overall performance of water institutions depends not only on their individual 
capabilities but also on their collective strength in terms of structural and functional 
linkages since institution-performance interaction in the context of water resource occurs 
within an environment characterized by the interactive role of many factors outside the 
strict confines of the water institutions and water sector. However, institutional linkages 
and their performance implications are also subject to exogenous and contextual 
influences, which could be formally traced by unbundling the water structure from its 
institutional environment (Saleth and Dinar, 2005). Moreover, it should be understood that 
not all institutional arrangements are effective especially in the area of water management. 
While success might be achieved in one case but failure could also occur in other cases, 
due to diverse social, economic, cultural, and political attributes of any typical case. In 
fact, all these critical factors may have affected the performance of many irrigation 
institutions (Meinzen-Dick, 2007). 
 
The relationship mechanism among existing institutional arrangements and other 
concerned parties has been changing which was emphasized in Commission of the 
European Communities (2002) in its White Paper on European Governance. The 
introduction of new processes of decision-making and new structures and modes of 
thinking, interaction among concerned parties and communication had been suggested in 
this White Paper for consideration in all efforts that aim to improve the governance of 
institutions. 
 
Furthermore, the changing trends in the institutions of the global water sector had been 
reviewed by the Saleth and Dinar (2000) who also presented an analysis of the institutions 
based on three pillars such as water administration, laws and policies. The same argument 
had also been supported by some other analysts and managers of water resources who 
stated that laws, policies and administration are the focal points for analyzing the 
performance of water institutions (Bandaragoda and Firdausi, 1992). In contrast, social 
patterns of adopting new institutional changes must be considered although this is beyond 
the practices of international organizations, government bureaucracies and regulatory 
systems. The institutional framework proposed by Bandaragoda (2000) is comparatively 
more comprehensive than those from other previous studies in assessing the performance 
of water institutions. Such framework covers a range of rules and regulations, norms, local 
practices, and organizations that collectively configure the human actions to manage the 
water resources effectively.  
Saleth and Dinar (2004) also argued that institutional change is economically more 
profitable in terms of improving the performance of water institutions as transaction cost 
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for institutional change is not expensive. Such cost is only meant to come up with a 
“welfare theoretic logic” for initiating the process of change in the arrangements of water 
governing institutions. The rest of the efforts are then focused on the structural unbundling 
of water institutions in order to evaluate their performance under the changing context of 
governing bodies. However, they added that such areas of studies are lacking especially in 
terms of measuring the factors that exogenously influence management and affect the 
performance of water institutions. 
An analytical framework to categorize the different levels of inter-linkages within water 
institutions was developed by Saleth and Dinar (1999). They also examined the interaction 
under the performance network of the water sector. In investigating the different 
institutional layers of linkages of such analytical framework, they used perception-based 
data and identified the contribution of economic factors in the changing process of water 
institutions. They also determined how these economic factors build up a political pressure 
on the bureaucracy to undergo institutional change in national water sector.  
Royal-Haskoning (2003) introduced a model for analyzing water institutions in a different 
perspective by involving different dimensions that have direct influence on the 
performance of water institutions as shown in Figure 2.1. This comprehensive model is 
appropriate for improving water governance by enhancing the performance of water 
institutions. In this framework, four main dimensions of water institutions were identified 
and categorized, such as leadership, stakeholders, enabling environment, and performance 
which could have two way effects on the performance of water institutions. 
 
 
Source: Royal-Haskoning, 2003 
Figure 2.1. Different dimensions of water institutions for good water governance  
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In order that water institutions could achieve effective performance, integrated approaches 
must be applied at appropriate scales of the management (Bates et al. 2008) under the 
principles of good governance and public participation (Rehman and Varis, 2005). In the 
context of development of effective water management institutions, Samad (2003) 
proposed that water management institutions must refocus their intentions from 
development of infrastructures towards better utilization and conservation of water 
resources, and finally should aim for improving over time the allocation of and regulations 
on water resources. Together with such adjustments, efforts should also be made towards 
capacity building, revisiting incentives for participation, facilitating the willingness to pay 
for services, and sustaining social mobilization at community level (UNDP, 2004).  
2.5 Performance assessment approaches in irrigation system  
Evaluating the performance of irrigation systems has been a pivotal topic of interest that 
aroused a great deal of attention among researchers, planners and managers of irrigation 
systems in the last decades. The performance of irrigation systems is an engineering term 
used in “irrigation science”, where in a broader scale; the term “irrigation system 
performance” includes efficiencies of various components like storage efficiency, 
conveyance efficiency of canals, application efficiency, and field efficiency among others. 
In turn, three main standards could be used to evaluate the performance of irrigation 
systems, these are: the physical condition of the infrastructure, water delivery services, and 
agricultural production.  
In this study however, the meaning of “irrigation system performance” covers limited areas 
of the canal levels’ operations, delivery services, organization and management, and the 
sensitivity of hydraulic structures, internal performance indicators, financial and 
agricultural productivity as well as the economic indicators at the whole command of any 
typical canal, as defined in the MASSCOTE approach. Nevertheless, this study also 
considered the suggestion of Renault (1999) that performance evaluation is necessary in 
order to improve irrigation management. 
Approaches and indicators for performance assessment 
Perret and Touchain (2002) proposed a framework (Figure 2.2) to improve the operational 
efficiency of irrigation systems. Later on, the framework was modified by Le Gal et al. 
(2003) in their study that dealt with the economic factors that influence the operations of 
irrigation systems. In the revised framework, more focus had been given to the ways of 
improving the operational efficiency of a given irrigation system, while also suggesting 
that the external influencing factors should be incorporated in assessing the performance of 
irrigation systems. 
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Source: Perret and Touchain, 2002; Le Gal et al. 2003  
Figure 2.2. Operation of an irrigation scheme: conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework proposed by Perret and Touchain (2002) provided many 
suggestions that were very useful in this study. This is considering that technical 
management and financial management domains of such framework have been considered 
and analyzed under the MASSCOTE methodology. In addition, the other two domains 
such as production and income generation were considered in the farm-level analysis of 
this study. 
 
Molden et al. (1998) identified the various factors that affect the performance of irrigated 
agriculture, i.e. hardware design, management, prices of inputs and their availability, 
climatic conditions, among others. In addition, Kloezen and Garces-Restrepo (1998) used 
comparative indicators (proposed by IWMI) to assess the hydrological, agronomic, 
economic, financial, and environmental performance of an irrigation system in Alto Rio 
Lerma Irrigation District (ARLID) in Mexico, where the researchers used comparative 
indicators to determine the gaps among the irrigation management policies. Such indicators 
were then used to assess the actual performance of ARLID relative to the system’s specific 
management goals. The findings of the study in ARLID showed that availability of 
abundant water and the planned irrigation depths were more than what the crops required. 
As a consequence, operational and maintenance costs were fully recovered while the 
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economic outputs per unit of water were maximized. Such efforts proved that the 
application of process indicators could provide better insights of the process of system 
management. Moreover, the results also showed that in all cases, the actual water delivered 
to the canal and fields was higher than what was planned and reported. Therefore, it was 
emphasized that that the minimum set of comparative indicators are the most cost effective 
tools for monitoring the outputs of an irrigation management. 
 
While describing the current challenges in water management, Renault (2000) pointed out 
that re-engineering the irrigation systems can enhance irrigation system management and 
canal operation which ultimately leads to improving the performance of the system. He 
also stated that there is a strong linkage between performance and sensitivity properties of 
canal structures, and thus, emphasized on the need to improve water efficiency and 
productivity to meet the future challenges of water and food.   
Murray-Rust et al. (2003) assessed the water productivity in the Syr-Darya River Basin of 
Central Asia, including the performance of its irrigation system in terms of water 
productivity and crop yield as the major performance indicators. They concluded that there 
was great variation in terms of performance of the system at different levels. For example, 
the upper part of the Basin was more efficient than the other parts while the performance of 
the private units was better than the cooperative units. Meanwhile, Sakthivadivel et al. 
(1999) used satellite remote sensing and geographic information system (GIS) techniques 
to assess the performance of Bhakra Irrigation System in India, where wheat productivity 
was used as a performance indicator. Groundwater depth/quality, distributary level 
discharge, rainfall, and evaporation were also considered in diagnosing the problem areas 
and developing the corresponding action plan. 
Mapping system and services for canal operation techniques 
FAO proposed in 2007 an approach known as the “Mapping System and Services for 
Canal Operation Techniques” (MASSCOTE) for improving the performance of surface 
canal water. The MASSCOTE approach is especially useful for water engineers and 
irrigation professionals in their efforts towards modernizing the irrigation management of 
surface canal systems. In this aspect, the word “mapping” has two meanings, namely: (i) 
spatial survey, and (ii) planning (Renault et al. 2007). While canal operation is at the heart 
of the MASSCOTE approach, a step by step methodology has been developed to overcome 
the complexity in improving irrigation water management. 
 
Through Rapid Appraisal Process (RAP), the constraints and performance of irrigation 
system had been systematically diagnosed while the problem areas in the system had been 
identified. Therefore, indicators in the RAP approach could be used as benchmark in 
comparing the performance of the system before and after the implementation of any 
modernization plans such as internal and external indicators of irrigation system. Burt and 
Style (2004) developed the corresponding definition of “benchmarking”3 which was the 
basic concept used in the RAP spreadsheet of the MASSCOTE framework.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Benchmarking is a systematic process for achieving continued improvement in the irrigation sector by 
comparing the relevant and achievable internal or external goals, norms, and standards. The three aspects of 
benchmarking are: evaluation of technical indicators (both internal and external), appraisal of the system 
processes, and evaluation of the services to users and their corresponding degree of satisfaction from such 
services. 
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Renault and Wahaj (2006) used the MASSCOTE approach to modernize the irrigation 
management of Sunsari Morang Irrigation System (SMIS) and the Narayani Irrigation 
System (NIS) in Nepal by specifically adopting ten steps of the MASSCOTE procedure. 
Results from the RAP which was conducted in 2003 and subsequently those of the 
MASSCOTE were applied in 2006 to the SMIS although the different steps of the 
MASSCOTE approach were adjusted. However, RAP was used to identify, locate and 
prioritize the problems while concerned staff had been mobilized to compile the baseline 
information of the project area for the modernization effort. 
 
Moreover, Renault et al. (2007) used various financial indicators to assess the performance 
of irrigation systems. Such financial benchmarking indicators which are shown in Table 
2.3 have been defined by the World Bank. 
Table 2.3. Financial indicators for assessing the performance of irrigation systems 
Indicator Definition 
1. Cost recovery ratio (Gross revenue collected) / (Total MOM cost) 
2. Maintenance cost to revenue ratio. (Maintenance cost) / (Gross revenue collected) 
3. Total MOM cost per unit area (US$/ha) (Total MOM cost) / (Total command area 
serviced by the system) 
4. Total cost per staff person employed 
(US$/person) 
(Total cost of personnel) / (Total number of 
personnel) 
5. Revenue collection performance (Gross revenue collected) / (Gross revenue 
invoiced) 
6. Staff persons per unit irrigated area 
(Persons/ha). 
(Total number of personnel engaged in irrigation 
and drainage service) / (Total irrigated area 
serviced by the system) 
7. Number of turnouts per field operator. (Total number of turnouts [offtakes]) /  
(Total number of personnel engaged in field 
irrigation and drainage service) 
8. Average revenue per cubic meter of 
irrigation water delivered to water users by 
authorities (US$/m3). 
(Gross revenue collected) / (Total annual volume 
of project irrigation water delivered) 
9. Total MOM cost per cubic meter of 
irrigation water delivered to water users by the 
project authorities (US$/m3). 
(Total MOM cost) / (Total annual volume of 
irrigation delivered by project authorities) 
Source: Renault et al. 2007 
 
Burt and Styles (1999) analyzed 16 irrigation projects in 10 developing countries and 
recommended the need to promote modern water control and management practices in 
irrigation systems. Using various tools and indicators, mainly the Rapid Appraisal Process 
(RAP), and external performance and internal process indicators for the collection of data 
and evaluation of each irrigation project, they provided some details on the proper and 
improper design and operation of various physical features such as turnouts, cross 
regulators, canals, water users’ organization, investments, and so on. The positive findings 
of their study prescribed that: (1) hardware modernization can drastically improve water 
delivery services and ease all operations; (2) some water users’ organizations are able to 
collect nearly 100 percent operation and maintenance fees were operating in a business 
style of providing good water delivery services; and (3) in most of the projects, small 
changes in design and operation had facilitated the improvement of water delivery 
services. However, Burt and Styles (1999) also came up with negative findings which 
included: (1) most irrigation projects could only attain about 20 to 30 percent efficiency; 
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(2) many consultants who have been improperly using the computers were only wasting 
time and resources; and (3) in projects with poor water delivery systems, the difference 
between actual and stated value of the water delivery services was wide. After the study, 
15 projects had partially modernized their systems in terms of hardware or management 
while some modernized both their hardware and management. 
Internal Indicators of RAP 
According to Renault (1999) and Renault et al. (2007), internal indicators could be used to 
assess the internal mechanisms (input used and outputs obtained) of an irrigation project. 
These internal indicators could be identified from the hardware, management and services 
that are available throughout the system. For example, the most common internal 
indicators could include equity, efficiency, adequacy, timeliness, and reliability of water 
supplies. These indicators would enable the visualization of the changes that are needed in 
terms of management, hardware and services as well as their influence on the overall 
performance of the system. The internal indicators could also determine how effective an 
operation is to be able to carry out the stated services. 
External Indicators of RAP 
Renault (1999) and Renault et al. (2007) also cited that external indicators (financial and 
agricultural productivity) could be used to compare the inputs and outputs, and eventually 
to assess the overall performance of an irrigation system. Usually expressed in ratios and 
percentages, the benchmarking indicators used by the International Programme for 
Technology and Research in Irrigation and Drainage (IPTRID) also lie in this category. 
These external indicators deal with outputs, i.e. production of agriculture, economic and 
environmental effects. However, financial indicators as given in Table 2.2 do not actually 
indicate the internal processes that are going on to produce the outputs. Nevertheless, 
external indicators could also be used as benchmark to evaluate improvements in the 
performance of a system before and after the implementation of modernization plans. 
Sensitivity of irrigation structures and canal operation 
 
Renault et al. (2001) also assessed the sensitivity of irrigation structures in Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan. Such sensitivity analysis was useful for the management of unexpected 
perturbations in a gated system and also helped to improve canal operations. They 
established that the overall performance of irrigation systems would depend on the 
sensitivity of the irrigation structures, and that sensitivity indicators change with the type 
of water flow. Moreover, they also proved that submerged flow conditions reduced the 
sensitivity of irrigation structures. Among the various methods in determining the 
sensitivity indicator of irrigation structures, they recommended that full supply depth 
should be attained in the parent canal with maximum discharge in the dependent canals 
through the offtake points. 
According to Renault et al. (2007), a steady state of flow conditions along the canals 
should be the management goal but such condition could be seldom achieved in open 
channel flows because change in water level or discharge is a main feature of irrigation 
canals. In this regard, FAO recommended that sensitivity analysis should be undertaken to 
observe the behavior and response of irrigation structures under the varying discharge and 
water levels.  
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Renault (2000) described that in most irrigation structures, adjustment of the open surface 
irrigation system to attain the goals of canal networks may not be necessary. Since the 
irrigation structures and reaches are interacting with each other, operations of the irrigation 
structures generate perturbations in these reaches. The findings of Renault (2000) also 
suggested that any small change in inputs could generate a large variation in outputs 
especially for those structures which are highly sensitive. Sensitivity analysis is therefore 
important to reduce the costs of operation. Furthermore, the irrigated areas which are more 
vulnerable to the changes would require more consistent irrigation water supplies and 
services than the lesser reaches which are capable of reconciling with the high variations of 
perturbations. 
Moreover, Renault (2000) also developed a mathematical relationship between the internal 
performance at system level with the sensitivity of offtake points and water depth control. 
Applying the model to irrigation systems in Sir Lanka and Pakistan, he proved that this 
was useful in defining the required operational efforts to meet the desired services. Using 
the established relationship, he was also able to set the tolerance limit of water depth that 
would enable an irrigation system to provide improved discharge by at least 10% variation 
from the indicated services. Visser et al. (1998) found inequitable and non-proportional 
behaviour of most of the outlet structures which transfer changes in inflows at the head of 
the distributary towards tail, which was different from the equitable and proportional 
design performance of the distributaries in the irrigation system of Punjab, Pakistan. 
 
Renault and Hemakumara (1999) maintained that the main aim of any irrigation system is 
to hold, transfer, regulate, and give or share water between the different irrigation areas. 
Regulation of water along the gravity canal is usually done by the cross regulators while 
distribution is done by the offtake structures. In order to run the irrigation systems, some 
kinds of manual or non-manual operations are required. In this regard, they developed a 
mathematical framework for the operation of the offtake structures by considering with 
their levels of sensitivity. The inaccurate information especially on the specifications of the 
settings of the structures had been among the main reasons for the low performance in 
canal operations, creating considerable impacts on the adjustments made in the irrigation 
structures and conveyance sensitivity. They also established that results of sensitivity 
analysis could describe two things, namely: (1) how the propensity of the system changes 
with perturbations, and (2) how an easy operational procedure could be developed. 
 
Renault (1999) reported that the ability to use new technologies (i.e. new hardware and 
software solutions) in the management of irrigation systems in developing countries had 
been rather very low. Although inaccurate operation directly affects water distribution and 
productivity, very little attention is given to canal operations due to certain difficulties. He 
therefore emphasized on the need to carry out sensitivity analysis of the irrigation systems 
in order to examine how the systems react when operated under the influence of various 
external factors. He also established that sensitivity analysis could help in identifying 
portions of the canal that require more care during the operations than any other parts. 
Nonetheless, he cited that the unavailability of updated information to assess the status of 
an irrigation system is a common flaw in most irrigation management.  
 
In order to improve the operational performance of irrigation structures, Renault (2000) 
divided the reaches into three categories that require high, medium and less frequent 
adjustments of the offtake points and cross regulators and still could provide the desired 
services in the concerned areas. He also conceptualized performance as a function of 
operations using the following relationship: 
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Kouchakzadeh and Montazar (2005) also used sensitivity analysis to estimate the reach 
time response to perturbations in Vadodara Canal of the Narmada irrigation project in 
India. Recognizing that the main purpose of any canal operation is to maintain the 
specified conditions in the canal and attain better distribution of water, they suggested that 
improvement in irrigation efficiency could be the main challenge for irrigation managers. 
Moreover, they also established that irrigation efficiency can be enhanced by improving 
canal operations which depend on accurate information, proper management and accurate 
setting of the irrigation structures. 
Cost of operation 
Sagardoy (1986) described that the main reason for the poor performance of irrigation 
systems could be the insufficiency of the resources for operations and maintenance. He 
also cited that inadequate services are the results of unavailability of sufficient financial 
resources but imposing higher irrigation service rates could not guarantee that repair, 
maintenance and operational activities would be improved. In this regard and before 
increasing water fees, he suggested that O&M costs should be reduced first, where the 
O&M cost must be equal or less than the water charges to be imposed. He assessed this 
concept using four irrigation agencies in Jamaica and arrived at the conclusion that in all 
cases, water charges had been considerably less than the O&M costs. Among the major 
components of O&M costs, personnel salary was found in one case while in other three 
cases, energy use was extremely high. He also conducted studies analyzing the costs of 
four irrigation schemes in the USA and found that in two schemes, personnel cost and in 
the other two schemes miscellaneous expenditures were the major components of the 
schemes’ annual expenditures. 
 
Renault et al. (2007) reported that irrigation managers usually mobilize different resources 
in order to provide the desired services to the water users, i.e. staff, transportation, energy, 
and so on, and all these services incur certain costs. As one of the fundamental elements of 
the modernization process, conducting a cost analysis can provide a clear picture of the 
cost effectiveness of current irrigation operations. The main objectives of conducting cost 
analysis could include the need to: (1) specify the service levels against the different costs, 
(2) set up appropriate water prices so that the costs for providing the services could be fully 
recovered, and (3) improve the performance through automation in order to promote better 
utilization of the resources in a cost effective manner. Furthermore, an analysis of the 
irrigation management budget could also provide good picture about the costs related to 
management and operational activities. For instance, personnel salaries and wages are the 
most important components of management budget, and in the case of Canal St. Julien in 
France, these components accounted for about 60% of its budget. The second major 
component of the Canal’s budget was related to canal maintenance contracts which 
accounted for 18% of the total budget. Nevertheless, about EUR 250 per hectare per year 
had been collected from the users the Canal’s water services in 2006.  
 
Cornish et al. (2004) reiterated that the main objectives of collecting irrigation water fees 
are to: (1) fully recover the costs of irrigation services without considering any forms of 
subsidies, (2) provide sufficient funds for the maintenance of physical infrastructures, (3) 
render better services to water users, (4) lessen excess demand, and (5) improve equity. 
They also mentioned that the rates of water fees computed based on area holdings are most 
commonly practiced in many parts of the globe. Such practice had also been considered as 
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the easiest method of imposing charges for services for which most administration in 
developing countries could easily implement compared with the volume-based charges. 
Nevertheless, after assessing the water charges in different parts of the globe, Cornish et al. 
(2004) noted that in Pakistan, India and Nepal, irrigation water fees could be less than 10 
US$ per hectare. Specifically in Pakistan, the cost of operation and maintenance of 
irrigation system is about 10 US$ per hectare while water fees ranged from 2 to 8 US$ per 
hectare, implying that water fees could be much lower than the O&M costs. Therefore, the 
main objective of charging water fees which is to recover the costs of relevant O&M 
activities is usually not fulfilled. This is one issue that was also reviewed in this study. 
Moreover, out of the eight previous case studies, it was only in three that such objective 
has been fulfilled, and only in one case that capital cost was recovered. This implies that 
the benefits gained by the farmers from irrigation are generally very high compared to the 
corresponding delivery costs. Nonetheless, the unwillingness attitude of farmers to pay for 
water services charges which still prevails at present comprises the major constraint in 
recovering the O&M expenditures. 
2.6 Performance assessment of irrigation farms 
Crop production and efficient water use are the major goals in developing the most 
appropriate design and management of irrigation systems. Increasing the productivity of 
water is particularly important in areas where water is a scarce resource. Physical scarcity 
is common in an increasing number of either dry or intensively developed basins even if 
additional water could be made available in a river basin that could be developed for 
further use (IWMI, 2000). Since it is likely that water will be increasingly less available for 
agriculture to sustain production, efforts to increase water productivity are deemed 
necessary. Malano and Van Hofwegen (2006) argued that in irrigated agriculture “the 
management of an irrigation system should aim for the delivery of water to agriculture 
lands at such times and such quantities that will enable the irrigator to produce the largest 
and best crops”. In a study conducted by Hayat (2007), lower crop productivity has been 
reported in Pakistan than in neighboring country India, as shown in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.4. Country-wise crop productivity in 2003-2004 
Crop Pakistan Punjab (Ton/ha)           Indian Punjab (Ton/ha) 
 Rice 1.70 3.69 
Wheat  2.49 4.20 
Maize 1.78 2.98 
Cotton 3.22 Bales/Hectare 3.26 Bales/Hectare 
Source: Hayat, 2007 
 
Water productivity which means “production per unit of irrigation water delivered” 
depends on several factors that include water management practices, agronomic practices, 
crop genetic materials, and economic and policy incentives to produce the desired crops. 
When water is distributed in an irrigation system, important processes are involved that 
include allocation, distribution, conflict resolution, and water drainage system. An explicit 
goal of water management should therefore be to increase productivity of the available 
supply of water. In this regard, quantification of water productivity in relation with the 
impacts of institutional reforms would be an important concern which should be addressed 
in order to improve the economic outputs of irrigation systems. 
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The irrigated agricultural area of Pakistan is mainly limited to the Indus plains where 
efficiency in water use is low especially within the command area of the irrigation system 
due to losses from seepage in the canal systems. Specifically, losses from seepage in the 
upstream area of the system could have severe consequences to the farmers located at the 
tail end of the irrigation system resulting in the overall inefficient delivery of surface water 
supply (Qureshi et al. 2008). 
 
Water productivity can be expressed as physical productivity or in economic terms as 
partial factor productivity, where physical productivity is defined as “the quantity of 
product divided by the quantity of input used”. Physical productivity is expressed in terms 
of mass (kg) or sometimes in monetary terms ($) especially in comparing the productivity 
of different crops (Molden et al. 1998). Moreover, the economic productivity of water uses 
can be determined using valuation techniques to derive the value of water used, and can be 
expressed as “income derived from water use or benefits derived from water resource”. 
 
According to Molden et al. (2003), improved water management should be concerned with 
water productivity which should also aim to provide improved timing of water supplies in 
order to reduce stress particularly at the critical crop-growth stages and subsequently 
increase yields. Since better water management could help in improving the reliability of 
water supplies, this would eventually encourage the farmers to invest more in terms of 
good farm practices and agricultural inputs, which would ultimately lead to high 
productivity per unit of water consumed. In another study conducted by Molden et al. 
(1998), they illustrated that water productivity is a measure of the system’s performance 
and can be calculated as the “ratio of agricultural benefit (output) to water use (input)”.   
Water Use
Benefit alAgricultur
     WP   
While economic productivity of water can be calculated using the equation given below 
however, in this study local market prices were used to calculate the costs of farm inputs 
and the corresponding farm incomes.  
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In a study conducted by Molden (1997) which accounted for water use and its productivity 
in an irrigation system, the following mathematical expression was used: 
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Where,  
Production is the output of the irrigated area in terms of gross or net value of production 
measured at local or world prices 
Irrigated cropped area is the sum of the areas under crops during the time or period of the 
analysis 
Command area is the area designed to be irrigated 
Diverted irrigation supply is the volume of surface irrigation water diverted to the 
command area, plus the net removals from groundwater, and  
Volume of water consumed by ET is the actual rate of evapotranspiration of crops 
 
Molden et al. (1998) stated that the performance of irrigated agriculture could be assessed 
for various purposes, i.e. to determine the general conditions of the irrigation systems, to 
improve the systems’ operations, to diagnose the constraints and problems, to assess the 
progress against the strategic goal, to better understand the determinants of performance, 
and to compare the performance with other systems or with the same system over time. 
Eighteen systems were selected from 11 countries, i.e. Burkina Faso, Colombia, Egypt, 
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, where the 
researchers assessed the relative performance of the different systems using external and 
comparative performance indicators and compared the irrigation performance across the 
various irrigation systems. In their study, the indicators used were related to the output of 
irrigated agriculture and to the inputs such as water, land and finance. In order to compare 
the performance of the irrigation systems, nine indicators were selected, which were easily 
available as well as those that need less amounts of data. During the estimation of the 
indicators, the researchers found two main types of uncertainties, i.e. uncertainties in the 
source of data and uncertainties in the estimates. Furthermore, the indicators used were 
related to the outputs and gave limited information about the internal processes. 
Nonetheless, the results of the study showed large difference in the levels of performance 
of the different systems where the least performing system was found in Pakistan while the 
most efficient system was in Mexico. 
 
Renault et al. (2007) also used same indicators to assess the water productivity in 
economic terms but adopted a different expression of the agricultural productivity and 
irrigation supplies. Nabi (2009) applied MASSCOTE approach to assess the irrigation 
performance of BC Irrigation Scheme in Pakistan. His findings are given in Table 2.5.   
Table 2.5. Agricultural outputs in Burala canal irrigation scheme in Pakistan 
Agricultural productivity and economic indicators Outputs 
Output per unit command area (US$/ha) 1,285 
Output per unit irrigated area, including multiple cropping (US$/ha) 807 
Output per unit irrigation supply (US$/m
3
) 0.28 
Output per unit water supply (US$/m
3
) 0.16 
Output per unit of field ET (US$/m
3
) 0.11 
Source: Nabi, 2009 
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Recently, Uçar (2011) assessed such comparative indicators for the performance of 10 
irrigation schemes in Turkey from 2004 to 2008. He reported that the highest output per 
unit command area in Boğazova irrigation scheme was at US$38,724 per ha and 
US$34,907 per ha in 2007 and 2008, respectively. The main findings of Uçar (2011) are 
shown in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6. Output of irrigation performance indicators in Turkey 
Indicator Minimum value (US$/ha) Maximum value (US$/ha) 
Output per unit command area 397 38,724 
Output per unit irrigated area 4,289 41,060 
Output per unit water supply (m
3
) 0.22 4.62 
Output per unit water consumed (m
3
) 0.97 8.28 
Water supply ratio 0.60 7.32 
Irrigation ratio 7 100 
Source: Uçar, 2011 
 
The indicators of the abovementioned agricultural productivity have also been considered 
as part of the MASSCOTE methodology in this study in order to assess the performance of 
external indicators which usually indicate the farm level outputs (a primarily objective of 
an irrigation scheme) as per unit of irrigation application from per unit of cultivated area in 
a given irrigation scheme. 
Typology of farms 
 
In the midst of the diverse nature of farming systems, landholdings, and production factors, 
it would be a challenging feat to develop sustainable economic strategies for adaptation of 
new technologies and institutional services particularly in Punjab Province, Pakistan. A 
farm typology
4
 approach had been used to classify the groups of farms in the study area 
which have similar characteristics such as socio-economics, among others. Typology 
constitutes an essential step in any realistic evaluation of the constraints and opportunities 
that exist within farm households. Typological studies can therefore be of great importance 
for exploring the factors that explain the main characteristics of each type of farms.  
 
Bidogeza et al. (2007) used the farm typology approach to classify the farm households in 
Rwanda, where farm households were typified by taking into consideration the factors that 
explain the adoption of new technologies. For this purpose, multivariate statistical 
techniques such as the principle component analysis (PCA) in combination with cluster 
analysis were used. Since multivariate statistical techniques offer the means of creating 
such typologies, particularly when an in-depth database is available, therefore PCA and 
cluster analysis had been correspondingly applied by Köbrich et al. (2003), Usai et al. 
(2006), and Bidogeza et al. (2007) before identifying the farm household types.  
 
In contrast, this study developed the farm typology manually as the multivariate statistical 
tools were unable to configure the well-defined and clear types of farms. In developing the 
said typology for this study, the criteria for the baseline characteristics were designed for 
                                                 
4
 Farm typology can be defined as “the classification of agricultural farms into number of groups based on 
similar characteristics”.  
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each farm type, which was actually a very challenging task. Nevertheless, farm typology 
was finally developed for this study although it was based only on landholding size owned 
by the farmers.     
Assessment of the techno-economic efficiency of irrigated farms 
The concept of relative technical efficiency
5
 based on a number of inputs and outputs was 
first introduced by Farell (1957). The basic stand point of efficiency as applied in DEA is 
to individually compare a set of Decision Making Units (DMUs)
6
. The Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) approach defines an empirical production function from a sample of 
similar cropping systems in DMUs. This function is actually the efficiency frontier that 
defines the full but relatively technical efficiency. The extended definition of efficiency
7
 
was given by Pareto-Koopmans in the handbook on DEA by (Cooper et al., 2004), where 
the difference in the distance to the frontier provides a score for each farm from 0 (for 
worst performance) to 1 (for best practice performance). DEA simultaneously constructs 
efficiency frontier and calculates the distance to that frontier for each individual 
observation. The frontier is a piecewise linear equation which is formed by enveloping the 
data points of the observed ‘best practice’ activities in the most efficient firms. DEA 
produces efficiency scores for individual farms as well as generates information about the 
benchmark farms for each individual production unit in the sample, the result of which 
provides the normative guidance for management (De Koeijer et al. 2002).  
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been used increasingly in recent times by both 
researchers and management practitioners in determining the relative efficiencies of 
cropping systems. DEA is a non-parametric analytic tool (Sarrico and Dyson, 2004; 
Asmild et al. 2007; Amado and Dyson, 2008; Chen and van Dalen, 2010; Khalili et al. 
2010; Ntantos and Karpouzos, 2010) which is commonly applied in the research and user 
communities to determine the relative efficiencies of the Decision Making Units (DMUs). 
This method has long been widely applied to evaluate the productivity and performance in 
industry as well as in marketing and services sectors. Moreover, this method has been 
applied to evaluate the productivity and performance of products and services (Doyle and 
Green, 1991), regulations (Piot-Lepetit et al. 2001), and strategic decision making 
(Demirbag et al., 2010). DEA-based research is much more recent in the agricultural 
sectors where researches on agricultural and environmental efficiency for sustainable 
development were pioneered by Callens and Tyteca (1999); De Koeijer, Wossink et al. 
(2002). However, very recent research studies were conducted applying DEA for wheat 
farming efficiency (Hadi Vencheh and Matin 2011) and irrigation systems performance 
assessment in Greece (Ntantos and Karpouzos, 2010). 
 
Two types of orientation for inputs and outputs data can be used in the DEA method. The 
input-oriented model aims to produce the same output while minimizing the inputs 
whereas the output-oriented model aims to maximize outputs using the minimum amount 
of inputs (Ntantos and Karpouzos, 2010). DEA input-oriented model was selected in this 
                                                 
5
 Technical efficiency means the ability of a firm (or agricultural farm) to produce a given level of output 
with minimum quantity of inputs and with the available technology or getting the maximum production from 
the available resources. 
6
 Any entity that mobilizes a set of inputs in order to produce a set of outputs could be designated as a 
Decision Making Unit (DMU), thus, any set of such entities could be subjected to DEA. Irrigation cropping 
systems are typical DMUs. 
7
 Full (100%) efficiency is attained by any DMU (cropping system) if and only if none of its inputs or 
outputs can be improved without worsening some of its inputs or outputs. 
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research study since production costs proved to be the key factor of farm differentiation (as 
shown in the results of the PCA). A BCC model that considers variable return to scale 
(VRS) was also used in this study since it provides more possible solutions for efficiency 
(Banker et al. 1984). Furthermore, each individual farm has been treated as a DMU to 
process the relative technical efficiency. 
 
Return to scale is another classification of the DEA models such as the CCR and BCC. The 
CCR model (Charnes et al. 1978) assumes a constant return to scale (CRS) and as a result 
all DMUs operate on an optimal linear scale but its frontier considers only one DMU as 
efficient. Meanwhile, the BCC model (Banker et al., 1984) considers the variable return to 
scale (VRS) with more possible solutions for efficient DMUs. In performing the relative 
technical efficiency analysis, DEA compares a set of decision-making units (DMUs). Since 
irrigation cropping systems are typical DMUs, each farm can be treated as a DMU. 
Furthermore, the DEA input-oriented model focuses on minimizing the inputs (Ntantos and 
Karpouzos, 2010) since production costs proved to be a key factor for farm differentiation.  
Assessment of irrigation water requirement 
Water demand management is being prioritized in the evaluation of the performance of 
irrigation systems (Lecina et al. 2011). Projection of water demand both at farm and at 
whole command level is important to assess the irrigation system performance in terms of 
water balance. Doria and Madramootoo (2009) used the CROPWAT model was used to 
estimate the irrigation water requirement in three different local climatic scenarios (dry, 
normal and wet) in Canada. For the same purpose, Kazbekov et al. (2009) also employed 
the CROPWAT model to calculate the IWR for the evaluation of the planning and delivery 
performance of WUAs in Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, Stancalie et al. (2010) explained the 
methodology used in CROPWAT model for assessing crop water requirement, crop 
evapotranspiration and irrigation requirement with the help of earth observation data. 
However, the input and output indictors in the CROPWAT model depend on the research 
needs, and for this study the only output indicator is irrigation water requirement in order 
to compare with the supplies from canal and groundwater in arid to semi-arid areas.  
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Chapter 3  
Research Methodology 
This chapter on Research Methodology provides the reader with an overview of the 
methods used to conduct this research study. Thus, this chapter includes description of the 
study area, reasons behind its selection, sample size, data collection methods, and the data 
analysis techniques used for the analysis of the data. 
3.1 Selection of the study area 
This section explains the choices made about the case studies to be investigated. Two 
irrigation schemes were selected, each under different governance system as per the 
requirement of the study. The Upper Pakpattan Canal (UPC) Irrigation Scheme was 
selected to represent the non-transferred irrigation schemes (IMT is not yet implemented) 
and thus is dubbed as Government-Managed Irrigation Scheme (GMIS). Meanwhile, the 
Burala Canal (BC) Irrigation Scheme was selected to represent the transferred irrigation 
schemes (IMT has been implemented) and is called the Farmers-Managed Irrigation 
Scheme (FMIS). The PIDA Act of 1997 was an initial step that initiated institutional 
changes in irrigation systems in Pakistan. The main criterion used to select the two 
different irrigation schemes was based on two conditions, firstly the institutional reform 
that has taken place and secondly the bio-physical and climatic conditions surrounding the 
systems.  
 
At the start, institutional reform was implemented in the Faisalabad irrigation zone only, 
out of the six main irrigation zones (administrative structures) in the irrigation system of 
Punjab. The institutional changes were adopted under a pilot project funded by the 
Government of Japan under a Mega Project of the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) and the World Bank. As a result, the irrigation system of Faisalabad zone was 
transferred to the farmer-users for them to operate and manage the irrigation water through 
their own capacities. For this reason, the “BC Irrigation Scheme” was selected as a study 
area from the Faisalabad zone, where irrigation management transfer (IMT) has been 
implemented. In this case, the irrigation system is managed and operated by farmers 
through different institutional structures like the Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) and Water 
Users Associations (WUAs).  
 
The BC Irrigation Scheme forms part of the Lower Chenab Canal (LCC East) circle in the 
Faisalabad Zone. It is situated about 40 km from Faisalabad City and takes its discharge 
from the Upper Gogera canal. Having been constructed in 1898 during Britain’s colonial 
rule in the Subcontinent, therefore it has a very long history of development. The total 
discharge of Burala Canal is 66 m
3
.s
-1
 while the gross command area of the Burala Canal is 
244,583 hectares, and the total length of the irrigation system is 156 kilometers. Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT) was implemented in Burala Irrigation Scheme in 2003-2004, 
while the rehabilitation and modernization projects on this canal were funding by external 
donors such as JICA and the World Bank. Under this project, FOs and WUAs were 
established after which the managerial and operational responsibilities were transferred to 
the farmer-users.  
 
Meanwhile, the Upper Pakpattan Canal Irrigation Scheme was selected from the 
neighboring Multan irrigation zone (where IMT was not yet implemented). The bio-
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physical and climatic conditions of the Upper Pakpattan Canal Irrigation Scheme are 
relatively different to those of the Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme. The Upper Pakpattan 
Irrigation Scheme is a Government-Managed Irrigation Scheme (GMIS) which takes 
discharge from the Sulemanki Headworks at Sutlej River near the Indian Border (eastern 
Punjab). It is also one and half century old irrigation system which was constructed during 
the British regime in the Subcontinent. The total discharge or flow rate capacity of the 
Pakpattan Canal is 186 m
3
.s
-1
 (including the discharges of seasonal canals), while the gross 
command area is 289,181 hectares and with total length of 174 kilometers. GMIS is 
operated under the Colonial Law and Irrigation Act of 1873. Both irrigation schemes are 
part of the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) and located within Punjab Province in 
Pakistan, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
  
 
Source: Author 
Figure 3.1. Location map of study areas 
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3.2 Conceptual framework 
In order to conceptualize the study, a framework (Figure 3.2) was drawn to reflect the 
philosophy of the research study. The conceptual framework reflects the four objectives of 
the research. As mentioned in the background of this study, the performance of the 
irrigation system was very low under the government’s management and the system was 
confronted with a series of operational, managerial, technical, economic, and governance 
related issues. Under such circumstances, institutional reforms were implemented in 1997 
where two pathways were considered, i.e. one with institutional reforms (FMIS) and the 
other without institutional reforms (GMIS). After the implementation of PIDA Act 1997 
(IMT), the governance structure has been changed taking into consideration some basic 
features such as laws, institutions, management, participation, and conflict resolution 
mechanism. Thus, Objective 1 relates to the description of the governance situations and 
institutional environments in both irrigation schemes under different governance systems. 
Objective 2 focuses on the performances of both irrigation systems in terms of water 
supply functions at scheme-level, while Objective 3 emphasizes on the farm-level 
production performances. Objective 4 reveals and concludes the results of the analyses and 
further focuses on the recommendations of the research. Figure 3.3 interlinks the functions 
of an irrigation system and performances to be analyzed in the research study. 
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Collective action at water supply level accounts for maintenance and repair of canals, and 
decisions for better operation of water supply system. Enabling institutional environment 
effects simultaneously on canal level water supply system and on farm level crop 
production system. Institutional environment accounts for laws, rules and regulations under 
which FOs and WUAs perform their prescribed functions for canal operation through 
accountable, responsive, and equitable delivery services. However, institutional 
environment at crop production level accounts for extension services, marketing services 
for farm inputs and outputs, access to groundwater, and financial services. Timely service 
refers to water delivery services in terms of reliability (availability of water at the time 
when it is demanded to irrigate crops). Access to groundwater and its usage for irrigation 
purposes provides a true picture of timely water in Pakistan where canal supplies are 
mostly unreliable. Contribution refers to money and in-kind services to improve water 
supply system which are directly depend on crop production system. It explains that 
farmers will contribute more if they will get better water delivery services to irrigate their 
crops which will ultimately improve farming income.  
3.3 Overall research design 
This research is an analytical evaluation type and thus, the research design is based on 
primary and secondary, as well as qualitative and quantitative data. The research design 
(Table, 3.1) relies on the two case studies from IBIS, one of which is the Burala Canal 
(BC) Irrigation Scheme (known as FMIS) and the other is the Upper Pakpattan Canal 
(UPC) Irrigation Scheme (known as GMIS).  
Table 3.1. Research design of the study 
Objective 
Sub. objective 
activities 
Methodologies used 
Data needed and 
sources 
1) To describe the 
institutional settings at play in 
the two contrasted governance 
systems of the selected case 
study schemes, and more 
generally, the ongoing 
irrigation management 
reforms in Pakistan. 
Organizational 
structure of irrigation 
system, 
Institutions,  
Legal frameworks, 
Governance situation 
Analysis of policy documents 
Key informant interviews 
Descriptive statistic 
Secondary data 
(see table 3.4), 
Primary data 
2) To assess and analyze the 
performances of the selected 
irrigation schemes in terms of 
water supply system and 
delivery service. 
Sensitivity of 
hydraulic structures, 
Water delivery 
services, 
Irrigation operation 
Water balance 
RAP sheet 
Observations 
MASSCOTE approach 
Primary data, 
Secondary data 
(see table 3.5) 
3) To assess and analyze the 
performances and efficiency 
of irrigation farms in the 
selected irrigation schemes. 
Farm differentiation, 
Farm efficiency, 
Crop water 
requirement 
Farm Typology, 
Principle component analysis, 
Descriptive statistic 
(frequency, percentage, 
average), 
Parametric statistic (t-test), 
Data Envelopment Analysis, 
CROPWAT 
Primary data, 
Secondary data 
4) To develop 
recommendations regarding 
management of both types of 
systems and regarding future 
transfer programs. 
Conclusion, 
Implications, 
Recommendations 
Key findings from objective 1, 
2 and 3  
Key informant interviews 
Group discussions 
 
Primary data 
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3.4 Sample design for questionnaire survey 
In order to achieve Objective 3, the number of farms to be studied was established. The 
respondents were selected randomly from the command areas of both irrigation schemes 
based on the list provided by the agricultural support services. A systemic random 
sampling technique was adopted in both study areas mainly because the study area is large 
and deficient in terms of resources. The following formula given by Arkin and Colten 
(1963) was therefore used to calculate the sample size in both irrigation schemes. 
 
 
 
n=sample size 
N=total number of households 
Z= confidence level (at 95% level Z = 1.96) 
P= estimated population proportion (0.85) 
d= error limit of 5% (0.05) 
 
A set of 126 households in FMIS and another set of 82 households from GMIS were 
surveyed. A questionnaire survey was conducted at household level (January to April 
2010) to collect the detailed quantitative information on technical and socio-economic 
features, including demography, livelihood system, farming system, and performances. 
However, the information collected were mainly based on farmers’ recollection and 
records of seasons’ events, and farming performances of the previous three years (2008-
2010).  
3.5 Data collection methods 
The research is based on primary survey using questionnaire to collect a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data, while secondary data were collected from various 
concerned offices. 
Primary data collection 
 
The primary data for this research study was collected through the use of different 
techniques such as household surveys, interview of key informants, observations, farmers’ 
groups discussions, and some discussions with the officials from both irrigation systems 
during the field survey. The specific primary data collected with the corresponding 
approaches adopted are shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2. Primary data collection methods 
Data collection approach Information seeking 
Household interviews 
(questionnaire) 
Socio-economic and technical information at irrigation system and 
farm level 
Key informant interviews Legal, policy, institutional environment. See also Table 3.3 
Observations Apparent canal conditions, irrigation methods, cropping systems, 
O&M of water channels, conditions of outlets, among others etc. 
Group discussions Role and performance of WUAs and FOs, resource mobilization 
and underground water issues at farms, market related concerns, 
and opportunities and suggestions for improvements 
RAP survey Canal operation, performance indicators, water quality. 
 
i. Household questionnaire survey  
 
Most socio-economic data were collected from households through a questionnaire survey. 
The questionnaire was used to interview the farmers. The sets of questions were mostly 
related to crop yields, costs of major inputs, farm resources, cropping calendar, 
governance-related questions and problems of farmers, institutional problems, farmers’ 
participation, and benefits of the new system. The sample Questionnaire is shown in the 
Appendix-A.  
 
ii. Key informant interviews 
 
Interviews of key informants are usually carried out to draw information from politicians, 
lawyers, government department officials, NGO officials, and village heads. For this 
research, scheduled and semi-structured interviews were conducted for key informants in 
the study area. Specifically, old farmers with knowledge of the old and new systems, 
members of WUAs or FOs were chosen as key informants and they were asked to give 
their views regarding efficiency issue, local farmers’ participation, problems and benefits 
of the new system, and the changing trends in selected irrigation systems. A total of 36 key 
informants were interviewed as shown in Table 3.3. The Checklist of questions for the 
interviews is shown in Appendix-B. 
Table 3.3. Key informants’ interviews 
Interviewees Description Number Nature of information 
Government and 
NGO officials 
PIDA officials (2) 
AWB officials (1) 
FO president (2) 
WUA chairmen (4) 
IWMI officials (1) 
PIPD officials (4) 
14 Policy interpretation 
Problems 
Suggestions 
 
Politicians Local MNAs (1+1) 
Locals MPAs (2+2) 
6 Policy interpretation, future 
planning, and party response 
Lawyers Local Bar Councils (1+1) 
District Bar councils (1+1) 
4 Legal rights 
Conflicts cases, Suggestions 
Village heads Lumberdaar (4+4) 8 Problems and suggestions 
Intellectuals Academicians (2+2) 4 Policy interpretation and suggestions 
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iii. Observation 
 
Direct field observations would provide an overview of the existing situation of the canals, 
head, tails, and any discrepancy in the system. During the series of visits in both case study 
schemes, observations were also made on the farm situations, cropping systems, irrigation 
methods applied by farmers, and physical condition of the canal infrastructure and 
supplies. Photographs were taken especially with regards to the issue of O&M of the 
canals and water theft through mogha (outlet) damaging and farm activities (Appendix–F). 
Observations also helped to compare the results obtained after a series of data analyses in 
this study. 
 
iv. Farmers’ group discussion 
 
Focal group discussions were carried out with groups of farmers at the canal, where the 
discussions mainly focused on their opinions about the performances of WUAs and FOs, 
corruption in the system, problems faced and their participation in the system. Problems of 
farmers with respect to resource mobilization at their farms, underground water, cost of 
farm inputs, and product market related issues were also taken into consideration during 
group discussions. Open-ended questions were discussed with the groups of farmers which 
highlighted only on the main concerns, while some opportunities and suggestions to solve 
their problems were also raised. All points discussed were recorded and incorporated in the 
research study. 
 
v. Rapid Appraisal Process (RAP) 
 
RAP sheet is a data collection tool and a part of MASSCOTE approach and is designed by 
FAO. In fact, RAP sheet is a template which constitutes further 13 sheets. A major part of 
RAP sheet required primary information through observation of hydraulic conditions and 
infrastructures of canals, offtakes etc. However, a bulk of secondary data was also required 
to enter in the RAP sheet such as water flow, daily discharges, technical information of 
canal design, underground water pumping etc. 
Secondary data collection 
 
The research made use of information from previous scholarly works by reviewing the 
literatures in journal articles and web sources especially on the performance of the 
irrigation system and its measuring indicators. Furthermore, secondary data were also 
collected from different organizations working in the area of irrigation. Moreover, farmers’ 
data, technical data about canal irrigation system, and policy documents and procedures 
were collected from different sources. Details of the main sets of data gathered are shown 
in Table 3.4 which also indicates the corresponding sources. 
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Table 3.4. Specific sources of secondary data with data information 
Source Information 
Provincial Irrigation and Drainage 
Authority, Punjab (PIDA) 
Maps, technical information, performance data of 
FOs. 
Program Monitoring & Implementation Unit 
(PMIU) 
Water flows, technical information 
Irrigation & Power Department, Punjab 
(IPD) 
Budget, expenditures, salaries, vacancy status, 
maps 
Area Water Board (AWB), LCC, East Budget, expenditures, salaries, vacancy status, 
maps 
Department of Agriculture  Extension services, farm machinery status, tube 
wells statistics. 
Department of Revenue ISF assessment and recovery situation 
Meteorological Department Climatic data 
International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI) 
Maps, reports on IMT in Pakistan 
Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA) 
National water policy 
3.6 Data processing and analysis: general statistics 
All the data from the questionnaires and other sources were compiled and then analyzed 
using Microsoft Excel, Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software, and Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) software.  
Quantitative data analysis 
 
i. Descriptive statistics 
 
Different types of descriptive statistical methods were used, e.g. percentage, frequency, 
average, mean, median, cross tabulation, diagrams, and bar charts.  
 
ii. Analytical statistics 
 
Considering the diversity in farm performances and the multiple factors that explain them, 
the Principle Component Analysis (PCA) was used to identify the variables that are most 
involved in the differentiation between farms through much smaller number of variables or 
dimensions called factors (Haan, 2002). PCA contributes to achieving a linear combination 
of representative variables that represent a maximum variance for a multidimensional 
phenomenon which are also uncorrelated. The initial number of variables is reduced in a 
smaller number of principle factors that explain most of the variance. Thus, PCA makes it 
possible to determine which indicators most explain the variability in farms (Corcoles, 
2010). It also provides a correlation matrix of all input variables which could help in 
understanding the variable relationships within samples. The PCA was carried out using 
the SPSS software. However, prior to conducting the PCA, the data were checked for 
appropriateness through Bartlett’s sphericity (Bidogeza et al. 2008), where all factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1 were ultimately retained based on the Kaiser’s criteria.  
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iii. Parametric statistics 
 
In order to compare the difference of the means between the two sets of data, T-test was 
used to highlight the significant differences among farm types in terms of production 
factors and farm income in both irrigation schemes. Furthermore, 2-tailed Pearson test was 
applied to observe the association of the various farm variables with each other. The 
significance of the pair-wise correlation was checked at P value of 0.01. 
Qualitative data analysis 
 
Qualitative analysis was also employed in this study using qualitative statements as these 
could help in identifying the problems and concerns of the farmers.  
 
The information for the qualitative analysis was collected from the sample households 
during the group discussions, from the responses of the open-ended questions, from the 
friendly and formal discussions, and field observations. Some aspects regarding the socio-
economic conditions in the systems were described taking into consideration the compiled 
qualitative data. For instance, since it was essential to know how the water users participate 
in collective decision, agreements, farmers’ perceptions, users’ level of satisfaction in 
different activities related to their implementation, it was therefore necessary to collect the 
qualitative data. However, field observations also transparently provide some details about 
various phenomena with respect to the research goal. All the relevant factors which were 
closely linked were therefore used to come up with the detailed conclusion.   
3.7 MASSCOTE approach  
MASSCOTE is an approach for carrying out sound and complete diagnosis of canal 
irrigation systems to unravel the complexity in the systems and ultimately to improve 
water management. The MASSCOTE spreadsheet also known as RAP sheet which was 
developed by FAO was used in this study to determine the external and internal 
performance indicators used for the analysis. The advantages of this spreadsheet include its 
being systematic, clear, well planned, and proceeds in a step by step manner. Efforts were 
therefore made to gather information to be fed into the MASSCOTE spreadsheet. These 
included the identification of the problems, their location and nature, and in order to obtain 
information about the general characteristics of the Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme and 
Upper Pakpattan Canal Irrigation Scheme which was done through actual field inspections. 
During the said inspections, information related to the operations of the irrigation systems 
and their physical conditions were evaluated. Moreover, relevant Information for the Rapid 
Appraisal (RAP) spreadsheet was obtained through interviews with the systems managers 
and operators especially with regards to the management aspects. The primary and 
secondary data were also analyzed to determine various indicators and physical features of 
the selected schemes. For the evaluation of water delivery services at different levels of the 
canal, the discharge/water delivered at each level was analyzed. In order to determine the 
internal indicators, i.e. indicators related to cross regulator, turnout, regulating reservoirs, 
communication, general condition and operation at different level of canals, three types of 
information were used, i.e. those collected during field inspections, interviews and 
secondary data. These internal indicators are part of RAP spreadsheet. For the external 
indicators, the World Bank benchmarking indicators were adapted (Appendix-D). 
Financial indicators were evaluated using budget data, number of employed personnel in 
irrigation department and farmers’ organizations, and water fees collection data. For 
further analysis, the budgets of the irrigation department and farmers organizations were 
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broken down into various components. Crop yields, area under particular crops, prices of 
crops and flow data were used for estimating the economic indicators and agricultural 
productivity. Details of the data sets required for the RAP sheet in the MASSCOTE 
approach is shown in Appendix-E. 
 
The RAP systematically diagnoses the constraints and performance of the irrigation system 
and identifies the problem areas in the system. The indicators for the RAP were therefore 
used as benchmark in order to compare the performance of the systems before and after the 
implementation of modernization plans. There are 10 steps in MASSCOTE framework as 
given in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5. MASSCOTE framework 
Phase A Phase B 
Baseline information Vision of SOM & modernization of canal 
operation 
1. Rapid diagnosis 6. Service of users 
2. System capacity and sensitivity 7. Management units 
3. Perturbations 8. Demand for operation 
4. Water networks and water balances 9. Canal operation improvements 
5. Cost of O&M 10. Integration of options 
 
Sensitivity of irrigation structures 
Two types of irrigation structures are present in the Burala Canal, i.e. cross regulators and 
offtake structures. The functions of cross regulators are to maintain constant water level 
along the canal whereas offtake structures provide the desired discharge to sub-command 
areas. Perturbations in the main canal generate variations in water level and discharge on 
the cross regulators and offtake structures, respectively. The level of variations that occur 
on these structures with perturbations was assessed by determining the sensitivity of the 
offtake structures only as the required data was not available for the calculation of the 
sensitivity of cross regulators.  
 
The offtake sensitivity was determined by following expression: 
 
h
q
q
SO


  
 
So = Sensitivity (offtake structure) (m
-1
) 
q = Offtake discharge (m
3
/s) 
h = Change in water level at regulator’s upstream side (m) 
 
Variation in water depth in main canal generates changes in the discharge from the offtakes 
which in turn produces an equal opposite variation in the main canal discharge. Based on 
the proportional distribution of water in IBIS, sensitivity varies as calculated by Visser et 
al. (1998). Therefore, in order to find out the effect in the main canal downstream of such 
particular offtake point, the conveyance sensitivity was determined using the following 
expression: 
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Q
q
SS oconveyance   
 
Scon = Conveyance Sensitivity (m
-1
) 
So = Sensitivity (offtake structure) (m
-1
) 
q = Offtake discharge (m
3
/s) 
Q = Main canal discharge (m
3
/s) 
Perturbation 
 
For the perturbation analysis, discharge and water level data were collected for the year 
2007. Then, the causes of perturbations were identified by analyzing the flow data and 
irrigation structures sensitivity by investigating the physical canal infrastructures. 
Moreover, the average water level (WL) change on a daily basis in the upstream cross 
regulator (major changes not included) was determined by using the standard deviation 
formula. Therefore, the discharge variation at distributaries, + target in % was calculated 
using the following expression. 
 
Discharge variation at distributary, + target (%) = Average WL change x S of distributary 
Service to users 
The status of the water delivery services was determined using the RAP spreadsheet, and 
the equity, flexibility and reliability indicators were calculated at different levels of the 
canal. The number of outlets receiving less or more water was identified using the existing 
and designed discharge data of those outlets. The amount of irrigation water supplied per 
unit area at different levels of canal was calculated by determining the total water supplied 
per year divided by total irrigated command area of that particular or minor distributary. 
Cost of operation  
Financial indicators identified by the World Bank were used as guide to obtain the 
information on the current operational costs. Furthermore, budget data from the irrigation 
department and farmers organizations were compiled, and broken down into budget 
elements in order to find out where improvements are necessary to minimize the repair, 
maintenance and operational costs. Thus, the maintenance and repair expenditures of 
Burala Canal from 2004-09 were collected and drawn against time to look at the trend of 
the maintenance and repair expenditures. Moreover, the performance of water fee 
collection after the formation of farmers organizations in the project area were also 
evaluated using the following expression: 
 
Water charges collection performance = water fees collected / water fees assessed 
 
Therefore, by using the above expression, the collection performance of each farmers’ 
organization in the project area could be calculated for the period from 2004-2009. 
Demand for operation 
 
The objective of this step was to determine the kind of operation necessary for the different 
irrigation structures to enable them to provide water delivery services within + 10% and + 
20% variation from the target values. Since the demand for operation depends on (1) 
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service required, (2) perturbation, and (3) sensitivity of irrigation structures, therefore the 
demand for operation for each structure was calculated using the following expression: 
 
offtakeS
q
q
hTolerance

  
Where 
Δh    = allowable variation in water level upstream side of the structure to  provide 
the desired water delivery service (m)  
Sofftake = Sensitivity (offtake structure) (m
-1
) 
Δq/q  = allowable variation in discharge from the target value in the secondary 
canal in % 
 
Finally, following criteria was used to set the demand for operation for each offtake 
structure.  
 
(1) If Δh < 5 cm then demanding target is high 
(2) If 5 < Δh < 10 cm then demanding target is medium 
(3) If Δh > 10 cm then demanding target is low 
3.8 Farm typology 
Given the fact that farm operations and characteristics vary in terms of strategy, diversity, 
resources, and potential towards farm income, a typology of farms was developed based on 
farm size. This could be justified considering that most agricultural statistics and irrigation 
policy documents of Pakistan have categorized irrigation farming systems into farm land 
size. In addition, farm size is considered a key factor for agricultural performance in Asia 
as cited by Fan and Chan-Kang (2005). The distribution of farms according to size in both 
schemes is shown in Figure 7.1.  
 
Therefore, farms in both irrigation schemes were categorized into three farm types, 
namely: “small farms” when the size is less than 2.5 hectares, “medium farms” for 5 to less 
than 12.5 hectares, and “large farms” when the size is greater than 12.5 hectares. 
3.9 Farming performances 
In order to analyze the technical performance of farms from the point of view of factors’ 
efficiency, a techno-economic efficiency analysis model was used for the investigation 
using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
 
DEA is a non-parametric linear programming approach that defines an empirical 
production function from a sample of similar Decision Making Units (DMUs), where 
cropping systems are considered as typical DMUs. This function is actually the efficiency 
frontier that defines the full but relative technical efficiency. It forms a best-practice 
function, constructed empirically from observed inputs and outputs (Norman and Stoker 
1991). When DEA performs the relative technical efficiency analysis, it compares a set of 
decision-making units (cropping systems). The difference in the distance to the efficiency 
frontier is given a score for each farm from 0 (worst performance) to 1 (best-practice 
performance). The DEA simultaneously constructs an efficiency frontier and calculates the 
distance to such frontier for each individual observation. The frontier is piecewise linear 
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and is formed by enveloping the data points of the observed ‘best practice’ activities for 
most efficient farms, then the DEA produces the efficiency scores for the individual farms.  
 
A DEA input-oriented model focuses on minimizing the inputs (Ntantos and Karpouzos, 
2010). This model was selected in this research study since production costs proved to be a 
key factor for the farm differentiation (as shown by PCA in the Section on Results). A 
BCC model that considers variable return to scale (VRS) was then used, as it provides 
more possible solutions for efficiency (Banker et al. 1984). In this connection, each 
individual farm has been treated as a DMU to be able to process the relative technical 
efficiency. 
 
Return to scale is another classification of the DEA models such as CCR and BCC. The 
CCR model (Charnes et al. 1978) assumes constant return to scale (CRS) and as a result all 
DMUs operate in an optimal linear scale but its frontier considers only one DMU as 
efficient. While in the BCC model (Banker et al. 1984), the variable return to scale (VRS) 
was considered with more possible solutions for efficient DMUs. Major difference in the 
CCR and BCC frontier is given in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
Source: Ntantos and Karpouzos, 2010 
Figure 3.4. Model differences between BCC and CCR 
When the DEA performs relative technical efficiency analysis, it compares a set of 
decision-making units (DMUs). Any entity that mobilizes a set of inputs in order to 
produce a set of outputs could be designated as a decision making unit, thus, any set of 
such entities could be subjected to DEA. Irrigation cropping systems are typical DMUs, so 
that each farm can be treated as a DMU while the DEA input-oriented model could be used 
to minimize the inputs (Ntantos and Karpouzos, 2010) since production costs are key 
factors in farm differentiation. Then, maximization fraction is calculated as the ratio that 
represents the sum of output per sum of inputs. 
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Where, ur is the weight given to output yr, υi the weight given to input xi,  and yrj and xij  
represent the values of the produced outputs and inputs yr and xi by DMUj, respectively. 
 
A BCC model with variable return to scale (VRS) was used in the analysis as it provides 
more possible solutions for efficiency (Banker, Charnes et al. 1984). In case of an input 
oriented BCC approach, the final solution is derived from the dual linear programming 
problem, as follows (in vector form): 
Minimize θ 
Subject to: 
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Where, θ is a scalar that corresponds to the efficiency and consequently the percentage of 
radial reduction to which each of the inputs is subjected; λ ≥ 0 is a vector of n elements, 
representing the influence of each DMU in determining the efficiency of DMU0, Y and X 
are the vectors of outputs and inputs of all DMUs under study, y0 and x0 are the vectors of 
outputs and inputs of DMU0, and N1 a nx1 vector of ones. 
 
The variables used in the DEA model are listed in Table 3.6 where the inputs used include 
selected production, harvest and post-harvest costs (related to land, machinery and 
equipment, biological and chemical inputs, labour), while annual farm income (monetized 
yields) was used as the only output variable. Land rental cost was used only in GMIS as 
land renting is hardly practiced in FMIS. All costs were calculated on a per hectare basis. 
Local market prices were used to monetize the costs and income. Transportation per unit of 
weight or bag, renting farm machinery per activity per hectare, tube well pumping cost per 
hour basis, and wages for labour on daily or fixed basis for particular farm activities (such 
as broadcasting granular fertilizers and application of chemicals by hand sprayers) were 
calculated based on the real expenditures by each farmer. Fertilizers include urea, Di-
Ammonium Phosphate (DAP) and farm yard manure for each crop, and zinc application 
for selected crops like rice and potato. Pesticides include herbicides, fungicides, and 
insecticides. 
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Table 3.6. Variables used in efficiency (DEA) analyses. 
Category Variables  Application domain 
Farming inputs 1. Land preparation cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 2. Land renting cost (PKR/ha) GMIS 
 3. Seed cost (PKR/ha)  FMIS / GMIS 
 4. Fertilizer cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 5. Pesticide cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 6. Tube well irrigation cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 7. Labor cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 8. Harvesting cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 9. Post-harvesting cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
Farming output 10. Annual farm income (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 
In the case of private ownership of equipment, tube well irrigation costs refer to the energy 
(fuel) required for pumping which is estimated considering the number of hours in use, 
while in the case of tube well renting, costs refer to the charges on a per-hour basis. 
Specifically, since sugarcane is replanted only every three years, the costs for seeds are 
spread accordingly. 
3.10 Estimation of irrigation water requirement in canal command 
Irrigation water requirement was estimated using a tool known as CROPWAT which was 
introduced by FAO. Thus, this tool was applied on each crop in both case study irrigation 
schemes to assess the irrigation requirement during the whole crop season. Climatic data 
including ETo, rainfall, effective precipitation were obtained from the climate database of 
FAO in CLIMWAT.  
 
 
where 
ETo reference evapotranspiration [mm day
-1
] 
Rn net radiation at the crop surface [MJ m
-2
 day
-1
] 
G soil heat flux density [MJ m
-2
 day
-1
] 
T mean daily air temperature at 2 m height [°C] 
u2 wind speed at 2 m height [m s
-1
] 
es saturation vapour pressure [kPa] 
ea actual vapour pressure [kPa] 
es - ea saturation vapour pressure deficit [kPa] 
D slope vapour pressure curve [kPa °C
-1
] 
g psychrometric constant [kPa °C
-1
] 
 
Loamy soil texture (medium soil type) common in both irrigation schemes was also 
considered during the analysis of the water demand-supply. The results were configured on 
an annual basis based on crops grown in different seasons at whole scheme-level. 
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Moreover, the monthly requirement of irrigation water was calculated and compared with 
the monthly canal supplies in order to investigate the monthly water demand-supply status.  
3.11 Case study description: historical and current situation 
This research study was carried out in the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) of Pakistan 
which embraces as a major part, the irrigation system of Punjab. IBIS is the most extensive 
irrigation system in the world which had been developed over the last 140 years. The 
schematic network map of the Indus basin irrigation system is shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
 
 
Source: Briscoe and Qamar, 2005 
Figure 3.5. Schematic network map of Indus Basin Irrigation System 
 
It stretches from the Himalayan Mountains in the north of the Pakistan to the alluvial 
plains of Sindh Province in the south passing through Punjab Province. The total estimated 
command area of the Indus basin is 944,574 km
2
. Most of the Indus plains have deep 
alluvial characteristics which could have developed through the continuous deposition by 
the Indus River and its side tributaries (rivers) such as Sutlej, Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum. 
These alluvial plains cover an area of 207,200 km
2
 of the entire Indus plains. The total 
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length of Indus River system is 3,180 kilometers, and thus on the overall, it irrigates 60% 
of the total cultivable agricultural land of 20 million hectares in the arid- to semi-arid 
region. The Indus River system comprises three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) 
and three eastern rivers e.g. Sutlej, Beas and Ravi. The Indus basin irrigation system 
embraces 3 dams, 19 headworks and barrages, and 12 link canals between the rivers. In 
addition, IBIS system includes main canals, branch canals, distributaries, and minors with 
length of 4230, 6835, 25,874 and 19,189 kilometers, respectively. Moreover, at field level, 
the system has 135,000 watercourses.  
 
 
Source: Ahmad, 2009 
Figure 3.6. Indus Basin Irrigation system of Pakistan with Punjab province 
 
Irrigation water is delivered to the field through a network of barrages, main canals, branch 
canals, distributaries, minors, sub minors, and outlets. The irrigation system of Punjab 
consists of about 23,184 miles long canals, which command the Culturable Commanded 
Area (CCA) of about 21 million acres. The 24 canal systems draw their allocated 
discharges from 14 barrages of the Punjab irrigation system. The barrages also control the 
diversion of supplies to the inter-river link canals which transfer the water of the western 
rivers to the eastern rivers to cater for other irrigation systems off taking from these rivers. 
The water from the rivers is diverted to main canals/link canals from barrages and head 
regulators, and distributed to the farmer’s fields through 58,000 outlets after flowing 
through the lengthy irrigation net-work. Figure 3.6 highlights the part of Indus Basin 
irrigation network in the Punjab Province in Pakistan. 
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Water resources in the Indus plains could have also emanated from glacier melting in the 
upper part of the Indus basin and precipitation in the form of rainfall and snow. In spite of 
all this, ground water economy in the Indus basin has been emerged up to a considerable 
extent particularly during and after the Green Revolution period. Even, it is called as Tube 
Well Revolution which has accompanied with serious governance issues not only at farm 
level but at bureaucracy level as well (Shah, 2009). According to Irrigation and Power 
Department (IPD) of Punjab, its irrigation agriculture is 22% deficit of irrigation water 
which is fulfilled by groundwater to meet the total crop water requirements. However, at 
global irrigated agriculture, share of ground water has been increased up to 30-50% of the 
total irrigation water demands. As a result in Punjab, water table is being depleted due to 
excessive pumping of groundwater which is causing serious economic and environmental 
effects. If water table is allowed to drop as such, availability of groundwater for the next 
generation will become difficult. For the sustainability of irrigated agriculture, canal 
supplies are to be increased (Bhutta, et al. (2007). 
 
IBIS is situated in arid to semi-arid region of Pakistan. Irrigated agriculture is the main 
source of commodities to boost the economy in the Indus plains of Pakistan. Thus, the 
potentials for full irrigation would be the main contributor to the sustainable agricultural 
development of the country. The population of Pakistan is gradually increasing at 2.7 
percent annually, and according to the Federal Statistics of Pakistan, the population of the 
country in 2010 was more than 180.8 million, of which labour employed in agriculture 
accounted for 44%.  
3.12 Biophysical profiles of the case studies 
Profile information of two case studies under this research study includes climate, soil and 
topography, land use patterns and agriculture, and cropping calendar. A brief overview of 
each profile is given below. 
Climate 
 
The climate conditions of the study area follow high seasonal fluctuations throughout the 
year, where there are four well-defined seasons: winter, summer, spring and autumn. For 
both case study schemes (FMIS and GMIS), data on climatic parameters such as 
temperature, rainfall, and evapotranspiration were acquired from CLIMWAT, the climate 
database of FAO. This climate database was developed by FAO based on average values 
of thirty years (1971-2000). Meanwhile, the reference evapotranspiration was calculated 
using the Penman-Monteith method.  
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Source: CLIMWAT 
Figure 3.7. Monthly variation in ETo and precipitation in BC Irrigation Scheme 
 
In the Burala Canal (BC) Irrigation Scheme, the total annual rainfall is 348 mm mostly 
occurring during monsoon in May, June and July. The monthly variation in 
evapotranspiration (ETo) and precipitation are shown in Figure 3.8. Evapotranspiration is 
the combined process of evaporation from soil and wet plant surfaces and transpiration 
from plants. Evapotranspiration rate is also very high compared to the rate of precipitation 
due to arid and hot climate in the Indus plains. The monthly precipitation is much less than 
the monthly evapotranspiration as shown in the Figure 3.7. The total annual 
evapotranspiration in the BC Irrigation Scheme is 1,527 mm, and the highest ETo rate 
usually takes place in July and August.   
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Source: CLIMWAT 
Figure 3.8. Monthly variation in ETo and precipitation in UPC Irrigation Scheme 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the ETo and precipitation situation in Upper Pakpattan Canal (UPC) 
Irrigation Scheme. The total annual rainfall in the area is 180 mm which is much less than 
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the total annual ETo of 1,822 mm. ETo rate peaks in June at 76.5 mm which is higher than 
in Burala scheme in the same month. July and August have more rainfall compared to all 
other months during the entire year but the amount of rainfall is lower than that in the 
Burala scheme.   
 
The mean day temperature during winter varies from 15 to 27 degrees Celsius (°C) while 
during winter nights the temperature could decrease to near freezing point. However, 
during dry winter nights, fog usually occurs while occasionally frost also occurs that could 
cause damages in crops. The summer temperature ranges between 34°C and 41°C, where 
the monthly averages in BC Irrigation Scheme are shown in Figure 3.9. The minimum 
summer temperature could be about 18°C while the minimum winter temperature of about 
5°C usually manifests in the month of January. 
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Source: CLIMWAT 
Figure 3.9. Monthly variation in temperature in the command of BC   
 
Figure 3.10 shows the temperature range in UPC Irrigation Scheme where May and June 
are the warmest months when the temperature could go beyond 42°C, but is also the most 
appropriate time for rice cultivation and harvest of maize, and when farmers would need 
higher amounts of water irrigation for their crops. There is much variability in the monthly 
temperatures during summer and winter, when the temperature could go higher than 40°C 
in summer and could go down to 6.5°C in winter with dry and fogy nights, even sometimes 
coming with frost. The occurrence of frost mostly during the months of December and 
January is however harmful for the potato crop, and it is during this time when crops 
demand more reliable and frequent water irrigation to protect their crops from the harmful 
effects of frost particularly in case of potato and other vegetables.  
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Source: CLIMWAT 
Figure 3.10. Monthly variation in temperature in the command of UPC    
 
There could be drastic arid conditions in both irrigation schemes but with little difference 
in terms of To. While arid conditions manifest more in the UPC Irrigation Scheme than in 
BC Irrigation Scheme, the average monthly To in the former is slightly higher while ETo is 
also higher but its precipitation rate is usually lower than in the latter. 
Soils and topography 
 
The soils in the BC Irrigation Scheme are characterized by predominately medium to 
moderate texture (clayey-loam) with little organic matter contents, and can be classified 
into two major groups such as normal and saline sodic soils. Normally, there is 
accumulation of lime below 1 meter, which is the main reason for the salty groundwater in 
some patches (mostly in the head and middle reaches of main canal) of the study area 
limiting the choice of crops to cultivate. As a remedy, farmers apply gypsum and some 
other forms of treatments to the groundwater prior to its use for irrigation. Meanwhile, 
soils in the UPC Irrigation Scheme are known to be silty and clayey-loam and thus, have 
predominately high productive potentials.  
 
BC Irrigation Scheme is situated in the command area of Chenab and Ravi rivers also 
known as “Rachna Doab” while the UPC Irrigation Scheme is situated in the command 
area of Sutlej and Ravi rivers which is generally known as “Bari Doab”. Topographically, 
most part of the study area is flat with alluvial deposits from the Indus river system. On the 
average, the topographic gradient of this area is 0.20 meter per kilometer with a general 
direction towards southwest. Surface drainage of the study area is therefore slow due to its 
flat topography. 
Land use patterns and agriculture 
 
The major use of land in both case study schemes is for agriculture. Rural settlements are 
scattered in different organized villages while some other small houses located away from 
villages seem to lack of basic facilities. Agriculture is the major occupation with 
sugarcane, maize, wheat and rice as the main cash crops of the area in FMIS (Burala Canal 
Irrigation Scheme) while cotton, potato, wheat, maize and vegetables are the main cash 
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crops in GMIS (Upper Pakpattan Canal Irrigation Scheme). Citrus and guava orchards are 
also found in some parts of the study area as additional sources of income in both irrigation 
schemes. In order to feed their livestock, fodder is also grown in the study area which 
includes sorghum, millet, berseem, and oat.  
 
In both irrigation schemes, change in type of cropping system is associated directly or 
indirectly with the performance of the water delivery system (both from canal and 
groundwater). Such performance of the irrigation system determines the quantity of water 
available at farm gate largely affecting the decision of the farmers on what crops to grow in 
their farms. Thus, irrigation sensitive crops such as maize, rice, and potato are grown in 
areas with favorable condition of the available canal water or where access to groundwater 
is possible. Furrow
8
 irrigation method is commonly under practice for crops such as cotton, 
maize, and vegetables in GMIS. However, furrow irrigation method is not commonly used 
in FMIS except sugarcane. In FMIS, flood
9
 irrigation method is commonly under practice. 
Cropping calendar 
 
In general, cropping calendar can be categorized into three main cropping seasons, e.g. 
Kharif, Rabi and spring. While sugarcane is grown mostly in FMIS as a perennial crop, 
rice, cotton, fodder (sorghum, millet) and maize are the major crops in summer (Kharif) 
from May to October in both irrigation schemes (FMIS and GMIS). Wheat is the major 
crop for winter (Rabi season) from November to April in both irrigation schemes. In 
GMIS, cotton and maize are typically the main crops for spring (February to June), while 
potato is grown as an early Rabi crop in October.  
Table 3.7. Cropping calendar of major crops 
Crop Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Rice
1
              
Rice
3
              
Wheat
2
             
Cotton
1
              
Cotton
3
             
Corn
1
             
Corn
3
             
Sugarcane             
Vegetables
1
              
Vegetables
2
              
Potato
2
             
Foddar
1
              
Foddar
2
              
1
means Kharif season, 
2
means Rabi season, 
3
means spring 
                                                 
8
 Furrow irrigation is a method of surface irrigation where the water is supplied to small ditches or furrows 
for guiding across the field. 
9
 Flood irrigation is a method of irrigation where water is applied to the soil surface without flow controls, 
such as furrows, borders or corrugations.  
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The cropping calendar for both case study schemes is given in Table 3.7. Although there is 
not much difference in the timing of cropping systems between FMIS and GMIS, but one 
to two differences could be very prominent. Sugarcane which is a major crop in BC 
Irrigation Scheme is not commonly grown in the UPC Irrigation Scheme. Meanwhile, 
cotton is usually grown in FMIS during Kharif season while farmers in GMIS prefer early 
sowing of cotton seeds in February and March.   
 
The information in Table 3.7 was obtained from various sources such as from the interview 
with farmers and secondary data from Punjab Agricultural Department. This cropping 
calendar can be matched with the official timing for cultivation and harvesting proposed by 
Punjab Agriculture Department. However, it was gathered during the group discussions 
and field observations that farmers do not strictly follow this calendar since they use their 
local knowledge to determine the appropriate timing for growing their crops.  
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Chapter 4  
Institutional Environment in the Study Area 
This chapter opens the section on the results of the dissertation, and mainly discusses the 
ways to achieve Objective 1. The beginning of this chapter briefly discusses the main 
institutions at federal level in Pakistan, specifically elaborating on the current institutional 
environment in the overall irrigation system of Punjab and then on the concerned local 
institutions in the case study schemes. The later part of the chapter discusses the changing 
governance features in the overall governance system of Punjab irrigation system, 
particularly after the institutional reforms, i.e. policy, participation of farmers, collection of 
water charges, budgeting, and conflict resolution mechanisms. 
4.1 Institutional setting for irrigation in Pakistan 
This research study was carried out in the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS), in Punjab 
Province in Pakistan. The main institutions and organizations involved in the management 
and regulation of water resources at national level of Pakistan are presented in the 
succeeding sections. 
 
Indus Water Treaty, 1960 
 
The Indus River system comprising the River Indus and its five tributaries, two western 
rivers (Jhelum and Chenab) and three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi), is very crucial 
for the people in Pakistan and western India. It should be recalled however, that the 
division of Indian subcontinent in 1947 created a mounting tension between Pakistan and 
India because of the uneven international boundary drawn cutting across the Indus River 
System. After the World Bank (a broker and signatory of Indus Water Treaty) interfered, 
Pakistan and India signed the Indus Water Treaty on 19 September 1960 which stipulated 
that the World Bank assigns the rights to India to take control of the flow of the eastern 
rivers while Pakistan has the rights to control the flows of western rivers of the Indus basin 
(Abbasi, 2012).  
 
Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) of 1991 
 
For the resolution of conflicts on water distribution among the concerned provinces, the 
Water Apportionment Accord which was unanimously signed by the provinces on 16 
March 1991 could be used as a mechanism. Subsequently, the ‘10 daily allocations’ 
regulation was made part of the Accord by the Council of Common Interest (CCI) on 16 
September 1991, which specifically provides that water apportioned for Punjab is 55.94 
million acre foot (MAF), where 37.07 MAF is for Kharif and 18.87 MAF is for Rabi 
cropping seasons. 
 
The main organizational structures to manage and regulate the water resource at various 
administrative scales in Pakistan are given in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Multi-scale organizational structure of the water resource of Pakistan 
Geographic scale of 
jurisdiction 
Name of organization Main functions 
National   
 Ministry of Water and Power To review policy matters related with water 
and power development. 
To carry out strategic and financial planning 
for long term master plans. 
To monitor the operation of Indus Water 
Treaty of 1960. 
 Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA) 
To undertake investigations, planning and 
executing schemes for irrigation, drainage, 
prevention of water logging and reclamation 
of saline land as an autonomous body 
responsible for integrated development of 
water and power resources in Pakistan 
 Indus River System Authority 
(IRSA) 
To regulate and monitor the distribution of 
water sources of Indus River amongst the 
provinces in accordance with Water 
Apportionment Accord of 1991   
Provincial (before IMT)   
 Provincial Irrigation and Power 
Department (PID) 
To regulate, plan, manage and monitor the 
surface and ground water supplies and to 
develop related infrastructure,  
To develop and implement projects  
Irrigation Zone Irrigation Zonal Office   
Irrigation Circle Irrigation Circle Office  
Irrigation Division Irrigation Divisional Office  
Irrigation Sub-division Irrigation Sub-divisional Office  
   
Provincial (after IMT)   
 Provincial Irrigation and Drainage 
Authority (PIDA) 
To deliver water supplies in the canal 
commands 
To formulate, implement and review 
policies and procedures  
Irrigation Circle Area Water Board To manage, distribute and cost of supplying 
bulk water to FOs 
Secondary Canal Farmers’ Organization  To supply irrigation water to irrigators 
Responsible for O&M 
To collect water charges 
Tertiary Canal Water Users’ Association 
 
Ministry of Water and Power, Pakistan 
 
The Ministry of Water and Power primarily deals with policy matters relating to 
development of water and power resources in Pakistan. In addition, the Ministry also 
performs certain specific functions that include the development of strategic and financial 
long-term master plans for the sustainable utilization of the country’s water resources. For 
example, proposals for long-term projects are submitted by WAPDA and its allied 
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corporations. These proposals are scrutinized in the Ministry through its attached 
departments to ensure the technical and financial viability of such projects. The 
implementation of five-year plans and annual development program in water and power 
sector are also overseen by the Ministry, which also monitors the activities related to 
power generation, transmission and distribution, as well as performs supervisory and 
advisory role for smooth operation of the power sector. Moreover, the Ministry also 
coordinates inter-provincial water sharing activities related to irrigation, drainage and 
water logging, and monitors the operation of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between 
Pakistan and India. The structure of the Ministry also includes the Water and Power Wing 
and the Federal Flood Commission of Pakistan. 
 
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) 
 
Created in 1959, WAPDA is an autonomous body which undertakes investigation, 
planning and executing schemes for irrigation, drainage, prevention of water logging, and 
reclamation of saline land, and is responsible for the integrated development of water and 
power resources in Pakistan. WAPDA also supervises the implementation of the Indus 
Basin Settlement Plan signed between India and Pakistan in 1960, more particularly 
developing replacement works for the sustainable management of river water and irrigation 
system in Pakistan. Thus, it is also tasked to develop water development projects which 
include extensive research and investigation to augment the capacity of the country's water 
resources.  
 
Established to control the water sector in the entire country which is divided into north, 
central, south zones generally covering the North Western Frontier Provinces (now Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa) and the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, WAPDA also implements SCARPs 
and surface water development projects in Pakistan. WAPDA has Chief Engineers (CE) 
and Project Directors to take charge of the implementation of projects falling under the 
regions within the zone. In addition, the Chief Engineer (Coordination and Monitoring) of 
the Water Wing of WAPDA takes charge of the construction and operation of dams and 
other projects under Water Wing services while two General Managers are designated for 
the Ghazi Barotha Hydropower and the National Drainage Projects. Headed by a General 
Manager (GM), the Planning Division of Water Wing looks after all the planning activities 
on the water side. Implementation of activities on water resources and hydropower 
development as well as the related vision-2025 are supervised by three General Managers, 
i.e. GM (Technical, South, North), GM (P&D), and GM for Hydro Development. The 
three water reservoirs in Mangla, Tarbela and Chashma which play a key role in the 
distribution and regulation of the surface water resources in the Indus Basin are also being 
operated and regulated by WAPDA.  
 
Indus River System Authority (IRSA) 
 
IRSA was established on 10 December 1992 to take charge in regulating and monitoring 
the distribution of water resource of the Indus River among the provinces in accordance 
with Water Apportionment Accord (WAA) 1991. It also takes care of the interests of the 
provinces as per allocations of the WAA especially in operating their respective irrigation 
system networks through the Provincial Irrigation Departments (PIDs). Irrigation demands 
of relevant canal command areas are addressed by PIDs on the basis of canal capacities, 
crop water requirements, historical rights, and local hydrological conditions. Taking into 
account the provincial irrigation demands, IRSA then discharges water from its three 
reservoirs. The early Kharif period (April-June) is the most vital period when irrigation 
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water demands could be high for sowing Kharif crops. After this period, the reservoirs are 
nearly empty after providing for the water demand of the winter crops although water 
could be available when the spring freshet starts to flow (Khan, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Organizational setup for irrigation at national level of Pakistan 
4.2 Institutional settings for irrigation in Punjab 
The main institutions involved in the management and regulation of water resources of 
Punjab Province in Pakistan are discussed in the following section. The organizational 
structure of Water and Power Department, Punjab is given in Figure 4.2. 
 
The Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 
 
The Canal and Drainage Act (1873) is the principle legislation for irrigation in Punjab. 
Under this Act, the entire irrigation network in Punjab province has been entrusted to the 
provincial government through the officers of Irrigation and Revenue Departments, and 
Judicial Officers. Figure 4.2 explains the hierarchy of the process of the Canal and 
Drainage Act and its implementation at various levels canal water networks in the 
irrigation system of Punjab.  
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Irrigation and Power Department of Punjab 
  
As promulgated in the Punjab Government Rules of Business, the official functions of the 
Irrigation and Power Department (IPD) with regards to irrigation and drainage related 
aspects include:  
  
 Surveys of rivers and riverines  
 Construction work and all matters connected with barrages  
 Construction and maintenance of canals  
 Research and development on tubewells and other water utilization schemes 
 R&D on flood control and flood protection schemes 
 R&D on drainage schemes.  
 Storage of water and construction of reservoirs 
 Conduct basic and applied research in irrigation, hydraulics, groundwater and land 
reclamation 
 Administration of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 
 Administration of the Soil Reclamation Act, 1952 
 Administration of the Land Improvement Tax Act, 1975 
 Assessment of water rates 
 Distribution of canal waters 
  
Moreover, some other core functions of the IPD of Punjab include: 
 
 Operation and upkeep of the irrigation system of the province 
 Planning, prioritization and implementation of maintenance works through 
approved O&M Work Plans, and under third party top supervision 
 Optimizing the use of water resources in the province through the equitable 
distribution of irrigation water supplies (about 54 MAF) to 58,000 canal outlets 
 Assessing water rates based on actual field inspections by the revenue staff of the 
department 
 Implementing the development program portfolio and foreign-aided projects 
 Providing for and executing a plan for the management of river floods in the 
province, and to construct and maintain flood protection programs/works 
 Promoting the participation of beneficiaries in the management of the Irrigation and 
Drainage Systems of the province, in line with requirements of the Punjab 
Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) Act of 1997 
 Administering the Electricity Act and Village Electrification matters as well as 
Acting as the Personnel Department for over 52,000 employees of the Provincial 
Irrigation Department with functions that also include addressing issues related to 
career development, posting and transfer, promotion and in-service training. 
 
Through the aforementioned roles and responsibilities of the PID, the status of the systems 
could be distinguished whether the system is controlled and managed by local user 
organizations and whether it is owned and to varying degrees, controlled by government 
agencies. While the former includes both indigenous systems which often have long 
histories, the latter system had turned over by the government to users’ groups for 
management after institutional reforms.  
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Figure 4.2. Organizational setup of Water and Power Department, Punjab 
 
Program Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU)   
  
The Program Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU) had been established within the 
IPD for carrying out the efficient and optimal canal operations oriented towards equity and 
transparency. Headed by a Chief Monitoring (Team Leader), PMIU comprises experts and 
other professionals who are appointed on contract basis, and had been strengthened with 12 
Mobile Teams (two for each Irrigation Zone) and capacitated with the necessary equipment 
and technical support staff. PMIU keeps a database of the daily water discharge and 
exercises proper check for water feeding of the tails ensuring the equitable distribution of 
water in the channels/outlets based on authorized shares and approved plans. This digitized 
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data (available at: http://irrigation.punjab.gov.pk/Search.aspx) had been used as a tool for 
the proper management of the canal system as well as equitable distribution of water to 
shareholders/Farmers Organizations.  
 
In addition to the abovementioned rules and mechanisms for monitoring, PMIU is also 
responsible to carry out the following duties:  
 
 Independent periodic inspections of canals/drains, barrages, large hydraulic 
structures, flood control facilities, and small dams to assess the special needs of 
M&R with respect to these structures other than routine M&R, and preparation of 
special report based on the expected outputs of its periodic inspections 
 Monitoring and evaluating the impacts of the overall program as well as 
implementation of certain key components of the reform program itself, and 
consolidating and analyzing all monitoring data and issues for publication in 
quarterly and annual reports.  
 
Conception of Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) in Punjab 
 
Vermillion and Sagardoy (1999) in their global analysis of IMTs have reported objectives 
that drived IMTs in various countries. The  irrigation and drainage sector of Pakistan has 
gone through profound changes in recent decades, and was found to be trapped into the 
vicious cycle of “poor funding, poor maintenance, poor infrastructure condition, poor 
supply, poor productivity, poor recovery and poor funding” (World Bank, 1994). The 
water management and use habits resulted into lack of trust, anarchy, inequity, and lack of 
transparency, which evolved over time and have fitted the particular prevalent economic, 
social, and environmental circumstances. The Bank’s analysis identified these as the 
symptoms of deep-rooted problems of poor accountability (Dinar, et al. 2004).   
  
The formal irrigation and water supply services in Pakistan have been managed as 
exclusive monopolies of government agencies, which did not provide services to many – 
especially the poor and tail-enders – and provided poor quality services to those who had 
access. Merry (1996) associates the lack of accountability to the scale of irrigation systems 
and management by bureaucracies. The overall situation in Pakistan has been that the 
public irrigation supplying monopolies faced no competition, and the accountability was 
only upwards (Dinar, et al. 2004). The status quo of unclear entitlements, discretion, and 
lack of transparency suited important groups in society. The essence of the reforms would 
be to reduce monopoly power, and introduce transparency, thus greatly reducing the space 
for discretion and corruption. The reforms had to be introduced with the explicit objectives 
of re-designing irrigation management institutions from a government monopoly to a 
public utility that would be responsible for sustainability of its assets, provision of quality 
irrigation and drainage services to its clients, and that would discharge its responsibilities 
in a business-like fashion, and would be accountable to the clients.   
 
Implementation of reforms and establishment of institutions in Punjab irrigation system 
 
In the 1990s, on the advice of the World Bank, Pakistan’s government embarked on major 
institutional reforms in irrigation management. The original reform proposal by the World 
Bank, devised through a detailed analysis of the situation (World Bank, 1994) was too 
revolutionary. It proposed: a) to treat water as a tradable commodity rather than a public 
good; b) to create private water markets by giving farmers water property rights 
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disconnected from land; c) to divide the four Provincial Irrigation Departments into 43 
autonomous Public Utilities (PUs, one each for 43 canal commands) and to create Farmers  
Organizations (one for each distributary); and d) PUs should have company style 
management and be registered under the Companies Act. 
 
The Pakistani government sought comments from provincial governments on the proposal, 
who dismissed the analysis, and provided highly critical comments. All the provincial 
governments reacted that the Banks’ proposals were too much divorced from reality, and 
the ideas did not match the prevalent socio-economic conditions. The federal government 
initiated discussions with the Bank for improving the reform model. The discussions and 
debates continued for another three years, when finally the World Bank and the federal 
government agreed on a revised reform model. The Bank rigorously pursued the reform 
through an 800 Million Dollar loan to the government under its National Drainage 
Program  
 
(NDP). The federal government pushed the provincial governments to accept the reform 
through attaching the further disbursement of NDP funds with the progress with the 
passage of legislation. Consequently, all the four Provincial Assemblies passed Provincial 
Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) Acts in 1997. 
 
Later on, as part of National Water Policy (still in draft form), the Government of Pakistan 
launched a medium-term Reforms Program for achieving its vision, in accordance with the 
national water vision viz: “By 2025, Pakistan should have adequate water available, 
through proper conservation and development. Water supplies should be of good quality, 
equitably distributed and meet the needs of all users through an efficient management, 
institutional and legal system that would ensure the sustainable utilization of the water 
resources and support economic and social development with due consideration to the 
environment, quality of life, economic value of resources, ability to pay and participation 
of all stakeholders”.  
 
Cognizant of the multi-faceted and multi-dimensional concerns in the province’s irrigation 
management system, the Punjab Government developed a vision and strategy for its 
irrigation sector. Its long-term vision is to provide adequate, equitable and reliable 
irrigation supplies to the cultivable lands of Punjab with the aim of enhancing agricultural 
productivity, and promote sustainable development focusing on holistic management and 
broad-based institutional reforms through Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). In 
addition, its strategic vision is to advocate institutional and policy reforms as well as 
critical investments in rehabilitation and systems improvement.  
 
Moreover, in order to improve the managerial and technical performances of the irrigation 
and drainage sub-sectors, the Government of Punjab introduced four types of reforms as 
part of its IMT process as follows:  
 
 Institutional and Policy Reform to improve the management and maintenance of 
the irrigation system for ensuring its long term physical and financial sustainability  
 Water Resource Management Reform to emphasize the critical importance of water 
entitlements, measurements and transparency 
 Irrigation Service Delivery Reform to improve the quality, efficiency and 
accountability of irrigation services, through greater participation of farmers, 
institutional reforms, and the use of contractual arrangements among water supply 
agencies and users 
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 Reform to encourage adaptation of new technology for the improvement of water 
use efficiency and on farm productivity through a system of incentives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Schematic organizational chart of irrigation system of Punjab after reforms  
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The schematic organizational chart of newly-established institutions of PIDA and its sub-
sequent institutions are shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
In order to effectively implement the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), new 
institutions were established with the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) 
at provincial level to be responsible for province-wide water delivery, system maintenance, 
and development and sales of water beyond amounts contracted with AWBs, Area Water 
Boards (AWBs) at main canal levels to operate, manage and distribute public utility 
(irrigation water) within command area through formal volume-based contracts with FOs, 
and trade water with other utilities, Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) at the secondary or 
branch canal levels to supply water to irrigators and responsible for operation and 
maintenance of secondary irrigation canals, to levy and collect water charges, and to make 
payments to canal level AWB for cost of supplying bulk water to FOs. At grassroots level 
is the Water User Associations WUAs at the tertiary canal levels or farmers outlets for 
providing water to the agricultural fields. Under this shift of governance, a package of 
certain rights, policies, rules and regulations, conflict resolution systems, water charges 
collection mechanism, monitoring and accountability measures has been handed over to 
the farmers. However, for the Government-Managed Irrigation System which is being 
implemented in accordance with the Act of 1873, no major changes are taking place in its 
institutional and governance structures. 
 
The reform, however, remained quite controversial throughout the implementation of the 
National Drainage Program (NDP) during 1994 to 2003, and both the donors and the 
governmental staff were uncertain whether its progress would be realized smoothly or not 
(Dinar, et Al. 2004).   
 
Lack of political will and resistance from stakeholders 
 
The media picked up the proposed reform and various stakeholders engaged themselves in 
a hot debate, questioning the rationale, modalities, as well as the perceived outcomes. For 
example, it was reported in the newspapers that the government was going to sell the 
irrigation canals to the World Bank (Nakashima, 2005), and the farmers had the perception 
that the World Bank would charge much higher rates for irrigation water, and in  advance 
(Bandaragoda, et al. 1997). 
 
People did not like, above all, the idea of a utility company, which would disconnect a 
water supply just because water charges were not paid properly (Nakashima, 2005). There 
was strong resistance to the proposed reform program by all the key stakeholders. The 
Provincial Irrigation Department feared to lose authority to distribute water and maintain 
irrigation systems. Big landlords and influential farmers feared to lose extra water than 
authorized and poor farmers feared water rates would go up and influential farmers would 
exploit them. 
 
While the federal government agreed to the need for reform by signing the loan agreement 
with the bank after some degree of resistance, the provincial governments did not share the 
same feeling equally. The federal government also gave mixed signals initially, for 
example by delaying the acceptance of offer from Asian Development Banks for 
formulating water sector strategy, which offered support to develop comprehensive 
national and provincial institutional and policy reforms and infrastructure development 
plans for all water sub-sectors. "The Government's perceived lack of interest” led to a 
delay in its execution by almost 3 years and “only after a drought raised awareness of 
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water issues, only then "the follow-up missions of ADB could convince the Government of 
the need for the program and then the Government supported it (ADB, 2005). 
 
The staff of provincial irrigation departments (PIDs)  not only opposed the reform,  but 
resisted and felt as if the reform were being pushed onto them and feared that they would 
entail dissolution of their service, and a breakdown in existing rent relationships (Shafique, 
et al. 2004). Another disincentive for the PID staff was that of leaving the relative security 
of service with the government, for more novel contractual work with more transparent and 
accountable institutions (World Bank, 2005). The PID staff obstructed the reform initially 
by delaying the passage of legislation till the donors threatened to withdraw the loan (van 
der Velde and Tirmizi, 2001). Once the legislation was in place, there was no option to not 
test the reform. PID happened to choose one of the most challenging irrigation systems in 
Punjab to pilot the reform. 
 
Equally, those segments of the farmers who were benefiting from the status quo had 
opposed the reform (Nakashima, 2005). Larger landowners were the most opposed to 
change, since they had been gaming the system for decades. Clearly, they exercised 
political influence, and benefited most from the deinstitutionalized politics that were in 
vogue. Many accounts of reform in earlier years (for example by Nakashima, 2005; 
Shafique et al. 2001; van der Velde and Tirmizi, 2001) indicated that the reforms were felt 
to be failing because of inadequate top level support, technical support to the farmers and 
vested interests of bureaucracy and big farmers. However, such opposition to reform was 
not unique to Pakistan, as Mollinga, et al. (2001) reported similar experiences in India’s 
Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Involvement of farmers in the implementation of IMT 
 
In the General Body of PIDA at provincial level, there are 6 permanent representations of 
farmers as given in Table 4.2. These farmers are nominated by government. There is no 
any election process for these farmers’ representatives. However, at scheme level, 
involvement of farmers is limited to water delivery, revenue collection, M&R, and 
monitoring. General Bodies of FOs and WUAs are elected by farmers. Farmers are 
responsible to operate and manage secondary and tertiary canals only. 
 
General body of Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) 
 
After the institutional reforms in the irrigation system of Punjab, PIDA was established as 
an autonomous institution under PIDA Act of 1997. The general body of PIDA is shown in 
Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2. Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) at province level 
General Body Number Remarks 
Chairman 1 Minister for Irrigation, Punjab 
Farmer Members 6 Nominated by the Government 
Non-Farmer Members 5 Chairman P&D Board, Punjab 
  Secretary, Irrigation & Power Department, Punjab 
  Secretary, Agriculture Department, Punjab 
  Secretary, Finance Department, Punjab 
  Managing Director PIDA 
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Specifically, the main functions of PIDA are: 
 
 To deliver water in the canals of the entire province 
 To prepare policy and strategies for construction and development 
 To formulate the rules and regulations  
4.3 Institutional setting at irrigation system level  
Institutional reforms in the province started with promulgation of PIDA Act 1997 by the 
Provincial Assembly of Punjab. For the implementation of the reforms initiatives, PIDA 
established a legal framework taking into consideration the participation of farmers at all 
levels of the irrigation management, i.e. at provincial, canal command and at distributary 
levels. Such framework legitimizes the reforms processes and sets out the conditions for 
establishment of Farmers Organizations and Area Water Boards through the Rules and 
Regulations and legal framework stipulated in PIDA Act 1997.  
 
Under this legal framework, the existing irrigation system management (Figure 4.4) has 
been converted into multi-tier system for management of the irrigation infrastructure 
(Figure 4.5). A model sketch showing management units in BC Irrigation Scheme (FMIS) 
is shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. A model sketch showing management units at UPC Irrigation Scheme (GMIS)  
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Figure 4.5. A model sketch showing management units at BC Irrigation Scheme (FMIS)  
 
General Body of Area Water Board (AWB) 
 
Area Water Board (AWB) had been established at canal circle level under PIDA Act of 
1997, and its rules were defined under “The Area Water Board (Rules) 2005”. The General 
Body of the AWB is given in Table 4.3 while the Pilot Area Water Board of Lower 
Chenab Canal (East) Circle is shown in Figure 4.6. The BC Irrigation Scheme comes under 
the jurisdiction of this particular AWB. 
Table 4.3. Area Water Board at Canal Command level 
General Body Number Remarks 
Chairman 1 Elected from the Farmer Members 
Farmer members 10 Elected from Farmers Organizations 
Non farmer members 9 Representatives from allied Government 
Departments and technical experts 
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Figure 4.6. Command area of Area Water Board (LCC East)  
 
Functions of Area Water Board (AWB) 
 
The main functions of AWB include the following: 
 
 To monitor/review the implementation of relevant work plans 
 To suggest/review the annual development programs 
 To prepare and implement the rotational plan for distribution of water under its 
command canals 
 To monitor the main canals, secondary canals, and tertiary canals under its 
command 
 To suggest/explain strategies and their implementation to stop water theft and canal 
related discriminations under the law of irrigation to ensure equitable water 
deliveries and address water shortages at tail reach 
 To monitor and review the collection of water charges 
 To monitor and review the expenditures in accordance with annual granted budget 
 To appreciate the participation of water users in the management of canal water 
 To establish Farmers’ Organizations, and help the Government and the Authority in 
the process of their development 
 To monitor the performance of Farmers’ Organizations, and suggest strategies to 
the Authority for improving the performance of Farmers’ Organizations 
 70 
 To obtain aid/budget/grant or cash from Government/Authority or any person with 
the permission of the Authority 
 To utilize the funds within the defined limits and in accordance the defined rules by 
the Authority 
 To perform additional works assigned by the Authority  
 
In addition to all abovementioned functions, AWBs are also responsible for the 
management of the irrigation, drainage and flood control systems from barrages to the head 
of secondary canals in their respective commands. 
 
Establishment of Farmers’ Organizations and procedures 
 
Farmers Organizations (FOs) are established according to the “Farmers’ Organizations 
Rules, 2005”, and supported by the following legal frameworks to enable them to smoothly 
carry out their duties and responsibilities. 
 
 FOs (Elections) Regulations, 1999 
 FOs (Registration) Regulations, 1999 
 FOs (Financial) Regulations, 2000 
 FOs (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 2007. 
 
Based on the abovementioned legal frameworks, the procedures for the establishment of 
FOs are defined as follows: 
 
 Farmers’ Organizations will comprise the representatives of all tertiary canals or 
minors. All Chairmen of Water Users Associations (locally known as Khal 
Panchayat) will be members of the FOs, where an FO will be responsible to 
regulate, and conduct repairs and maintenance of its respective secondary canal 
(locally known as Rajba). An FO will also serve as canal officer under their defined 
authority to perform their functions and in accordance with the Irrigation & 
Drainage Act of 1873. 
 All Chairmen of WUAs will establish their respective Farmers’ Organizations 
(locally known as Nehri Panchayat), while FOs can be established on minor levels 
or part of secondary canals.  
 Farmer-members of WUA will elect 4 members and one chairman from among 
themselves where the chairman will be a member of the General Body of FO. 
Election is held based on the rules and regulations of Farmers’ Organizations. 
 FO can have its own name, but its circle of authority will be defined according to 
the rules and regulations set by the Government of Punjab and PIDA, and should 
emphasize on secondary canals. 
 Each FO will establish a registered office within the boundary of its command area, 
although such office could be located in the building given by the Irrigation 
Department or any other nominated building or if possible in the building of PIDA. 
 Each FO will consist of a General Body and an Executive Committee which can be 
organized based on conditions given below. 
(a) The number of members of the General Body will be equal to the number of 
tertiary canals or minors, while one member from each minor or tertiary canal 
could be the chairman of WUA.   
(b) The General Body of FO will elect its Executive Committee which will consist of 9 
members with corresponding positions as shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. Management Committee of Farmers’ Organization  
Management Committee Number Remarks 
President 1 Management Committee (elected by 
General Body
1
) 
Vice President 1  
Sectary 1  
Treasurer 1  
Executive Members 5 Three from tail reaches 
1
 General Body consists of Chairmen of Khal Panchayats (WUAs) 
 
 The Executive Committee will discharge all authorities except those which come 
under the authority of the General Body, while management and financial matters 
of various institutions/individuals involved are in accordance with the prescribed 
rules and regulations of FOs. 
 The Executive Committee elected by the General Body of FOs will serve for a 
period of three years starting from the time when the authority is handed down to 
FOs. 
 One person to serve as an assistant, whether full time or part time will be recruited 
from the Authority or AWB or can be recruited by FO to do office works. 
 It will be compulsory for FO to work and to run the irrigation system in accordance 
with the limits indicated in the rules and regulations of the agreement with 
AWB/PIDA and according to the related prescribed principles and responsibilities. 
 
Rules and Regulations of FOs 
 
The functions of the Farmers’ Organizations were first defined in 1999 but replaced in 
2005 with new rules under “Farmers’ Organizations (Rules) 2005” requiring each FO to 
perform its functions accordingly. Under the rules defined in 2005, FOs are liable for the 
repair and maintenance of their command irrigation system, management of water flows, 
equitable water distribution, repair and maintenance of bridges/falls/outlets, assessment 
and collection of water charges including those from non-irrigation water usage by 
industries, and providing solutions for water distribution related conflicts among farmers in 
accordance with its rules and regulations. Moreover, FOs will recruit its employees and 
keep accounts of its expenses which should be opened for audit. 
 
These rules which fall under 18 (2) IMT “Farmers’ Organizations (Rules) 2005” are given 
in detail as follows: 
 
 To regulate, maintain, and look after all basic infrastructures including hydraulic 
structures according to designed level 
 To take canal water supplies from the head regulator of main canal or branch canal 
 To ensure equitable and timely distribution of water to farmers and other users of 
water in the command 
 To protect the environment including the quality of water in channels 
 To investigate the recovery of water charges and other irrigation related charges 
from water users 
 To collect water charges and other charges from liable persons 
 To submit remaining amount of water charges to the account of Authority after 
deducting the FO share based on the agreement with the Authority 
 To charge additional services from FOs and their collection 
 To recover fines from the water users in case of delayed payment of water charges 
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 To solve water related conflicts among farmers or other water users 
 To use proper authority and measures in performing all the above mentioned rules 
 
General Body of Water Users’ Associations 
 
WUAs (Khal Panchayat) have been established under the rules defined in “Farmers’ 
Organizations Rules, 2005” and the General Body consists of five members, one chairman 
and 4 members (elected from among the farmers of the watercourse).  
 
Irrigation Management Transfer Agreement 
  
The most important provisions from the agreement of Irrigation Management Transfer and 
Farmers’ Organizations include the following: 
 
 The agreement is made between PIDA (through its Chief Executive, 
AWB/Superintending Engineer of the Canal Circle) and Farmers’ Organizations of 
concerned distributary. 
 The agreement is valid for a period of three years from the date when distributary 
system is handed over to concerned Farmers’ Organizations. 
 The Authority/AWB would continuously monitor and evaluate the activities of 
Farmers Organizations through inspections, field visits and progress reports.  
 The FO is entitled to have its share as approved by PIDA and the Authority from 
the collected water charges which should be spent for the administration and 
operation of the distributary as well as for repair and maintenance of the channels 
and structures.  
 The Chief Executive (CE), Area Water Board (AWB)/Superintendent Engineer 
(SE) of the Circle are liable to provide water to distributary as per authorized 
discharge and based on availability of water. 
 
The criteria for sharing water charges with FOs are given in Table 4.5. In accordance with 
the rules, FOs are responsible for submitting the funds to the account of the Authority or 
Area Water Board after deducting their share based on the aforementioned criteria. 
 
Table 4.5. Criteria of water charges sharing by Farmers’ Organizations 
Water Charges Collection FO Share PIDA Share 
Below 60% 40% 60% 
Up to 80% 40% 60% 
80% and above 40% 60% 
Above 90% 43% 57% 
Source: Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that institutional environment which constitutes such factors 
as access to labour, access to credit, and access to extension services and technical advices, 
have been incorporated and discussed in the Chapter on performance assessment of farms.  
4.4 Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system of PIDA 
Monitoring and evaluation is an important tool for assessing the performance of projects 
and programs to ensure their smooth and effective implementation towards achieving the 
objectives. PIDA has developed a very comprehensive and effective mechanism of 
monitoring its new entities (e.g. Farmers Organizations) against their entrusted functions 
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vis-à-vis impacts and outcomes. In this regard, PIDA has established its M&E Unit with 
the main objective of carrying out internal on-going evaluation especially with respect to 
the performance of FOs as well as managing other monitoring and evaluation activities. 
For benchmarking the performance of Farmers Organizations, the M&E Unit is involved in 
securing certain improvements through the comparison of relevant and achievable internal 
or external norms and standards. Nevertheless, the M&E Unit in PIDA has different 
functions from the PMIU in IPD in view of their different mechanisms of operations and 
respective core functions of PIDA and IPD.   
 
Main objective of M&E system 
 
The following are the major objectives set in M&E system: 
 
 To carry out continuous monitoring of the reforms components especially the 
performance of FOs. 
 To suggest appropriate remedial measures/actions to smoothen the progress and 
performance in achieving the desired objectives in accordance with the timeframe.  
 To establish benchmarking system taking into consideration the performance key 
indicators that could be utilized for subsequent monitoring and evaluations. 
 To identify the constraints in the implementation of various activities and 
accordingly suggest different managerial steps/remedial measures to overcome the 
limiting factors. 
 To prepare periodic progress/monitoring reports reflecting the status of the 
performance key indicators. 
 To conduct internal monitoring of pre- and post-project situation in the operation 
and management of irrigation system. 
 To prepare Terms of Reference for third party evaluation for the components where 
such review would be required.     
 
Implementation process 
 
The M&E Unit of PIDA has prepared and instituted a system of monitoring and 
benchmarking of performance of Farmers Organizations. The following specific key 
indicators are incorporated and considered under the monitoring and benchmarking of the 
performance of FOs: 
 
 Organizational development 
 Management of physical condition of distributary - O&M of channels & works 
 Irrigation service delivery - operation and regulation of channels, monitoring and 
recording of water delivery of channels and outlets to maintain equity 
 Disputes resolutions and disposal of revenue cases 
 Water rate (abiana) assessment and collection 
 
For the implementation of such system, M&E teams have been designated to carry out 
internal/ongoing monitoring of performance of FOs against their entrusted functions. The 
template for FOs monthly progress report and M&E field inspection sheets have been 
introduced to properly assess the functioning of the FOs and standardize the FOs 
performance, as well as carry out sub-sequent monitoring and evaluations.  
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Inspections 
 
In-depth monitoring of operational and managerial functions of FOs and verifying the 
implementation of its irrigation management system as well as investigating the physical 
conditions of channels including outlets parameters and the delivery performance of 
outlets, are being periodically carried out by M&E Unit teams through regular inspections 
of channels and outlets. The M&E Teams inspects the channels jointly with FOs, where 
copies of physical inspection reports are provided to FOs with the identified weak areas 
conveyed to particular FOs for them to execute the necessary follow up improvements and 
to take actions especially towards improving water regulations and delivery, and ensuring 
equity. 
 
Evaluation 
 
Monthly progress reports submitted by the FOs based on defined templates and field 
inspection reports of M&E Teams on concerned FO and channels are documented and 
compiled. These reports are then analyzed with respect to the entrusted functions to FOs 
especially regarding irrigation service delivery to farmers, repair and maintenance of 
channels, disputes resolution, and collection of water charges (abiana). The weak areas of a 
particular FO where its performance is unsatisfactory are communicated directly to the 
concerned FO through writing. Furthermore, in-house meetings are also convened to 
formulate strategies for the improvement of the performance of FOs and enhancement of 
weak areas including capacity building and training of staff and officers of the FOs. 
 
Based on the aforementioned roles and responsibilities of various entities at different tiers, 
i.e. PIDA, AWB and FOs, the following are the broader areas being considered during the 
monitoring and evaluation of the performance of FOs: 
 
 Organizational Development – Constitution of Standing Committees, conduct of 
meetings (General Body & Management Committee), training & capacity building, 
inter-community visits, preparation of annual business plan/budget, water 
scheduling, record keeping, understanding & commitment regarding roles and 
responsibilities, cohesion amongst the FOs members, AWB & PIDA as well as 
other stakeholders 
 Management of Physical Conditions – walking through the channels, identification 
and execution of physical/O&M works, maintaining of hydraulic structures 
(bridges, falls, head regulators) and the inner sections of the channels to design 
parameters  
 Efficient Service Delivery – responsiveness to emergency calls relating to breaches, 
cuts, water theft, water related disputes as well as maintenance of outlet structures 
to design parameters, serving as watch and ward of the channels, reduction in canal 
breaches/cuts as well as water theft cases, suggesting methods of improving 
irrigation system, efficient use of water, water measurements, increase in delivery 
efficiency/conveyance losses at watercourse level 
 Regulation and water accounting – ensuring effective delivery performance of 
outlets at different reaches, observation of gauges at various reaches of the channel 
including water delivery, accounting among others 
 Equity in Water Delivery – carrying out water measurements at various reaches of 
the channel, actual discharge against the sanction, checking of gauges, checking of 
outlets, and control over water theft 
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 Revenue Management – assessment and collection of water rates (abiana), 
utilization of funds for the operation & management of the distributary sub-system 
 Dispute Resolution & Disposal of Revenue Cases – resolution of conflicts related 
to water allocation, distribution, and revenue & unauthorized irrigation/water theft 
cases (initiation, action & finalization)  
 Farmers Community Participation – promoting self-help regarding repair of 
breaches/cuts, desilting of channel, repair & maintenance works as well as several 
others 
 Accounts Management – management of accounts (procurement of goods & 
services, execution of works, assessment, collection & utilization of funds) as per 
the procedures laid out in the financial management guidelines of PIDA 
 Coordination amongst the Stakeholders – facilitating interaction/cohesiveness 
between PIDA, AWB, FOs, IPD, Agriculture Department, NGOs as well as other 
stakeholder in collaboration/or with the assistance of stakeholders relating to the 
irrigation/water management, agriculture, marketing and other activities  
 Self-Monitoring & Progress Reporting to PIDA/AWB – monitoring FOs to 
improve their performance with reference to agreed parameters and monthly & 
periodically progress reports submission on prescribed formats/forms 
 
Criterion for Ranking the Performance of Farmers’ Organizations 
 
The appropriate types of indicators are included in the criterion for examining the success 
and sustainability of the Farmer Organizations (FOs), where each indicator is assigned a 
specific weight. Based on the collective values of the performance indicators, the 
performance evaluation of particular FO is given the corresponding performance rating 
based on the standardized four broader rating categories shown in Table 4.6.   
Table 4.6. Categories of rating the performance of Farmers’ Organizations 
Rating/Standard Score %age FO performance as per rating 
Poor 
Less than 
55% 
FO is not performing adequately in this aspect and requires support and 
guidance. The PIDA/AWB should intervene, investigate and boost the 
performance of FOs 
Adequate 55-70 % 
FO has reached the minimum acceptable standard in this aspect, but 
remains vulnerable, and progress should be monitored 
Satisfactory 70-85% 
FO is performing well, and the FO is considered to be sustainable, but 
monitoring and support should be continued 
Good 
More than 
85% 
FO performance is very good, mature, fully sustainable and model for 
other FOs. FO is able to develop further or accept additional 
responsibilities 
 Source: Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) 
 
Rating of Farmers’ Organization functioning against performance indicators  
 
The performances of Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) are also evaluated based on the criteria 
for ranking shown in Table 4.7. Each FO is assigned value/score (in percentage) for each 
major indicator as also given in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7. Performance indicators and criteria for ranking Farmers’ Organizations 
 
Indicators Standard Assigned Value/Score 
1 Organizational development Poor 
Adequate 
Satisfactory 
Good 
Less than 50% out of  wt.(weightage) score 15 
50-70 %  out of  wt. score 15  
70-90% out of wt. score 15 
Greater than 90% out of  wt. score 15 
2 Management of physical condition of                 
distributary sub-system – O&M of 
channels & works 
Poor
Adequate  
Satisfactory 
Good 
Less than 60% out of  wt. score 20  
60-70 %  out of  wt. score 20    
70-80% out of wt. score 20 
Greater than 80% out of  wt. score 20 
3 Irrigation Service Delivery: 
a) Operation & regulation of 
channels; 
b) Monitoring & recording of water 
delivery of channels and outlets to 
maintain equity 
Poor 
Adequate  
Satisfactory 
Good 
Less than 70% out of  wt. score 45  
70-80 %  out of  wt. score 45 
80-90% out of wt. score 45 
Greater than 90% out of  wt. score 45 
4 Disputes resolution and disposal of 
revenue cases 
Poor 
Adequate 
Satisfactory  
Good 
Less than 40% out of  wt. score  5              
40-60 %  out of  wt. score  5                     
60-80% out of wt. score  5               
Greater than 80% out of  wt. score 5 
5 Water charges assessment and  
collection 
Poor 
Adequate  
Satisfactory 
Good 
Less than 60% out of  wt. score  15              
60-80 %  out of  wt. score  15                      
80-90% out of wt. score  15                
Greater than 90% out of  wt. score 15 
Source: Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA) 
 
Summary of Irrigation management Transfer (IMT) in Punjab 
 
In Punjab, irrigation management transfer (IMT) has been a fully bureaucratic decision 
since it was a prerequisite to heavy investments on rehabilitation by the World Bank 
(Hassan, 2008). Although, IMT in Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme can be justified by 
technical concerns but cannot justified by farmers’ demands or requests. The adoption of 
IMT policies in Pakistan represents a case of a “coercive policy adoption” as opposed to a 
“voluntary policy adoption” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Hassan, 2008) at all levels. Later 
on, Dolowitz (2000) identified three main reasons for policy failure in “policy transfer 
cases” such as; a) uninformed transfer, b) incomplete transfer; and c) inappropriate 
transfer. In case of Pakistan, it appears that all the three reasons were quite evident when 
the debate started. According to irrigation engineers from the Department of Irrigation 
(IPD) of Pakistan, IMT has been imposed with some sense of haste in 1997 through PIDA 
Act 1997 and implemented in 2004-2005. In spite of such situation, IPD is now expanding 
the reform to other schemes in Punjab near the case study area. Observers admit that 
farmers, although they may have not yet been fully autonomous, skilled and capacitated, 
are actually quite enthusiastic and motivated about the IMT. Until now, in terms of 
transferred schemes, the WUA and FOs only deal with water delivery and service fee 
collection with no effort exerted for instance in product marketing, credit, machinery 
pooling, and input supply. Thus, with such limited role, the government falls short of the 
actual needs of the farmers for irrigation water. As aforementioned, the recent warning 
from Ostrom (2007) and Molle (2008) against “panaceas” should be considered so that 
IMT is not fraught with haste, leapfrogging, and disregard of the local situation and human 
dimensions. Lankford (2009) further ascertained that irrigation development is not only 
about infrastructure and technology, and thus, should not put the individual farmer at the 
center but the community of smallholders instead. “This subtle shift moves us away from 
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an excessive emphasis on ‘atomised’ […] solutions and technologies, and towards the 
notion that the institutional and organizational challenges of managing water as a 
common property are paramount” (Lankford, 2009: 479). 
4.5 Main findings 
Institutional and organizational settings underlying the FMIS and GMIS have been 
investigated, the results of which are discussed in this chapter. Based on the analysis of 
policy documents, it could be gleaned that all the legal frameworks as well as rules and 
regulations are well-documented in both irrigation schemes. Farmers in FMIS have more 
awareness about functions, rules and regulations of FOs and WUAs. Moreover, PIDA has 
a well-defined mechanism for performance evaluation, monitoring and inspection 
especially with respect to the operations of the Farmers’ Organizations. However, some 
key elements were ignored during implementing institutional reform such as; a) 
assignment of clear water rights for FOs, b) making AWBs accountable to FOs, and c) 
putting in place strategies for capacity building of FOs, AWBs, and PIDA to undertake 
their jobs in the new fashion (Hassan, 2008).  
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Chapter 5                                                                                                           
Assessment of Governance Features at Scheme Level 
As part of the performance assessment at scheme level, it is important to include some 
governance performance indicators that are not included in the application of the 
MASSCOTE approach. It should be considered that these governance indicators could also 
reveal the performance of institutions in terms of delivering services, since these are 
mostly based on the opinions and stock knowledge of farmers. In this regard, this chapter 
starts with the perceptions of farmers on the governance of the irrigation systems, which 
they indicated as part of the questionnaire survey. The results of the performance of FOs 
specifically for resolving water theft cases and in compiling statistics of water theft cases 
by each FO are also reported in this chapter based on secondary data from the Area Water 
Board of the Lower Chenab Canal (LCC East) in Faisalabad. 
5.1 Farmers’ perception on local governance features 
This section provides the picture of the governance features in the Burala Canal (BC) 
Irrigation Scheme (FMIS) as well as that of Upper Pakpattan Canal (UPC) Irrigation 
Scheme (GMIS). 
 
Level of transparency 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the level of transparency regarding financial and organizational aspects 
in the study areas, such as Burala Canal (FMIS) and Upper Pakpattan (GMIS) irrigation 
schemes. During the survey, the farmers were asked whether they are aware of the budget 
allocated to the schemes, ISF recovery situation, corruption (to secure water deliveries of 
legal water share and illegally) budget expenditures on O&M, and the organizational 
procedures adopted by WUAs, FOs, and by IPD.  
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Figure 5.1. Level of transparency regarding financial and organizational matters  
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The results indicated that farmers in FMIS have been very motivated and nearly 60% are 
much aware about the financial and organizational matters of WUAs and FOs. Meanwhile, 
in the same category of “high transparency” only 10% of the farmers in GMIS know about 
the financial and organizational operations of such institutions. Specifically, more than 
30% of farmers in GMIS have no idea about the financial and organizational aspects of the 
IPD. Moreover, in terms of corruption and rent seeking behavior by the officials and staff 
of public agencies (IPD) has been reported by Rinaudo (2002), Easter and Liu (2005). 
However, farmers are also involved in this kind of bid to get better water deliveries 
particularly under water scarce situations.  
 
Level of fines and penalties imposed and recovery 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the level of fines and penalties imposed by authorities against persons 
found to be involved in illegal actions that could affect or suspend water delivery services 
to other farmers. Based on the farmers’ opinion, it could be perceived that GMIS has more 
strict policies against such illegal actions than FMIS. Specifically in GMIS, punishment is 
meted by requiring offenders to deposit cash after which long procedure of hearings are 
conducted either by responsible officers of IPD or by legal courts. Although, the process 
could be time consuming and expensive, very high amount of fines and penalties had been 
collected from an individual offender or groups of offenders. In one instance, even 
tampering the information prepared by field staff was subjected to punishment such as the 
case in Patwari, Ziledar as the action had obviously misguided the authorities in taking the 
most appropriate action. Nevertheless, the influence from local but politically influenced 
persons could also affect the decisions to punish offenders. 
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Figure 5.2. Level of fines & penalties imposed on farmers against illegal actions 
In Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme (FMIS), the practice of imposing big fines and penalties 
is not common as indicated by only about 23% of the farmers surveyed who agreed with 
the option “many fines”. Although about 50% of the farmers agreed with imposing “some 
fines” which could be in terms of cash deposit to WUA or FO or to some extent closure or 
suspension of the water delivery during certain period of time, nearly 30% of the farmers 
believed that there is no need to impose fines and penalties against offenders.   
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Even after the institutional reforms in Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme, there was still no 
specific nor pre-defined fines and penalties imposed by FOs and WUAs against persons 
involved in illegal actions such as outlet tampering, water theft, canal breaching, and so on. 
It is also significant to mention that even a simple guideline of punishment such as the kind 
of punishment corresponding to which action, the terms and conditions and the like, was 
lacking. However, in cases where farmers are not satisfied with the decisions taken by the 
FOs, they have to undergo the usual government court litigations which could involve very 
lengthy procedures. In fact, such situation could have been a result of the absence of well-
defined punishment guidelines and on the mechanism of imposing fines, and the type and 
degree of fines to be meted per illegal actions, in the rules and regulations of FOs given by 
PIDA.  
 
Figure 5.3 shows the level of restoration of fines and penalties imposed by concerned 
authorities. In view of its more effective mechanism, GMIS shows better results of 
recovering fines and penalties from offenders than FMIS. Although the procedures of 
imposing fines and recovery mechanism could be lengthy, but there is no respite granted to 
offending farmers. In GMIS for instance, once a case had been filed, fines are immediately 
imposed and recovered in any way possible. However, the main weak side of this whole 
procedure is the difficulty in accessing the appropriate offices of IPD especially during 
hearings and investigations, while the process could be time consuming and costly. 
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Figure 5.3. Level of recovery of fines and penalties 
 
As mentioned earlier, the mechanisms for imposing fines in FMIS are weak. As confirmed 
during the survey, 50% of the farmers believed that only partial recoveries had been 
accomplished in the FMIS as regards collecting fines. In fact, even if WUAs and FOs are 
fully autonomous in their decisions, some kind of respite and flexibility had been granted 
to offenders (nepotism and political affiliations) which tend to decrease and slow down the 
rate of recovery. Easter and Liu (2005) also reported that there is penalty system for the 
defaulters and late payers of water charges (ISF). This situation violates the governing 
principle no. 5 when (Ostrom, 1990) calls for graduated sanctions on those who violate the 
operational rules. However, FOs are not yet fully institutionally capable to take necessary 
action and to implement sanctions. 
 
 81 
Level of responsiveness by authorities 
 
Figure 5.4 presents the picture of the opinion of farmers on level of responsiveness by 
authorities in attending to their complaints and suggestions for water delivery services. 
During the survey, more than 50% of the farmers in FMIS agreed that WUAs and FOs 
were quick to respond and take immediate actions in short period of time. For such efforts, 
the farmers could easily access to the offices of FO and WUA which means savings on 
transportation costs and precious time on the part of the farmers. 
 
In the case of GMIS, almost 65% farmers believed that IPD seemed to delay its response 
on their complaints as well as in taking the appropriate actions. The farmers reported that 
they have to visit offices of IPD many times even for registering their simple complaints. 
Moreover, they also cited that the procedures to get the final actions by IPD are much too 
lengthy. 
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Figure 5.4. Level of responsiveness by institutions regarding complaints and actions 
 
Level of satisfaction on decisions taken by authorities and institutions 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the satisfaction level expressed by the farmers on decisions taken by 
authorities and institutions with regards to conflict resolution and irrigation management. 
More than 52% of the farmers in FMIS are satisfied with the decisions taken by WUAs and 
FOs, while only 16% of the farmers in GMIS agreed. Farmers in FMIS have been more 
satisfied because most of their conflicts are resolved locally with mutual understanding and 
decisions at WUAs and FOs level. It don’t mean here that farmers are fully satisfied in all 
aspects of irrigation management under FOs and WUAs such as water delivery, 
monitoring, revenue collection, and equity, reliability of water flows etc. Most farmers also 
recognized that conflict resolution mechanism is very important tool to improve their 
satisfaction level and enhance their contribution towards effective operation and 
maintenance of irrigation system. However, level of farmers’ satisfaction is comparatively 
higher in FMIS mainly because of their motivation to participate and their involvement in 
the management of irrigation system. Farmers were observed satisfied as they don’t have 
to go to IPD offices for their complaints and conflict resolutions. Results given in Figure 
5.5 are limited to satisfaction on O&M and ease of conflict resolution. 
 82 
Satisfaction level on decisions taken by authorities
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Satisfied
A bit satisfied
Not satisfied
Opinion of farmers (%)
FMIS GMIS
 
Figure 5.5. Level of satisfaction on decisions for conflict resolution  
Provision of respect and moral support 
 
Figure 5.6 shows that 70% farmers agreed and were obliged to recognize the role of 
authorities of WUAs and FOs in promoting respectful consideration and moral support, in 
which case they felt feel well treated. It was also noted that all types of farmers (regardless 
of their farm sizes) have been treated and respected well in FMIS.  
 
However, the situation in GMIS had not been so favorable, as could be noted from only 
about 12% of the farmers who agreed with the promotion of respectful considerations and 
moral support extended by the IPD. Consequently, nearly 60% of the farmers agreed that 
authorities have shown less respect and moral support. More strikingly, 32% of the farmers 
gave full negative response and showed no respect with the IPD. Many farmers reported 
instances that clearly manifested the insulting attitude and behavior of clerical and office 
staff of IPD, and more particularly, small and poor farmers had been humiliated in the 
offices of IPD. The inattentive behavior of authorities by neglecting the concerns of 
farmers (by any means) in public offices is therefore challenged as such attitude could 
affect the trust and cooperation of farmers in the smooth operation and maintenance of 
irrigation systems. Efforts to buoy up respect and provide moral support on the part of the 
authorities and institutions could build the confidence of farmers and their motivation 
towards enhancing their contribution for the effective operation and maintenance of 
irrigation systems, and promote collective action among them. 
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Figure 5.6. Provision of respect and moral support by staff and officials 
 
Monitoring against water theft and outlet tampering 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the opinion of farmers on the level of monitoring and check by 
authorities against water theft and outlet tampering in both irrigation schemes. WUAs and 
FOs have been more frequently monitoring such illegal actions, as indicated by 35% of the 
farmers who agreed on the “excellent” and 40% agreed on “good” efforts of authorities in 
monitoring of irrigation infrastructures and the water resources. Many farmers also 
reported that some FOs have monitoring teams visiting them in disguise and checking the 
outlets operation even during night time considering that most of illegal actions such as 
tampering of outlets and water theft using pipes usually occur at night. However, in the 
existing mechanisms for monitoring, some weaknesses need to be addressed such as the 
biased role and political influence of big landlords.   
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Figure 5.7. Level of monitoring and check by authorities 
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Nevertheless, nearly 50% of the farmers in GMIS reported the faulty monitoring 
procedures of IPD. As an example, field staff of IPD conducts 2 or 3 visits to the farms on 
a daily basis. However, no visits are made for monitoring the operations at night for lack of 
resources and staff. Although the Project Management and Implementation Unit (PMIU) of 
IPD also make few field visits but these are only conducted mostly on main canals. 
Moreover, since the persons responsible for monitoring the secondary and tertiary canals 
are provided only with bicycles, it would be difficult for them to frequently visit the entire 
length of the canals on bicycles. Result depicts that FMIS shows more closeness with the 
monitoring principle of governance given by (Ostrom, 1990). 
5.2 Institutional highlights in Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme (FMIS) 
This section focuses on the institutional features based upon farmers’ perceptions on 
effectiveness of BC Irrigation Scheme or FMIS in capacity building and training activities, 
while an analysis of conflict resolution mechanisms is also presented. 
 
Effectiveness of capacity building 
 
After institutional reforms in BC Irrigation Scheme, capacity-building program had been 
started by PIDA to enhance the skills and capacity of the farmers. However, it had been 
observed that the farmers lacked the initiative to fully participate in such activity while 
there was also low motivation of the farmers during the training sessions conducted. Figure 
5.8 shows the opinion of farmers on the level of effectiveness of capacity-building 
trainings. During the survey, only 15% of the farmers reported that the training activities 
were very informative, useful, and very helpful to enhance their skills and performance. 
Although another 45% agreed, but they also expressed that the capacity-building training 
sessions were somewhat useful while some farmers (24%) thought that the training 
activities were just time-wasting processes and that nothing useful could be obtained from 
the sessions. Such low motivation and decreased participation of farmers that were noted in 
the training sessions therefore require re-visiting of the contents of the training to enhance 
the interest of farmers, as it is also reported by Hassan (2008). It was also very noticeable 
that IPD does not conduct any such kind of capacity-building program.   
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Figure 5.8. Level of effectiveness of capacity-building trainings by FOs and WUAs 
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Farmers’ Organization wise cases of water disputes 
 
Table 5.1 shows a list of cases water disputes and their resolution as per Farmers’ 
Organization (based on the data from Area Water Board, LCC east, Faisalabad). The 
information given represents the cases of water disputes entered and resolved during the 
year 2009. The performance of six FOs is appreciable as they show 100% results in terms 
of resolving cases of water disputes at local level. The names of these FOs are Ghark, 
Waghi, Ditch, Kallar, Kabirwala, and kalera. It must be noted that those FOs had limited 
number of cases entered (less than 12 per year anyway). Bhoja FO shows the worst results, 
with only 7% cases of water disputes. However Bhoja FO also showed the highest number 
of cases entered (61 cases). These results represent only for cases resolved at FOs level. If 
FO is unable to resolve a case of water dispute, it is reported to police station or court after 
that, with the permission of the FO president. 
Table 5.1. Farmers’ Organizations’ statistics on cases of water disputes 
Name of FO 
Cases of disputes 
Entered Resolved Resolved (%) 
Ghark  5 5 100 
Waghi 10 10 100 
Ditch 4 4 100 
Kallar 1 1 100 
Kabirwala 11 11 100 
Kalera 12 12 100 
Nupewala 15 14 93 
Pithorana  15 14 93 
Obhal 15 14 93 
Naurang  16 14 88 
Dulchi 13 11 85 
Ranjiana  18 15 83 
Kamalia 17 14 82 
Arif 20 16 80 
Pervaiz  15 12 80 
Duravan  20 14 70 
Farooq 19 11 58 
Summundri 15 8 53 
Bhalak 32 16 50 
Muniawala 6 1 17 
Bhoja 61 4 7 
Tandlianwala 0 0 - 
Killianwala 0 0 - 
Balochwala 0 0 - 
 
Average number of cases by each FO is ~14 with median value of ~15. It shows that 90% 
of FOs is entered less than 20 cases of water disputes per year. Similarly, 25% of FOs 
resolves 70% of water dispute cases whereas 85% is the median for resolution of cases. 
However ~78% is the average of resolution of water dispute cases by each FO.   
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Figure 5.9. Performance of Farmers’ Organizations in resolving water dispute cases 
 
Figure 5.9 shows that except for case of Munianwala, FO manages to resolve all of water 
dispute cases if numbers of cases entered are less than 12 per year such as Ghark, Waghi, 
Ditch, Kallar, Kabirwala, and Kalera FOs. In case, number of water disputes exceeds than 
12, then capacity and performance of FOs decreases gradually as in case of Bhalak and 
Bhoja FO. Most worst situation is observed in Bhoja FO as 61 cases of water dispute were 
entered whereas only 7% of them were resolved.   
 
Farmers’ Organization wise cases of water theft 
 
Table 5.2 shows a list of water theft cases under each FO in the BC Irrigation Scheme 
during the year 2009. Usually, it is tried to resolve all cases of water theft at local level 
(WUA or FO). In case these institutions are unable to resolve a case, it is reported to local 
police station. It is not possible to report any case to police station without prior permission 
of the FO president. Police investigation team then try to resolve disputes by mutual 
understanding of both parties after detail investigation and hearings. If parties don’t agree 
on the decision, case of water dispute is then registered as a FIR (First Information Report) 
and transferred to court for further judicial decision. If a case of water dispute goes beyond 
the capacity of FO, then it may take years to resolve with high expenditures.  
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Table 5.2. Farmers’ Organizations’ statistics on cases of water theft 
Name of FO 
Cases of water theft 
Entered (No) Resolved (No) Resolved (%) 
Reported to 
police 
FIR 
registered 
Dulchi 6 6 100 0 0 
Nupewala 4 4 100 0 0 
Duravan  5 5 100 0 0 
Pithorana  6 6 100 0 0 
Arif 3 3 100 0 0 
Pervaiz  4 4 100 0 0 
Ghark  1 1 100 0 0 
Ditch 2 2 100 0 0 
Kalera 7 7 100 0 0 
Kabirwala 12 11 92 1 0 
Naurang  7 6 86 0 0 
Ranjiana  9 7 78 0 0 
Kallar 8 6 75 2 0 
Obhal 5 3 60 2 0 
Kamalia 13 7 54 6 0 
Waghi 7 3 43 4 0 
Killianwala 91 17 19 60 20 
Bhalak 187 14 7 14 0 
Tandlianwala 104 0 - 100 4 
Bhoja 61 0 - 56 48 
Balochwala 0 0 0 0 0 
Muniawala 0 0 0 0 0 
Summundri 0 0 0 0 0 
Farooq 0 0 0 0 0 
 
During year 2009, it was found that out of 24 FOs; only 3 FOs registered FIRs at police 
stations and cases were referred to courts for resolution. These 3 FOs are Tandlianwala, 
Killianwala, and Bhoja. There are 9 other FOs like Dulchi, Nupewala, Durawan, Pithorana, 
which performed excellent and show 100% result in the resolution of water cases. These 
FOs resolved all entered cases of water theft with their local capacity. Table 5.2 shows that 
75% of FOs entered less than 12 cases of water theft during year 2009. The average 
number of entered water theft cases is 27 whereas median value is 7 cases.  Similarly, 30% 
of FOs has solved less than ~75% of cases. In average, ~79% cases are solved by each FO 
during year 2009. The median value of resolved water theft cases is 96%.  
 
Figure 5.10 shows the performance of FOs in terms of resolution of water theft cases 
against the number of cases entered per year. First, it shows the group of 9 FOs which 
resolved all entered cases within their capacity such as Dulchi, Nupewala, Duravan, 
Pithorana, and Arif etc. It is noticeable here that there is less number of cases entered under 
these FOs.  
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Figure 5.10. Performance of FOs in resolving water theft cases 
 
For efficient resolution (100%) of water theft cases, maximum number of entered cases is 
7 during whole year and minimum number is 1. However, with the increase of number of 
entered cases, the performance of FOs to resolve these cases decreased such as Kamalia 
and Bhalak FO. The situation is worst in case of Bhoja and Tandliawala which entered 61 
and 106 cases of water theft respectively but could not resolve any of them. All of these 
cases were referred to police for resolution. Consequently, police investigate and try to 
solve these cases of water theft. FIRs (First Information Report) are registered for unsolved 
cases and then referred to courts for further jurisdiction and final resolution. Out of 542 
entered cases, 245 (~45%) cases were referred to police station which are against the 
Ostrom (1990) governance principle number 6 “conflict resolution mechanism” as given in 
Table 2.1. These results show the inefficiency or weak performance of FOs particularly in 
resolving the water theft cases. As per Ostrom (1990) principle number 5 “graduated 
sanctions” can considered to control the attempts of water theft.  
5.3 Main findings 
In contrast to IPD, FOs and WUAs are performing better in terms of monitoring, 
responsiveness, transparency, provision of moral support and respect to farmers and in 
taking decisions however conflict resolution of complex-nature cases and recovery of fines 
and imposing penalties by FOs is still poor. It is important to mention here that FMIS 
shows better results in some performance indicators than GMIS only comparatively. 
However, GMIS is performing comparatively better than FMIS in terms of imposing fines 
and their recovery. There are significant number of disputes cases reported to FOs (average 
~14 and Median =15) but 90% FOs have 20 or less reported cases on annual basis. Except 
in 1 case, when number of cases is less than 12 per year, FO can solve all. As number of 
reported cases increases from 12, they seem to find it difficult to solve and resolution rate 
decline. Overall, only 25% of FOs has a resolution rate less than 70%. Similarly, in case of 
resolution of water theft cases, FOs show 100% results if the numbers of entered cases are 
< 7 annually. On average, 27 cases of water theft are entered and ~79% cases are solved by 
each FO on annual basis. GMIS with strict mechanism of policy implementation shows 
remarkable recovery of revenue collection and imposing high penalties and fines against 
water theft and cases of outlet tampering.     
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Chapter 6                                                                                                             
Performance Analysis at Irrigation Scheme Level 
In order to analyze and improve the performance of canal based irrigation, Renault and 
Wahaj (2007) suggested that the MASSCOTE approach or the Mapping System and 
Services for Canal Operation Techniques be adapted. The MASSCOTE approach was 
developed mainly for the modernization of irrigation management of surface canal system. 
With canal operation at its core, the MASSCOTE approach also comprises ten steps, i.e. 
rapid diagnosis, system capacity and sensitivity, perturbation, mapping water networks and 
water balance/accounting, service to users, mapping the cost of operation, mapping the 
demand for canal operation, partitioning in management units, operational improvements 
and aggregation, and consolidating management. This chapter discusses the objective 2 of 
this research. 
 
In carrying out the MASSCOTE approach, RAP (Rapid Appraisal Procedures) was first 
conducted in Burala Canal (BC) Irrigation Scheme in February and in Upper Pakpattan 
Canal UPC) Irrigation Scheme in March 2010. The results of RAP (Rapid Appraisal 
Process) are discussed in the following sections:  
6.1 Rapid diagnosis: common features in both schemes 
The primary objective of rapid diagnosis using RAP is to obtain first-hand information 
about the nature and location of the problems and their prioritization to be able to mobilize 
the stakeholders in taking up modernization. RAP is also meant to generate baseline 
assessment against which progress could be measured (Renault and Wahaj, 2006).  
  
Some of the common highlights of the rapid diagnosis conducted in both irrigation 
schemes include the following:   
 
 Infrastructures in both schemes are about 100 years old. 
 
 There is wide variation in the availability of water in the Indus River during the 
different seasons, where about two-thirds flow is observed during the Kharif season 
(summer) and one-third during the Rabi (winter) season. Therefore, the existing water 
supplies are not sufficient to meet the requirements of crops in view of the increased 
cropping intensity that finally results in acute shortage of canal water. The severity of 
the problem is increasing from the head reach to the middle until tail reaches of the 
distributaries/minors. As a resort, this shortage has been addressed by pumping ground 
water. 
 
 The irrigation system was designed for 65% cropping intensity and now the cropping 
intensity has increased up to 150%. 
 
 Large amount of silt flows from the river to the main canal, and the deposited silt 
which does not cause serious problem in main canals is also deposited on the surface of 
the distributaries and minors reducing the flow of water to the tail-enders. 
 
 Most of the canals are made from earth so that deferred maintenance program during 
the previous years had made the conditions of main canal, distributaries and minor 
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canals very bad causing the canals to breach. In an attempt to address this problem, less 
flow is given to these canals even if water is available in large quantities in the river in 
summer especially during monsoon. 
 
 The flat rate water charging system adopted to charge farmers for the use of irrigation 
water is based on cultivable land holdings, does not take into account the different 
nature of water use, cropping intensity, among others. Nevertheless, the fee is levied 
regardless of the crops grown, area under crops, and so on. The amount of fees charged 
per ha is Rs. 210 (2.8 US$/ha) during the Kharif season and Rs. 125 (1.7 US$/ha) for 
Rabi season (1US$ = 75 Rs in 2008-09). Considering that the amount charged is very 
low, it could not cover the operational, maintenance and management costs. 
 
 Water theft is also a major problem of the canal resulting in a remarkable number of 
outlets having been tampered and in view of such condition these outlets receive more 
water than their designed capacity. 
 
 As most of the parts of the canal are earthen and the seepage rate in the main canal is 
about 20% while in distributaries, minors and water courses seepage rate is about 25% 
and about 20% in farmers’ fields, this means that only 35% of water is available for the 
crops. 
 
 The Department of Irrigation always announces full water closure and suspension of 
water supply to the distributaries, minors and water courses for four weeks usually in 
January for maintenance and desiltation of the main canals, its distributaries and 
minors. However, maintenance activities mostly exist only in papers. Consequently, the 
growth of weeds in the distributaries and minors continue to be enormous reducing the 
water flow while increasing seepage. This results in less water availability to the tail-
enders, and in fact, many cases tail-enders do not receive irrigation water from the 
canal system. 
 
 Human activities and grazing/watering/trespassing of livestock damage the canal banks 
which also cause perturbations in the water level. As a result, outlets receive less water 
and ultimately also reduce the water delivery services to some areas. 
 
 Most irrigation structures on the main canal are un-gated. The water flow in these 
canals is controlled using wooden sheets (in local language called karri system). 
Likewise, all the minors and outlet structures are also un-gated, and as a consequence, 
accurate control of the flow into distributaries and minors is also lacking. 
 
 There are large variations in the amount of irrigation water supplied to users. Those on 
the head receive more water per ha than the users on the tail ends. Such variations exist 
at the main, distributary and minor canal levels. 
 
 Water delivery service to the users which is poor at the different levels of the canal is 
worst at third level canals. The reasons of poor water delivery service are proportional 
to the type un-gated structures, since less control of the water level could be made in 
these areas as well as in areas with tampered outlets. 
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Burala Canal (BC): specific issues 
 
The main infrastructure of Burala Canal network is about 100 years old. After institutional 
reforms, a large project for the rehabilitation of BC has been launched by JICA and some 
other donors. As a result, many of the structures (outlets, cross regulators, and earthen up 
of banks) have been installed a new or repaired, mostly on the main canal.  
 
The collection of water fee remains weak and collected fees are less than the operational, 
maintenance and management costs. Actually the water tariff that is set and charged is 
lower than operational, maintenance and management costs. 
The irrigation system was initially designed for 65% cropping intensity; it has been now 
increased up to 115%. 
 
Upper Pakpattan Canal (UPC): specific issues 
 
The irrigation system was designed for 65% cropping intensity whereas now the cropping 
intensity has increased up to 150%. 
 
The collection of water fee is much better than Burala Canal (BC) with more than 80% 
recovery efficiency. However, the tariff that is charged is lower than the actual O&M costs. 
 
Internal performance indicators  
 
Internal performance indicators have been assessed during the RAP survey. Results are 
compiled for both case study irrigation schemes and shown in Table 6.1. Most internal 
indicators show below average (2) in both irrigation schemes. However, Burala Canal (BC) 
Irrigation Scheme showed a bit better internal performance as given in Table 6.1. This is 
particularly because of institutional reform and the modernization and rehabilitation 
projects on BC, which have developed and improved hydraulic infrastructure. In this 
context, value 2.4 and 2.2 shows better and improved general physical conditions for the 
second and third level canals respectively in BC Irrigation Scheme. Although, there is not a 
clear difference in the general conditions of main canals of both irrigation schemes 
however operation of the main, second, and third level canals is better in BC irrigation 
scheme than UPC Irrigation Scheme. 
 
Unlike UPC Irrigation Scheme, a clear difference is noted in the actual and stated water 
delivery service to individual ownership units (farms) in BC Irrigation Scheme as, actual 
water delivery service is lower (0.9) than the stated water delivery service to farms (1.4). 
Cross regulator hardware is not exist at the offtakes of third level canals in BC irrigation 
scheme, which provides more flexibility in the water delivery service to third level canals. 
However, actual water delivery service at the most downstream point in the system 
operated by a paid employee is better (1.9) in BC Irrigation Scheme than UPC Irrigation 
Scheme (1.1). FOs and WUAs has a significant involvement to secure a good water 
delivery service from the paid employees of IPD at main canal and within secondary canals 
as well.    
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
Table 6.1. Internal performance indicators 
Internal Performance Indicators FMIS GMIS 
Actual water delivery service to individual ownership units (e.g., field or 
farm) 
0.9 0.9 
Stated water delivery service to individual ownership units (e.g., field or 
farm) 
1.4 0.9 
Actual water delivery service at the most downstream point in the system 
operated by a paid employee 
1.9 1.1 
Stated water delivery service at the most downstream point in the system 
operated by a paid employee 
1.6 1.9 
Actual water delivery service by the main canals to the second level canals 2.6 2.2 
Stated water delivery service by the main canals to the second level canals 2.1 2.3 
Social "order" in the canal system operated by paid employees 0.8 1 
Main Canal FMIS GMIS 
Cross regulator hardware (main canal) 1.1 0.9 
Turnouts from the main canal 2 1.7 
Regulating reservoirs in the main canal 0
a
 2 
Communications for the main canal 2.5 2.6 
General conditions for the main canal 1.8 1.6 
Operation of the main canal 3 2.1 
Second Level Canal FMIS GMIS 
Cross regulator hardware (second level canals) 1.3 1.1 
Turnouts from the second level canals 1.7 1.5 
Regulating reservoirs in the second level canals 0
a
 0
a
 
Communications for the second level canals 2.5 2.4 
General conditions for the second level canals 2.4 1.4 
Operation of the second level canals 2.4 2.2 
Third Level Canal FMIS GMIS 
Cross regulator hardware (third level canals) 0
b
 0.9 
Turnouts from the third level canals 1 0.7 
Regulating reservoirs in the third level canals 0
a
 0
a
 
Communications for the third level canals 1.6 2.5 
General conditions for the third level canals 2.2 1.7 
Operation of the third level canals 2.2 1.9 
Note: Maximum Value = 4, Minimum Value = 0 
a
 Regulating reservoir does not exit. 
b
 Cross regulator hardware does not exist. 
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External performance indicators 
 
External performance indicators were also assessed during the RAP survey. The results 
were compiled for both case study irrigation schemes as shown in Table 6.2, which 
indicated that cost recovery ratio is much less in BC Irrigation Scheme. However; the ratio 
of maintenance cost to revenue is much better in BC than in UPC Irrigation Scheme. 
Table 6.2. External performance indicators  
Financial Indicators FMIS GMIS 
Cost recovery ratio 0.33 0.67 
Maintenance cost to revenue ratio 0.48 0.33 
Total MOM cost per unit area (US$/ha) 5 4 
Total cost per staff person employed (US$/person) 1,046 1,488 
Revenue collection performance 0.62 0.85 
Staff persons per unit irrigated area (Persons/ha) 0.029 0.013 
Number of turnouts per field operator 1.5 2.8 
Average revenue per cubic meter of irrigation water delivered to water 
users by the project authorities (US$/m
3
) 
0.0004 0.0005 
Total MOM cost per cubic meter of irrigation water delivered to water 
users by the project authorities  (US$/m
3
) 
0.0007 0.0004 
Agricultural Productivity and Economic Indicators FMIS GMIS 
Output per unit command area (US$/ha) 2,271 4,013 
Output per unit irrigated area, including multiple cropping (US$/ha) 2,014 2,643 
Output per unit water supply (US$/m
3
) 0.267 0.357 
Output per unit of field ET (US$/m
3
) 0.226 0.298 
 
Furthermore, management, operation and maintenance (MOM) cost per unit area is 5 US 
dollars per hectare in BC Irrigation Scheme (FMIS) which is higher than UPC Irrigation 
Scheme (GMIS) with 4 US dollars. With regards to the current working staff strength, 29 
persons are providing services for 1000 hectares in BC compared to only 13 persons are 
working for same area of 1000 hectares in UPC Irrigation Scheme which reveal the 
deficiency of staff in one way or superior efficiency of staff for doing same job with so 
limited number of staff. With the fact that staff employed in FOs are paid very low salaries 
comparative to government employees in UPC Irrigation Scheme. However, such 
information could also provide a reason for higher cost of per staff person employed in 
UPC Irrigation Scheme. Each staff person has to look after and monitor around 3 turnouts 
which are almost double to BC Irrigation Scheme.  
 
Despite of all this, agricultural productivity of per unit irrigated area is significantly higher 
in UPC than in the BC Irrigation Scheme. This is particularly because of the crop 
diversification, mechanized, and intensive farming as discussed in Chapter of farm-level 
performances. These results of agricultural productivity can be compared with the findings 
of Nabi (2009) in Pakistan (as given earlier in Table 2.5) and with another recent study by 
Uçar (2011) in Turkey (given in Table 2.6). The results of external indicators in this study 
show that agricultural output performances in BC and UPC Irrigation Schemes (Pakistan) 
are much lower than Turkey. However, these findings are better than assessed by Nabi 
(2009) in the same Burala Irrigation Scheme.  
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6.2 System capacity and sensitivity of offtakes   
The sensitivity of irrigation structures (offtakes) had been assessed and mapped out, while 
singular points in terms of transport, control, and measurement of flows had also been 
identified during the course of this research study. The one limiting factor of this section is 
the sensitivity of cross-regulators which could not be assessed due to unavailability of 
required data.  
 
Sensitivity refers to the characteristic of the irrigation structures that identify how irrigation 
structures react when subjected to changes (perturbations, e.g. variations in water level or 
discharge) in flow conditions. The sensitivity of irrigation structures sensitivity implies 
change in output (water level or discharge) with every change in input (water level or 
discharge). Sensitivity indicators are used to quantify the magnitude of the reaction of the 
system as well as to trigger specific operation procedures, e.g. high-sensitive structures 
need to be operated more often and with more care than low-sensitive structures. 
Table 6.3. Ranking of sensitivity indicators for an offtake 
Offtake Sensitivity indicator Example 
Highly sensitive Greater than 2 Overshot type offtake 
  Undershot type with very low head (0.25m or less) 
Medium sensitive Between 1 and 2 Undershot type with head between 0.25 and 0.5m 
Low sensitive Below 1 An undershot gated structure fed with head >0.5m  
  Specific modulated structure 
Source: FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper 63 
 
For offtake structures the sensitivity is the change in discharge (q) according to change in 
water level (h) (Figure 6.1). Ranking of sensitivity indicators is shown in Table 6.3. 
 
 
Source: Renault et al. 2007 
Figure 6.1. Offtake structure input and output  
 
A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
Burala Canal has 36 offtake structures (including both gated and un-gated) which are at the 
head of 34 distributaries, one minor and one branch canal and taking water from the main 
canal. The sensitivity of these structures varies remarkably from one structure to other. The 
results showed a maximum sensitivity of an offtake structure at 8.20 m
-1
 which is at the 
head of Azmat Shah distributary (Figure 6.2). The reason for the high sensitivity of this 
structure is the less availability of water at the head considering that the main canal does 
not run at its full water supply depth. The minimum sensitivity of the offtake structure is 
Discharge (q) Water level (h) 
Offtake function: 
Translate water level in 
parent canal into discharge 
in dependent canal.  
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0.90 m
-1
 at the head of Hassoki distributary, which could be due to the availability of water 
at its head is high.  
 
Similarly, the sensitivity of other offtake structures along the Burala Canal depends upon 
the availability of head on these structures and the presence of flow control structure 
downstream of the offtake structures. Figure 6.2 shows the sensitivity (S) of offtake 
structures as a function of head (h). However, 5% offtakes in Burala Canal are low 
sensitive, 17% are medium sensitive and 78% are high sensitive. 
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 Figure 6.2. Sensitivity of offtakes structures at BC Irrigation Scheme 
Note: LS denotes for low sensitivity, MS for medium and HS for high sensitivity 
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The average sensitivity of all offtakes is 3.25 m
-1
 and median is 2.76 m
-1
 which show high 
sensitivity of all offtake structures along Burala Canal regardless of sensitivity ranking i.e. 
low sensitive, medium sensitive and high sensitive offtake structures.   
Table 6.4. Variations in discharge at different offtake structures of BC Irrigation Scheme 
S.No Diversion channel 
Designed Q 
(m
3
/s) 
Variation in 
discharge*  
+0.1m (10%) 
Variation in 
discharge*  
+ 0.2m (20%) 
OT1 Ala 0.43 28.8 57.5 
OT2 Arif 0.55 27.6 55.1 
OT3 Azmat Shah 0.28 82.0 164.0 
OT4 Balochwala 0.65 31.1 62.3 
OT5 Bhoja 4.04 25.9 51.7 
OT6 Chakko 0.11 78.6 157.3 
OT7 Dauranwan 0.35 43.9 87.7 
OT8 Dhodian 0.18 54.4 108.9 
OT9 Ditch Right 0.34 47.7 95.4 
OT10 Ditch Left 0.49 28.8 57.5 
OT11 Dulchi 0.53 11.8 23.6 
OT12 Farooq 1.13 15.7 31.3 
OT13 Ghark 0.28 10.6 21.3 
OT14 Gil Ghazi 0.20 12.5 25.0 
OT15 Girja 0.37 52.3 104.6 
OT16 Hassoki 0.08 9.0 18.0 
OT17 Jhoke 0.35 42.2 84.3 
OT18 Kabirwala 5.24 14.6 29.3 
OT19 Kalera 1.03 21.8 43.5 
OT20 Kaller 3.85 23.5 47.0 
OT21 Kamalia 1.37 27.7 55.5 
OT22 Kanya 0.51 25.0 49.9 
OT23 Killianwala 6.47 22.4 44.7 
OT24 Munianwala 0.10 64.5 129.0 
OT25 Naurang 0.94 25.9 51.9 
OT26 Nupewala I 0.34 50.9 101.7 
OT27 Nupewala II 1.04 20.3 40.7 
OT28 Obhal 0.41 45.8 91.6 
OT29 Pervaiz 0.77 36.0 71.9 
OT30 Pithorana 0.50 20.8 41.6 
OT31 Rajiana I 0.29 9.4 18.8 
OT32 Rajiana II 0.29 51.6 103.1 
OT33 Samundri 0.46 42.1 84.3 
OT34 Tandlianwala 11.13 10.8 21.5 
OT35 Waghi 2.06 28.9 57.9 
OT36 Bhalak 4.34 25.2 50.5 
*Variation in discharge is calculated based on sensitivity value of that offtake 
 
Table 6.4 presents the variations in the discharge at the offtake structures (head of 
distributaries) when there is change in water level of 0.1 m in the Burala Canal. The 
minimum variation in discharge is 9% at Hassoki distributary (OT 16) and the maximum 
variation in discharge is 82% at Azmat Shah distributary (OT 3) for 0.1 m water level 
change upstream of the structure. In order to provide uniform water delivery along the 
canals, different operational strategies are required for the different offtake structures, 
where structures with high sensitivity would require more frequent adjustment in their gate 
settings. Moreover, it is also necessary to observe the discharge of the distributaries to 
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ensure uniform water delivery service along the canal. Nevertheless, a distributary which 
has high discharge and medium sensitivity can produce more variations in the discharge of 
main canal than a structure which has high sensitivity and low discharge. 
 
B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
There are 17 offtake structures at the main Upper Pakpattan Canal (UPC). Similar with the 
condition of Burala Canal, sensitivity varies from one offtake structure to another 
depending on the availability of water at the head and in the main canal. The sensitivity of 
all offtake structures at UPC is shown in Figure 6.3. The offtake structure of 1-BR 
secondary canal shows the highest sensitivity value (4.37 m
-1
) among all the other offtakes. 
As indicated in Figure 6.1, the reason of high sensitivity of 1-BR is the low availability of 
water at the head of the offtake structure in this secondary canal. However, the offtake 
structure of 1-AR secondary canal shows lowest sensitivity value (0.35 m
-1
) which reveals 
high and consistent availability of water at the head of the offtake structure of the 1-AR 
distributary. 
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Figure 6.3. Sensitivity of offtakes structures at UPC Irrigation Scheme 
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The average sensitivity of all offtake points in UPC is 2 m
-1
 with median value of 
sensitivity of 1.83 m
-1
. Furthermore, the sensitivity of all offtake structures can be 
categorized into three groups, namely: low sensitivity, medium sensitivity, and high 
sensitive offtakes. In this study, only two offtake structures (1-AR and 3-L) show low 
sensitivity against the available water at the head in the main UPC, and are grouped into 
low sensitive (LS) offtake structures. However, nine offtake structures representing 53% of 
all offtake structures fall in the medium sensitive (MS) category, which also implies that 
53% offtakes in the UPC are medium sensitive to the available water at the head of the 
main canal. Meanwhile, the six offtakes in the category of high sensitive (HS) offtake 
structures represent 35% of all offtakes at the main canal.  
 
Efforts were made to assess the variation in discharge of offtake structures against the 
variations of the water level in the main canal up to a certain limit of  + 0.1m (10%) and + 
0.2m (20%), the results of which are shown in Table 6.5. As indicated in the Table for the 
1-AR offtake structure, if there is 0.1 m change in the water level of the main canal in 
UPC, it will cause 3.5% change in the discharge of the 1-AR.  
Table 6.5. Variations in discharge at different offtake structures of UPC 
S.No Diversion channel 
Designed Q 
 (m
3
/s) 
Variation in 
discharge* 
 +0.1m (10%) 
Variation in 
discharge*  
+ 0.2m (20%) 
OT1 1-AR 1.35 3.5 7.0 
OT2 1-BR 0.24 43.7 87.5 
OT3 1-CR 0.60 26.0 52.1 
OT4 1-L 3.43 12.2 24.5 
OT5 1-R 2.30 16.3 32.7 
OT6 2-AL 0.67 26.0 52.1 
OT7 2-AR 2.23 19.1 38.1 
OT8 2-BR 1.79 13.7 27.4 
OT9 2-L 5.90 13.1 26.1 
OT10 2-R 1.76 19.3 38.6 
OT11 3-AL 0.51 27.3 54.7 
OT12 3-L 14.91 8.7 17.4 
OT13 4-L 2.18 18.1 36.3 
OT14 5-L 6.43 13.1 26.2 
OT15 6-L 3.63 18.3 36.7 
OT16 Jiwan Shah 0.23 32.8 65.6 
OT17 Shaffi 0.28 29.8 59.6 
*Variation in discharge is calculated based on sensitivity value of that offtake 
 
Similarly, if there is 0.2 m change in main canal head, there will be 7% variation in the 
discharge of 1-AR. Any offtake structure with high sensitivity value will show more 
variation in discharge in response to the change in variation in the main canal head stream 
and vice versa. The offtake of 1-BR distributary with highest sensitivity (4.37 m
-1
) would 
lead to 43.7% variation in discharge in response to the 10% variation in the main canal 
water head, as shown in Table 6.5. 
 
Summary 
 
In comparative to UPC, proportion of high sensitive offtake structures is more in BC. As a 
results 0.1 m change in the water level in the main canals leads to 32.5% variation in the 
discharge of secondary canals in BC Irrigation Scheme and 20.1% in UPC Irrigation 
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Scheme, on average basis. This is particularly due to the remodeling and redesigning of the 
offtakes of main BC during rehabilitation project after institutional program. The main 
objective behind this project is to ensure water supply at tail region which is obviously 
improved. Full supply depth of water is needed to overcome the high sensitive offtakes and 
inequity in water delivery in both irrigation schemes. 
6.3 Perturbation 
Perturbations analysis is used to measures the causes, magnitudes, frequency of water 
variation in canals, and suggests options for coping with such changes. Based on the 
available data on water supplies in both schemes, results are organized at main canal and 
one secondary canal level from each irrigation scheme and presented in the subsequent 
sections. 
 
A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
Supply to Main Canal 
 
The Burala Canal receives water from Upper Gugera Canal which takes its discharge from 
the Khanki Barrage. Figure 6.4 shows large variation in the water supplied at the intake 
regulator of Burala Canal in 2009-10. The maximum discharge supplied to the Burala 
Canal is 53 m
3
-s
-1
 even if the canal was closed three times due to (1) annual repair and 
maintenance, (2) implementation of relevant development program (installation of new 
irrigation structures), and (3) breach of canal (Figure 6.4). Burala Canal could be 
considered as a perennial type in terms of its flows. Allocation of water to Burala Canal 
depends on the overall water supplies in the Indus Basin River System (IBRS) and caters 
to two main cropping seasons, e.g. winter (Rabi) and summer (Kharif). During the field 
survey, one case of canal breaching was reported which caused about one week closure in 
the main canal flows.  
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Figure 6.4. Discharge variation in main BC (April, 2009 to March, 2010) 
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Water level at Burala Canal intake regulator varied up to 10-15 cm on a regular basis, and 
since the Burala Canal receives water from Upper Gugera Canal, the many direct outlets 
from Upper Gugera Canal cause perturbations. Burala Canal and Upper Gugera Canal 
(parent canal of BC) are homogeneous in terms of structures therefore there is also the 
possibility that the offtake structures in the Upper Gugera Canal may have high sensitivity, 
which could also be one source of the perturbation. Water theft from the Upper Gugera 
Canal is also a main problem (pipes are illegally placed in the canal) which could also be 
another reason for the variations in the discharge and water level at the intake regulator of 
Burala Canal. 
 
Supply to secondary canals 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the flow of water supplied to one secondary canal (Kabirwala 
distributary) in the BC Irrigation System. This secondary canal is located at the tail reach 
of Burala Canal. The discharge delivered to the main canal substantially varies which 
could be the reason for the variation in the discharge delivered to the distributaries which is 
very high. The variations in discharge is amplified due to the presence of direct outlets in 
the main canal, sensitive offtake structures upstream and water theft (through personal 
communication, 23 unauthorized outlets present at the main canal were reported) from the 
main canal. These could be the main reasons for the perturbations at distributaries 
(secondary level canal). 
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Figure 6.5. Discharge variation in a secondary canal (April, 2009 to March, 2010)  
 
B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
Supply to Main Canal 
 
The Upper Pakpattan Canal (UPC) receives water from Head Sulemanki (a diversion 
structure at Sutlej River) which takes its discharge from the Balloki Barrage through a link 
canal. Figure 6.6 shows that water supplied at the intake regulator of UPC varies largely 
during 2009-10. However, the canal was completely closed one time for annual repair and 
maintenance for one month during January 2010. UPC is also perennial type in its flows 
with maximum discharge of 72m
3
.s
-1
 (after subtracting the official discharges to seasonal 
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canals
10
 under Sulemanki Division e.g. Khadar Branch etc). Allocation of water to UPC 
also depends on the overall supplies in the Indus Basin River System (IBRS) and could 
cater into two main cropping seasons, e.g. winter (Rabi) and summer (Kharif).  
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Figure 6.6. Discharge variation in main UPC (July, 2009 to June, 2010) 
 
Supply to secondary canals 
 
Indent discharge is the actual volume of water allocated for a certain period of time based 
on the availability of water flows in the parent canal or any other source like dams and 
barrages, among others, and is different but usually less from the designed discharge of any 
canal.  
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Figure 6.7. Variation in discharge in 3-L secondary canal (July, 2009 to June, 2010) 
                                                 
10
 Seasonal canals deliver water only during Kharif season (15 April to 15 October) however these seasonal 
canals are not part of this study. 
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As shown in Figure 6.7, during the months of July, August, and September of 2009, the 
current discharge of 3-L distributary is same according to its indent discharge. However, 
after September, fluctuations in the current discharge started to occur and continued for the 
entire year except in January 2010, when the canal closed due to maintenance and repair. It 
is clear from Figure 6.7 that the current discharge of 3-L distributary does not follow the 
indent allocation of discharge.  
6.4 Water networks and water balances 
For this section, the nature and structure of all the streams and flows that affect and are 
influenced by the command area are mapped out. The discussion includes assessment of 
the hierarchical structure and the main features of the irrigation and drainage networks, 
natural surface streams and groundwater, and the results of the mapping of opportunities 
and constraints, including those of the drainage and recycling facilities. 
 
A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
Surface streams 
 
The command of Burala Canal (BC) Irrigation Scheme (FMIS) is surrounded by two main 
rivers, e.g. Chenab River from northeast to west, and Ravi River from east to west. Being 
part of the Lower Chenab Canal East (LCC East), Burala Canal is fed by LCC East that 
takes its discharge from Qadirabad Barrage on Chenab River. The designed capacity of 
Burala Canal is 66 CMS (cubic meter per second) and its annual peak flow in 2009-10 was 
55 CMS. The total water inflow for Burala Canal in 2009-10 was 1029 MCM (million 
cubic meter) at the point of entry or at diversion used for irrigation purposes. Electrical 
conductivity (EC) of BC water is 0.2 dS.m
-1
. It is also important to know that water 
inflows from Burala Canal are the main source of irrigation in the entire command area.  
 
Groundwater availability and its usage for irrigation 
 
Groundwater is also being used for irrigation as a supplementary source, and as noted 
during RAP survey the groundwater situation splits the command area into two parts: area 
with sodic groundwater and area with sweet ground water. Most part of the head reach and 
some parts of middle reach of Burala Canal have problem with regards to sodicity in the 
underground water, where groundwater cannot be used for irrigation purposes. Farmers 
therefore make conjunctive use of underground water with canal water. With the tail reach 
having good quality of underground water, no big variation was found in terms of depth of 
the underground water table. However, on the overall the use of underground water for 
agriculture could be very costly. Along with its irrigation objectives, groundwater is also 
being used for domestic and industrial purposes. 
 
Water recycling and drainage facility 
 
There are 36 secondary canals on Burala Canal that drain r to tertiary canals, and their 
flows are used for agriculture. Due to unreliable flows and delivery services of canal water, 
dependency on underground water has been increasing year to year. Drainage of available 
canal water is however good through a good network of delivery channels and on-farm soil 
texture that facilitate water seepage and infiltration. There are two other drains such as the 
Jaranwala Drain and Samundary Drain that mostly collect water from industries. These 
drains also flow out water from domestic sewage and rains into the Ravi River in the 
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downstream. These drains are not limited to Burala Canal command, but are also 
connected to the outer areas.  
 
Water balance 
 
Water balance which accounts for available canal inflows, its delivery and groundwater 
supply is constrained by two main issues related to water resource. The first issue deals 
with unreliable water delivery and too much fluctuations of water supply in the canals, 
where in most times the available water volume is not enough to fulfill the requirements of 
agriculture. Considering that the Burala Canal was initially designed to meet the irrigation 
requirements for only 65% of cropping intensity, now that intensity has increased up to 
110%, it has become difficult for Burala Canal to supply the water demands.  
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Figure 6.8. Monthly water supply and requirement in BC Irrigation Scheme 
 
Figure 6.8 depicts this water deficiency situation very clearly. Irrigation requirement per 
unit of irrigated area in the command of Burala Canal is 8311 cubic meters however, canal 
supplies only cover 4558 cubic meter. Strikingly, this supply is in the canal head which 
decreased further upon reaching the farm-gate level. This issue gives rise to another issue 
which deals with governance and managerial problems. In view of the sodic quality of 
underground water, it can support only requirements up to a certain limit. Improvement in 
the delivery performances and governance indicators therefore could provide the solution. 
At any rate, the current water supplies are far beyond less than the water requirements for 
irrigation taking into account the present cropping patterns. Figure 6.8 shows the trend of 
the monthly water supplies of Burala Canal into its command throughout the year. The 
irrigation water requirement peaks in June and also in May and July. While the least 
irrigation requirement is in January, canal water supplies are more than the irrigation 
requirement in November and December, particularly due to extreme cool weather and less 
ETo, and since this is the initial period of Rabi cropping season crops do not require much 
irrigation. 
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B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
Surface streams 
 
The command of UPC irrigation scheme (GMIS) is located in Bari Doab surrounded by 
two main rivers, e.g. Sutlej River and Ravi River. UPC is fed by Sulemanki Barrage on 
Sutlej River and based on the Indus Treaty of 1959 between India and Pakistan, India was 
given full right to use, control and manage the supplies of Sutlej River. In this connection, 
water was diverted from Balloki Barrage through Balloki-Sulemanki link canal to fed 
Sulemanki Barrage and to UPC. The designed capacity of UPC 81.51 m
3
.s
-1
 and its annual 
peak flow in 2009-10 was 72 m
3
.s
-1
. The total water allocated for UPC canal in 2009-10 
was 1702 MCM. However, only 1456 MCM was available at the point of entry or 
diversion to be used for irrigation purposes. Electrical conductivity (EC) of UPC water is 
0.3 dS.m
-1
. It is also important to note that inflows from UPC canal are the main source of 
irrigation in the entire command area.  
 
Groundwater availability and its usage for irrigation 
 
In the command of UPC, groundwater is also used for irrigation as a supplementary source. 
During RAP survey, it was observed that the quality of groundwater is very good from the 
point of view of irrigation particularly in the head and middle parts of command. However, 
the depth of underground water is an issue because farmers have to pump underground 
water from the depth of more than 200 feet on the average, while in some areas the 
underground water table could be as deep as 300 feet. As gathered during the discussions 
with farmers and engineers, the depth of underground water table is increasing day by day 
mainly because of shortage of rains and heavy pumping of water. As reported in the Punjab 
Development Statistics 2008, there were a total 7165 private tube wells only in District 
Pakpattan in 1994 and this number had almost doubled in 2004 with 10% yearly increment 
in terms of installations of private tube wells. Out of this total, almost 64% of the tube 
wells are operated by using diesel engines and rest by electric pumps. Therefore, farmers 
have to invest a significant amount on fuels for diesel engines diminishing the efficiency of 
tube well irrigations in terms of investments for inputs. According to the RAP analysis, 
about 434 MCM of groundwater is pumped by tube wells in the entire command of UPC.  
  
In some parts of the tail command of UPC, sodic groundwater was also reported, which 
cannot be used for irrigation purposes. Thus, the farmers make conjunctive use of 
groundwater with the canal water. However, since the depth of groundwater table is lower 
compared to head and middle reaches, this makes pumping of groundwater for agriculture 
very costly. 
 
Groundwater is also being used for domestic and industrial purposes along with its 
irrigation objectives. There are 57 government tube wells in the district Pakpattan only that 
are used to supply water for domestic use. 
 
Water balance 
 
Like in the Burala Canal, the first and foremost issue is unreliable water delivery and 
severe fluctuation of water supply in the canals. Therefore, the available water volume is 
not enough to fulfill the requirements of agriculture. Also considering that the UPC was 
initially designed to fulfill the irrigation requirement for only 65% of cropping intensity, 
and now that the intensity had gone up to 150%, UPC has not been able to cope with such 
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requirements. The second issue which deals with governance and managerial problems 
could be addressed through the improvement in the delivery performances and governance 
indicators. The trend with respect to the current water supplies which shows that these are 
far less than the water requirements for irrigation with the present cropping patterns is 
depicted Figure 6.9.  
 
Similar to BC Irrigation Scheme, the highest irrigation water required from the UPC 
Irrigation Scheme occurs in June, and also in July and May in descending order of 
irrigation water requirements. The monthly water requirements are shown in Figure 6.9. 
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Figure 6.9. Monthly water supply and requirement in UPC Irrigation Scheme 
This trend is particularly due to the period of Kharif cropping season which requires high 
irrigation like rice, maize and cotton. Therefore, during the months of November, 
December and February, the water supplies could be more than what is actually required in 
agriculture.  
 
However, these results show an overall and general picture of water supply and demand. 
Based on the canal supply situation, both irrigation schemes are water deficit on annual 
basis with multiple cropping (refer to cropping calendar Figure 3.6). In both irrigation 
schemes, groundwater contributes a major proportion to cover this deficiency of irrigation 
water. 
6.5 Financial aspects: costs and budgets 
It is necessary to gather a complete picture of the costs pertaining to the operation of the 
system in order to identify where possible gains could be enhanced with respect to the 
current service and operational setup, and what particular cost element needs to be 
investigated in order to improve the services. Another objective is to map the costs of 
current operation techniques and services, disaggregate the elements that contribute to the 
costs, and valuate the options for the various levels of services based on current and 
improved techniques. 
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A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
Records showed that the management, operational and maintenance (MOM) cost to supply 
water delivery service under the BC Irrigation Scheme was 5 US$/ha in 2009-10, while the 
budget of Burala Canal Irrigation Department was US$ 0.90 million and that of the 
Farmers Organizations was US$ 0.27 million. This means that the total budget of the 
whole BC Irrigation Scheme was US$ 1.17 million in 2009-10, implying that there is a 
need to recover the expenditures through various appropriate means.  
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Figure 6.10. Main canal budget distribution in BC Irrigation Scheme (2008-2009) 
In addition, BC Irrigation Department has 512 personnel while the Farmers Organizations 
have 178. Thus, there are 682 staff that include engineers, revenue staff, operators, 
monitoring and clerical staff who are engaged in providing the irrigation services for the 
BC Irrigation Scheme. Nevertheless, in spite of the 682 staff strength, 187 (27%) posts for 
various positions are still vacant at the main canal level only. Reports also indicated that 
the FOs were deficit of technical staff. Figure 6.10 shows the budget breakdown for BC 
Irrigation Scheme, which indicates that a major portion of the budget is expended for the  
salaries of staff (80% of the budget) working in offices and in the fields for management as 
well as for providing the irrigation services. Meanwhile, about 17% of the budget is 
allocated for repairs and maintenance of canal structures, 2% for operations and 
transportation costs, and 1% for administration utilities, stationery, and equipments.  
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Figure 6.11. Annual budget distribution of FOs and WUAs in BC Irrigation Scheme 
 
As shown in Figure 6.11, the breakdown of annual budget for FOs and WUAs in Burala 
Canal Irrigation Scheme reveals that 55% of the total budget is spent on salaries of staff, 
22% on repairs and maintenance, and 21% on administration utilities such as electricity, 
stationery, fuels and transportation. Based on the reports of FOs from the Area Water 
Board of Faisalabad, many FOs are short of technical staff like engineers because the 
salaries of staff working under FOs are low and more importantly, most staff are hired on 
contract basis, while some FOs were reported to have recruited retired Patwaries and sub-
engineers. In spite of such attempts to lower operations costs, FOs spend 5% more on 
repairs and maintenance of canals than IPD in the main Burala Canal. 
 
Before the establishment of the Farmers Organizations in BC Irrigation Scheme, water 
charges were assessed by Patwaries (persons assessing the water charges) based on crops 
cultivated and the area used for each crop. Now, a flat rate system for water charges has 
been developed and implemented on per acre basis regardless of the crops being grown. 
While the Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) is now collected by the Water Users Associations 
and Farmers Organizations, the tasks of Patwaries were also finished but since they are 
government employees they have to be retained as such with corresponding government-
related jobs. As a result, in the BC Irrigation Scheme alone, 112 Patwaries are still working 
and continue to receive salaries accounting for about 12.5% of the total allocations for 
salaries. This could be one of the reasons for the high proportion of personnel salaries in 
the total budget for the BC Irrigation Scheme. 
 
Figure 6.12, results and status of ISF recovery by FOs on annual basis, indicating that after 
the establishment of FOs, recovery in year 2004-05 was about 83% which was much 
higher than present. The 5 year average of ISF collection is 62.4% with a wide standard 
deviation of 22.6% annually. 
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Figure 6.12. ISF recovery trend among various years in BC Irrigation Scheme 
The results therefore showed that in the study area, the assessed water fee is less than the 
operation and maintenance expenditures. As suggested in Figure 6.12, there is continuous 
declining trend in the recovery of ISF from farmers. In 2004-05, recovery of ISF was more 
than 80% but decreased to less than 30% in 2008-09, indicating possible severe 
inefficiency on the part of WUAs as well as FOs particularly in the collection of ISF from 
farmers. After discussing this issue with officials and farmers, it was gathered that the 
farmers were quite flexible in their payments of ISF resulting in possible delays. This 
flexibility could be a result of some operational deficiencies on the part of the FOs 
particularly due to lack of typical rules and enforcement system for defaulters and free 
riders, which also prevent competent authorities of FOs to stop water delivery to 
defaulters. Easter and Liu (2005) also reported that there is no incentive or penalty system 
for the payers of water charges (ISF) for in time and late payments of water charges. This 
situation violates the governing principle no. 5 when (Ostrom, 1990) calls for graduated 
sanctions on those who violate the operational rules. As a point of consideration, declining 
trend in the ISF highlights the deficiencies by both sides e.g. institutions as well as farmers. 
Diverse and unequal social setup among farming communities (large farmers, small and 
poor farmers, politically influenced farmers etc.) open room for large and influenced 
farmers to make delay payments or not at all (Nakashima, 2005). Nakashima (2005) 
already reported the reservations of small and poor farmers that after IMT, landlords will 
exploit them in terms of water delivery services. It seems true here when many small and 
poor farmers highlighted the outlet tempering and mismanagement in the rotation system 
by a minister. When this issue was discussed with officials of AWB, it was told that many 
development projects and fundings were approved and facilitated by this minister, so we 
cannot take any action against him. FOs are not yet fully capacitated to take action mostly 
because of two main reasons e.g. one is lacking of strict jurisdiction and secondly, inter-
personal relationships (kinships and political affiliations). As a matter of fact in Punjab, 
during the implementation of IMT, most focus was given on the organization of FOs and 
WUAs, while leaving the farmers to operate irrigation system by their selves. 
Implementation of rules and regulations, and enforcement mechanisms particularly under 
the diverse social and political structures of Punjab are still lacking to develop after the 
establishment of FOs and WUAs. 
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B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
The total operational, management and maintenance cost to supply water delivery services 
under the UPC Irrigation Scheme was 4 US$/ha in 2009-10 while the total budget of the 
UPC Irrigation Scheme was US$ 0.84 million. The personnel strength of UPC is 450 but 
only 335 persons are currently working and engaged in providing irrigation services to the 
UPC irrigation area. This strength of personnel includes professional engineers, sub-
engineers, operators, field staff, and revenue staff. It is also significant to mention that 
there are vacant positions at the managerial level as well as for field staff including some 
very important positions such as canal patwaries, gauge readers, beldars (casual personnel 
responsible for monitoring and maintenance), and clerical staff. Moreover, there had been 
no well documented training for sub-engineers and field operators although professional 
engineers have gained exposure from some training sessions at national and international 
levels. Regarding the staffing pattern for GMIS, out of 450 sanctioned posts, 335 persons 
are currently appointed and engaged in services while 115 (25%) posts for various ranks 
are still vacant.   
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Figure 6.13. Annual budget distribution of UPC Irrigation Scheme 
Figure 6.13 shows the breakdown of the budget for UPC Irrigation Scheme, indicating that 
major part of the budget is allocated for salaries of staff (71% of the budget) working in 
offices and in the field for management and for providing the irrigation services. While 
about 22% of the budget is allocated repair and maintenance activities, 3% is for 
operations and transportations and the remaining 4% is for administration, utilities, and 
equipments.   
 
In UPC (GMIS), collection of ISF is in a much better situation than in Burala Canal 
(FMIS). As shown in Figure 6.14, recovery efficiency had never gone lower than 80% 
during last few years, even in 1999-2000 it could be noted that recovery was 100%. The 6 
year average collection is ~91% with a small standard deviation of ~7% annually. In UPC, 
ISF is also assessed on per acre basis (flat rate) which is relayed to the farmers by 
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Patwaries
11
, but collection of ISF is done by Numberdars
12
. Such arrangement denotes the 
proper and strict enforcement of the rules of Punjab Irrigation and Power Department. 
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Figure 6.14. ISF recovery trend among different years in UPC Irrigation Scheme 
Summary 
 
The information and knowledge about the costs of management, operation and 
maintenance in the case study schemes appeared very fragmented. Table 6.6 summarizes 
the all financial aspects of BC and UPC irrigation Schemes. It has been made in some 
studies that ISF has only made up to 2 to 6 percent of the total cost of production of 
different crops which have to be increased considerably to have any remarkable effect on 
the water demand eventually (Sahibzada, 2002). It will be helpful to cover the MOM 
expenditures and FOs will be more financially autonomous. 
Table 6.6. Financial aspects of irrigation schemes  
Financial aspects FMIS GMIS 
Total budget (US$/ha) 5.65 4.93 
Non-salary budget (US$/ha) 1.47 1.41 
Salary & allowance (US$/ha) 4.18 3.52 
Management, Operation & Maintenance 
(US$/ha) 
5 4 
Cost recovery ratio 0.33 0.67 
 
Further analysis should therefore be made in order to produce reliable figures specifying 
what should be considered as reasonable cost for a given service and the composition of 
the maintenance cost that should be included. 
                                                 
11
 Field staff of Revenue Department responsible for assessing water charges (ISF locally known as 
“abiana”), data collection and record keeping of agricultural land and seasonal and yearly crops. 
 
12
 Representatives of government at village level contracted on permanent basis and responsible for 
collection of water charges from water users. 
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6.6 Service of users 
This portion focuses on mapping the existing services provided to users and suggests 
possible options for improving such services with due consideration to farmers and crops 
as well as to other water users. 
 
A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
The services in the Burala Canal command were assessed and ranked according to FAO 
standards (FAO, 2003a) during the RAP exercises in the field. The estimated service 
indicators are shown in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7. Services to users at various delivery levels in BC Irrigation Scheme 
Indicator 
Main to secondary 
canals 
Secondary to 
tertiary canals 
Tertiary to farm 
level 
Farm level 
Flexibility 1 1 0.5 3 
Reliability 2.5 2 1.5 1.5 
Equity 2 2 1 2.5 
 
Current services 
 
Based on the abovementioned estimated service indicators denoting the current delivery 
services at various canal levels, a summary of the findings is given in the succeeding 
sections of this paper. 
 
Service to secondary canals 
 
The decline in the quality of services was noted from the main canal to secondary and 
tertiary canals as well as at the most lower levels, e.g. agriculture fields in BC Irrigation 
scheme. Although it is noticeable that the services along the main canal were quite reliable 
but these had been very weak or poor in terms of flexibility and equity. As also observed 
during the RAP survey, services to secondary canals vary from one canal to another, i.e. all 
secondary canals do not get the same services. The levels of offtakes of many secondary 
canals which were redesigned and restructured (levels were upgraded) during the 
rehabilitation program after reforms, could be a significant reason for the high value of 
offtakes sensitivity. This is considering that any small change in the main flow of main 
canal could cause big change in the discharge of the secondary canals. 
 
Although there is no justifiable reason for the difference in terms of soil conditions and 
cropping patterns, the only reason given by officials during the interview and discussions 
was their efforts to provide equitable water supplies to the canal tail. 
 
Service to tertiary canals 
 
Results of the analysis show high level of reliability and inequality at the tertiary canal 
levels based on the flexibility indicator which is comparatively better at an estimated value 
of 1.0. Although, initiatives to remodel the offtakes level along the main canal were meant 
to improve the delivery of water flows at the tails but such efforts decreased the services at 
the tertiary canal levels in the head and middle reaches. In spite of all these, many 
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secondary canals were lined fully or partly with different materials like bricks, and were 
cemented, concreted, and some re-enforced with earth.  
 
Service to farmers 
 
The results also indicated that the current service to farmers had not been sufficient enough 
to fulfill their requirements considering that the irrigation schemes were initially designed 
for 65% of cropping intensity which increased up to more than 110% on the average. 
Water is distributed among farmers based on the concept of “warabandi13” after every 7 
days for a fixed time depending on landholdings. Further, this fixed time varies from 
offtake to offtake depending on the size and designed discharge of such offtake. Some 
offtakes could have 7 minutes per acre but some 15 minutes per acre. Owing to the current 
service indicators, farmers are unable to grow high water demanding crops because of 
unreliable water supplies. As an option, they have to depend on high-cost tube wells to 
fulfill their needs and demands for water, particularly during summer when day time 
temperature could go higher than 40°C. More strikingly, it should be noted that this is a 
supply based irrigation system where water supplies are not delivered based on the 
requirements of the cultivated crops.  
 
Flexibility 
 
Below the secondary canals, offtakes are unregulated providing for much flexibility, but 
the main problem is on the unreliability and inequity of supplies. However, some elements 
of political influence had also been gathered from during field survey and discussions with 
farmers particularly after the establishment of the FOs and WUAs. Moreover, during the 
monsoon season when many farmers do not need water; they try to close the offtakes to 
save their crops from flooding even if it is not permitted. Similarly, during times of high 
demand for water irrigation, occurrence of water theft and tampering of outlets could be 
very common.   
 
Multiple uses of water 
 
Water from the canal is also used for other purposes such as in maintaining livestock raised 
by farmers. Herds of buffalos, cows, goats and sheep drink and bathe from every level of 
the canals but also cause damages to infrastructures. For this reason, the Department of 
Irrigation has developed and specified the locations for animals. However, canal supplies 
seem to have no other major role except for agriculture purposes although in instances 
when the groundwater in some parts of the study area becomes saline, many people install 
hand pumps near the canal banks to get water which is safe for domestic purposes.   
 
Other services provided 
 
Officials of the Area Water Board (AWB) identified some services which are provided to 
farmers such as: 
                                                 
13
 Traditional irrigation water rights are defined by a “warabandi” system, where water supply is determined 
by rotation and an individual’s water allocation is measured by the time of water intake proportional to the 
size of farmland irrigated. Therefore, the traditional water rights are based on a time-equitable system. In this 
way the water rights are linked with the farmland and cannot be separated from its land holding. The 
warabandi system has been operated for more than 100 years by farmers, with official recognition of the 
government. 
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 Training to strengthen the capability of WUAs; and 
 Helping the WUAs and FOs in settling cases of conflicts, irrigation fee recovery, 
elections, and enforcement of rules. 
 
Service to the environment 
 
Based on existing relevant documents and according to concerned officials, no service has 
been provided to the environment. However, since the main canal and tertiary canals are 
earthen, a major portion of water lost due to seepage could contribute to lowering the 
salinity in affected areas specifically in the head and some parts of middle reaches. It 
should also be considered that this could also cause water logging in some areas because of 
the saline nature of underground water especially where tube well irrigation is not 
commonly used. However, Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) of Lower Gogera Canal 
(parent canal of BC) is 8 mg/litre and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) is 14.3 mg/litre 
(IPD, 2008).   
 
Service adjustment to the water holding capacity 
 
In view of the varying properties of the soil from the head to tail-ends, farmers at tail-ends 
are able to diversify their cropping systems because of good and more fertile soil 
conditions. This means that water supplies (frequency and volumes) could be adjusted 
according to the local soil conditions and cropping patterns thus, improving water 
efficiencies and productivities. 
 
B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
Similar exercises had been adopted in the UPC to estimate the service indicators at various 
levels of the canals. The results are given in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8. Services provided to users at various delivery levels in UPC Irrigation Scheme 
Indicator 
Main to secondary 
canals 
Secondary to 
tertiary canals 
Tertiary to farm 
level 
Farm level 
Flexibility 1 1.5 1.5 2.5 
Reliability 2 1 1 1 
Equity 2.5 1.5 0.5 1 
 
Service to secondary canals 
 
As indicated in Table 6.8, it is clear that there is a decline in the flexibility of deliveries 
from the main canal to most downstream levels, e.g. farms. In terms of flexibility, the RAP 
survey observed that the deliveries from main canal to secondary canals had a value of 1.5 
suggesting that the flows for secondary canals are dictated by the project office at the main 
UPC. Downstream operators are not allowed to undertake any adjustments without prior 
directives or instructions from the project office.  
 
The value of the reliability at 2.0 suggests that flows reach the destination in plus or minus 
2 days although 4-week shortages could be common throughout the year. A 4-week 
complete closure has been imposed in the main UPC every January for desilting and 
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general maintenance. Moreover, the equity value of 2.5 in Table 6.8 reveals that about 10% 
turnouts receive significantly poorer services than the average. 
 
It had been observed that the service along the main canal is quite reliable but very weak or 
poor in terms of flexibility and equity. In fact, the RAP survey recorded that service to 
secondary canal varies from one canal to another, e.g. all secondary canals do not get same 
service. There was also no justifiable reason for this difference in terms of soil conditions 
and cropping patterns. The only reason noted during the interview and discussions with 
officials was to provide equitable supplies to canal tail reach. 
 
Service to tertiary canals 
 
The results in Table 6.8 show better flexibility at the tertiary canal level, but a flexibility 
value of 1.5 means that the delivery schedule is dictated by project office. However, 
schedules could be adjusted by operators on about a weekly basis in accordance with the 
available supplies and taking into consideration the directives from project office. 
Nevertheless, high decline was observed from the results of the reliability and inequities in 
deliveries at the tertiary canal levels. Since almost 97% secondary canals are unlined and 
are earthen, this situation decreases the reliability and increases the inequity in available 
water deliveries in the entire command. Many secondary canals are also old and damaged 
while in many areas, canal banks had already taken a zigzagging shape that contributes to 
the delay in the timely access of flows to certain reaches. 
 
Service to farmers and environment 
 
The flexibility indicator at farm level at 2.5 denotes that delivery schedule is fixed 
(warabandi: one time for every 7 days) for a fixed period of time, but such deliveries do 
not match with the actual crop needs. The current service to farmers is therefore not 
enough to fulfill their demands especially that the irrigation scheme was designed initially 
for 65% of cropping intensity which has increased on the average to 150%. Furthermore, 
this fixed time varies from offtake to offtake depending on the size and the designed 
discharge of certain offtake. While some offtakes could take 7 minutes per acre but the 
others could have 15 minutes. Owing to such current service indicators, farmers are unable 
to grow high water demanding crops because of the unreliable water supplies. Thus, the 
farmers have to depend on high-cost tube wells to fulfill their needs and requirements, 
particularly during summer when day time temperature could as high as or even over 40°C. 
Moreover, as a supply based irrigation system, water supplies should be delivered based on 
the demands of crops being cultivated. It should also be noted that about 74% of the 
tertiary canals are unlined, 9% are lined with bricks, and only 17% are concrete lined. 
Although a national program known as the National Program for Improvement of 
Watercourses (NPIW) was started in 2003, and still continues at tertiary canals at farm 
level.  
 
In UPC Irrigation Scheme, Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) at Sulemanki Head works 
is 10.88 mg/litre and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) is 23.2 mg/litre which are higher 
than BC irrigation Scheme (IPD, 2008). The higher the value of BOD and COD denotes 
the higher value of pollution in the canal water samples. It means that quality of canal 
irrigation water in UPC is more polluted than BC.  
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6.7 Management units 
The irrigation system and command areas could be divided into subunits (subsystems 
and/or subcommand areas) that are homogeneous and/or separated from one another by a 
singular point or a particular borderline. 
 
A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
All the 36 secondary canals of the Burala Canal are managed by farmers in accordance 
with the PIDA Act of 1997. The 24 managing bodies at the secondary canal levels are 
known as Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) that further comprise the Water Users’ 
Associations (WUAs) at the tertiary canal levels. After the FOs receive water from the 
main Burala Canal, the water is then diverted to the WUAs for irrigation purposes. 
Farmers’ Organization is established to manage and operate at distributary and minor canal 
level however Water Users’ Association do same at water course level. In the 
organizational structure of the BC Irrigation Scheme, there is another regional managing 
board on top of all FOs known as the Area Water Board (AWB), which works under the 
command of the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA). There are three 
main cells working in AWB, these are the “institutional support and coordination cell”, 
“monitoring and evaluation cell”, and “capacity building cell”.    
 
The executive committee members of FOs and WUAs are elected by their members where 
each farmer (water user) bears the right of one vote regardless of their landholding size. 
Although farmers were very motivated during the interviews, some elements of political 
influence could be noticed not only in the elections processes but also in terms of the 
equitable distribution of water as well.  
 
The existing structure of the 24 FOs at the secondary canals of the BC Irrigation Scheme is 
given in Appendix C. However, a number of issues were reported during the discussions 
with the water users and also observed in the data provided by them, which include: 
 
 Uneven command area under each FO,  
 Difficulties in accessing the offices and resources of FOs due to distance,  
 Some FOs are very big with more numbers of WUAs while some have only few 
WUAs,  
 Technical issues such as infrastructure and engineering information that are 
spread over the different sub-divisions, and 
 Political affiliations and interferences. 
 
Considering the aforementioned issues, it is proposed to restructure the overall 
management units (FOs) in the BC Irrigation Scheme as shown in Table 6.9 into 19 new 
FOs that could effectively assist the water users with respect to access, conflict resolution, 
and improve water delivery services. The proposal was also envisaged to improve the 
collection of ISF and decrease the burden of allocating considerable funds for salaries from 
the budgets of FOs since the number of FOs is reduced. However, 6 FOs could not be 
restructured mainly because of their special status even if they are very large in terms of 
command areas. In addition, some FOs could not also be possibly restructured into smaller 
units such as the Bahlak FO as well as the Tandlianwala and Killianwala FOs.  
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Table 6.9. Proposed management units of BC Irrigation Scheme 
Sub-
Division 
Secondary channels CCAa  Outlets 
Proposed management Units 
FOs Remarks 
T
an
d
li
an
w
al
a
 
 
 
 
Chakku 506 3 
} 1 New Dulchi 2,391 13 
Nupewala I 1,628 27 
Nupewala II 4,629 24
1
 
} 2 New Pithrana 2,281 12 
Hassoki 502 3 
} 3 New Naurang 4,493 21 
Bahlak 13,562 78  4 Same as existing 
Tandlianwala 17,306 85  5 Same as existing 
Jhoke 1,596 8 
} 6 New Pervaiz 3,412 17 
Ranjiana I 1,615 11 
} 7 New Ranjiana II 1,074 5b 
Duranwan 1,508 11 
} 8 New Ala 2,065 9 
Arif 2,501 17 
} 9 New Obhal 1,842 7 
K
an
y
a 
  
 
Killianwala 19,296 104  10 Same as existing 
Girja 931 4 
} 11 New Dhodian 483 6 
Gill Gazi 895 5 
Belochwala 2,909 15 
} 12 New Kanya 2,247 15 
Samundari 1,104 5 
} 13 New Farooq 4,752 28 
Munianwala 475 3 
Bhoja 11,458 61  14 Same as existing 
S
u
lt
an
p
u
r 
 
 
 
Kalera 4,651 28 
} 15 New Ditch L 2,262 10 
Ghark 1,397 5 
} 16 New Kamalia 6,208 26 
Waghi 9,346 41  17 Same as existing 
Azmat Shah 1,024 6 
} 18 New  Ditch R 1,939 12 
Kaller 2,238 11
1
 
Kabirwala 9,085 43  19 Same as existing 
a 
Culturable Command Area, 
b
Estimated value. 
 
Based on all these issues, it is tried to propose new management units (FOs) in the BC 
Irrigation Scheme as shown in Table 6.10. There are 19 new FOs proposed by restructuring 
previous 24 FOs. Some other very important issues could also be included in the 
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restructuring of the previous management units. These include irrigation water 
requirements, soil type, cropping systems, and so on. 
 
B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
The Upper Pakpattan Canal Irrigation Scheme is a government-managed irrigation scheme 
(GMIS), and the details of its management units are given in Figure 4.4. Punjab Irrigation 
Department is responsible for the management of the water resource in the entire command 
of the Upper Pakpattan Canal (UPC) including the main canal, secondary canals, and 
tertiary canals. In this regard, the existing management units remain unchanged. 
 
In its organization structure, the UPC Irrigation Scheme has one Senior Executive 
Engineer (SEE) who monitors and manages the entire command of the UPC with the 
assistance of sub-engineers and field staff. However, collection of ISF is the responsibility 
of another wing known as the “revenue section”. The UPC Irrigation Scheme has 3 sub-
divisions where one sub-divisional officer (SDO) is responsible for the management, 
monitoring and resolving local water related conflicts among the farmers. In cases where 
allegations become serious or unavoidable, the cases are raised to the see and then to legal 
courts which could take years to resolve incurring huge amounts of penalties and fines.   
6.8 Demand for operation 
In assessing the means, opportunities and demand for canal operations, spatial analysis of 
the entire command area is undertaken together with preliminary identification of the 
subcommand areas (e.g. management, services). 
 
A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
As cited earlier, the head and some middle reaches of the BC Irrigation Scheme has been 
confronted with some problems related to high salinity of the canal water while it is also 
not always possible to use underground water for irrigation. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
improve the delivery of surface canal water to fulfill the requirements for crop irrigation 
keeping in view the equitable distribution of irrigation water throughout the entire 
command including the tail reaches.  
 
Another concern of the management units to improve the performance and demand for 
operation of the BC Irrigation Scheme is to undertake an assessment of the canal operation 
demand at FOs level which can then be chosen accordingly. This is considering that it is 
always possible for the demand for operation to vary from one FO to another depending on 
the soil characteristics, cropping systems, and on-farm water applications.  
 
Operation demand as a function of sensitivity 
 
As a performance indicator, operation demand as shown in Table 6.11 could be taken as a 
function of sensitivity of the offtake points at the head of secondary canals of the BC 
Irrigation Scheme, and could be expressed by the tolerance of the water control. Tolerance 
which gives the allowable variation control on water level to achieve water discharge in 
secondary canals within the range of + 10% and + 20%, is calculated using by following 
expression: 
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From the results (Table 6.10), it can be gleaned that demand varies along the offtake 
structures of the main Burala Canal. Based on the demand, the offtake structures could be 
categorized into three target groups, namely: low demanding target (LDT), medium 
demanding target (MDT), and high demanding target (HDT). As an example, the Azmat 
Shah secondary canal has the highest sensitivity (8.20 m
-1
) thus, it falls in the high 
demanding target category within the +10% and +20% variation of the water level, 
implying that the offtake structure of Azmat Shah distributary needs to be monitored 
frequently. Meanwhile, controlling the discharge could be achieved mainly by reducing the 
sensitivity of the offtakes.  
Table 6.10. Demand for BC operation as a function of allowable variation on water level 
Name of 
diversion 
channel 
Sensitivity of 
offtakes 
Tolerance on water level control to 
achieve discharge in the secondary 
canal within + 10% variation 
Tolerance on water level control to 
achieve discharge in the secondary 
canal within + 20% variation 
  m
-1
 (cm) Remarks (cm) Remarks 
Ala 2.88 3.48 HDT 6.95 MDT 
Arif 2.76 3.63 HDT 7.26 MDT 
Azmat Shah 8.20 1.22 HDT 2.44 HDT 
Balochwala 3.11 3.21 HDT 6.43 MDT 
Bhoja 2.59 3.87 HDT 7.74 MDT 
Chakko 7.86 1.27 HDT 2.54 HDT 
Dauranwan 4.39 2.28 HDT 4.56 HDT 
Dhodian 5.44 1.84 HDT 3.67 HDT 
Ditch Right 4.77 2.10 HDT 4.19 HDT 
Ditch Left 2.88 3.48 HDT 6.95 MDT 
Dulchi 1.18 8.46 MDT 16.92 LDT 
Farooq 1.57 6.38 MDT 12.77 LDT 
Ghark 1.06 9.39 MDT 18.78 LDT 
Gil Ghazi 1.25 8.00 MDT 16.01 LDT 
Girja 5.23 1.91 HDT 3.82 HDT 
Hassoki 0.90 11.11 LDT 22.22 LDT 
Jhoke 4.22 2.37 HDT 4.74 HDT 
Kabirwala 1.46 6.83 MDT 13.66 LDT 
Kalera 2.18 4.60 HDT 9.19 MDT 
Kaller 2.35 4.26 HDT 8.52 MDT 
Kamalia 2.77 3.61 HDT 7.21 MDT 
Kanya 2.50 4.01 HDT 8.01 MDT 
Killianwala 2.24 4.47 HDT 8.95 MDT 
Munianwala 6.45 1.55 HDT 3.10 HDT 
Naurang 2.59 3.86 HDT 7.71 MDT 
Nupewala I 5.09 1.97 HDT 3.93 HDT 
Nupewala II  2.03 4.91 HDT 9.83 MDT 
Obhal 4.58 2.18 HDT 4.36 HDT 
Pervaiz 3.60 2.78 HDT 5.56 MDT 
Pithorana 2.08 4.81 HDT 9.62 MDT 
Rajiana I 0.94 10.64 LDT 21.28 LDT 
Rajiana II 5.16 1.94 HDT 3.88 HDT 
Samundri 4.21 2.37 HDT 4.75 HDT 
Tandlianwala 1.08 9.29 MDT 18.58 LDT 
Waghi 2.89 3.46 HDT 6.91 MDT 
Bhalak 2.52 3.96 HDT 7.93 MDT 
LDT: Low Demanding Target=low sensitivity, MDT: Medium Demanding Target=medium sensitivity, and 
HDT: High Demanding Target=high sensitivity 
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Operators and other staff responsible for monitoring the performance of offtakes can play 
very important role in controlling the discharge by frequently checking and monitoring the 
sensitivity of the offtakes. The decreased tolerance and increased sensitivity of the offtake 
structures should be monitored and checked more frequently as these could affect the 
performance of the entire irrigation system.  
 
Demand with respect to service 
 
Managers of the Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme should also take into consideration the 
results of the current service indicators while checking the variation in demand of the 
different sections of the Burala Canal. This is necessary because some secondary canals 
could be very long with large command areas such as the Tandlianwala and Bhalak 
distributaries.   
 
B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
Demand with respect to sensitivity and service 
 
As one of the current service indicators, variation in demand in the various sections of the 
canal command should be assessed as part of the most important tasks for the managers of 
the UPC.  
Table 6.11. Demand for UPC operation as a function of allowable variation on water level 
Name of 
diversion 
channel 
Sensitivity 
of offtakes 
Tolerance on water level control to 
achieve discharge in the secondary 
canal within + 10% variation 
Tolerance on water level control to 
achieve discharge in the secondary 
canal within + 20% variation 
  m
-1
 (cm) Remarks (cm) Remarks 
1-AR 0.35 28.71 LDT 57.41 LDT 
1-BR 4.37 2.29 HDT 4.57 HDT 
1-CR 2.60 3.84 HDT 7.68 MDT 
1-L 1.22 8.18 MDT 16.35 LDT 
1-R 1.63 6.12 MDT 12.24 LDT 
2-AL 2.60 3.84 HDT 7.68 MDT 
2-AR 1.91 5.24 MDT 10.49 LDT 
2-BR 1.37 7.31 MDT 14.61 LDT 
2-L 1.31 7.65 MDT 15.30 LDT 
2-R 1.93 5.18 MDT 10.37 LDT 
3-AL 2.73 3.66 HDT 7.32 MDT 
3-L 0.87 11.48 LDT 22.95 LDT 
4-L 1.81 5.51 MDT 11.02 LDT 
5-L 1.31 7.64 MDT 15.28 LDT 
6-L 1.83 5.45 MDT 10.90 LDT 
Jiwan Shah 3.28 3.05 HDT 6.10 MDT 
Shaffi 2.98 3.35 HDT 6.71 MDT 
LDT: Low Demanding Target=low sensitivity, MDT: Medium Demanding Target=medium sensitivity, and 
HDT: High Demanding Target=high sensitivity 
 
Table 6.11 shows the results of the analysis of the tolerance and demand for operation in 
UPC. The secondary canal 1-AR has very low sensitivity (0.35 m
-1
) falling under the low 
demanding target (LDT) within the + 10% and + 20% variation of the water level control, 
implying that this offtake structure would not need any special attention. However, 
secondary canal 1-BR which has very high sensitivity (4.37 m
-1
) and falls within the high 
demanding target (HDT) category, needs very high attention in terms of monitoring the 
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performance of its water discharge. Frequent checking of this offtake is therefore proposed 
for operators and other responsible staff to undertake. Moreover, some offtake structures of 
the secondary canals like 1-L, 1-R, and 2-AR fall in the medium demanding target (MDT) 
category with 10% tolerance in water level but once tolerance increases to 20% variation in 
water level, these offtakes would fall into the category of low demanding target (LDT).  
6.9 Canal operation improvements 
Identification of improvement options for each management unit should focus on: (i) water 
management; (ii) water control; and (iii) canal operation (services and cost-effectiveness). 
 
There are some points which need critical considerations in order to improve the operation 
of Burala Canal. In this study, although the MASSCOTE analysis covers the detailed 
performance of the main canal, this approach can also be applied for further detailed 
investigations in the secondary canal levels.  
 
Therefore, canal operation improvements would help in achieving the following important 
objectives: 
 
 High performance in achieving the service goals even without making any major 
changes 
 Improvement of services provided to water users 
 Improvements in water management  
 Reduction of the costs of operation 
    
In order to plan and design the appropriate canal operation improvements, it is very 
important to know and to specify the service situation such as performance assessment 
with change or without change in the target services for the users. In case there is no 
change in the target service, the performance operation could focus on improving the 
process of achieving the best actual performance compared with the target in terms of 
reliability, adequacy, flexibility, and equity. Whereas in case there are changes in the target 
service, the operation could focus on providing new irrigation services. 
 
A. Burala Canal (FMIS) 
 
Major change in services in a water deficit situation  
 
In a situation where there is low or deficit flows in the main canal head, the suggestions 
below are made to ensure flexible and equity in water deliveries throughout the main 
downstream canal. During the MASSCOTE survey, it was observed that the IPD adopts a 
rotation technique for operating water flows to the secondary canals. The weekly-based 
process means that in one week water is delivered to all the secondary canals on the right 
side of the main Burala Canal while the left side canals are closed for that same week and 
vice versa for the succeeding week.  
 
Another rotation procedure is also adopted in case of high deficit flows. In this case, the 
main Burala Canal is divided into three sections (based on control points). Water is 
delivered for one week in each section which is normally undertaken in a sequence. The 
same rotation procedures are also applied in the secondary canals. 
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However, in cases where there is full supply or partially low flows, no rotation is applied 
and water is diverted to the secondary canals based on the available flows. Such rotation 
has been considered the most appropriate arrangement although some infrastructural and 
official weaknesses were also reported and observed during the strict implementation of 
rotation processes.  
 
Management setup 
 
Water flows of the main Burala Canal are operated (controlled and converted) by IPD 
while the flows of the secondary canals are managed and operated by the staff of FOs. All 
FOs work under the local managing body known as the AWB. In this regard, the staff of 
IPD is responsible for the operation and for keeping records of the measuring gauges of all 
offtakes at the main Burala Canal. The same types of duties are also performed by the staff 
of FOs at the secondary and minor canal levels. 
 
Service from Burala main canal to secondary canals 
 
Improving operation at regulators 
 
Operation at the regulators could be improved by controlling the flows throughout the 
length of the canal. This can be achieved by initially adopting correct and precise 
operational procedures in terms of sensitivity, frequency of checking and monitoring, 
tolerance, targets, and modalities of adjustments as shown in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12. Procedures that could be adopted by the operators at cross regulators 
Element for improvement Procedures 
Function Water depth control 
Type of control Upstream control 
Target Adjust and set a specific water level at the upstream side at plus or 
minus x cm about the target where tolerance depends mainly on the 
sensitivity of nearby offtakes and on the control of discharge which 
should be manipulated.  
Tolerance 
Frequency of monitoring Based on the perturbations (frequency and magnitude) and sensitivity 
of the regulators, highly perturbed and sensitive regulators should be 
checked and monitored after every 2-3 hours. However, regulators 
with low sensitive and perturbed values can be checked even once a 
day. 
Modalities of monitoring Monitoring could be made with naked eyes while gates should be 
carefully observed. 
Modalities of intervention As observed, many gates of the regulators are old and could no longer 
function precisely, and would need to be adjusted with precise 
measurements. Nevertheless, some new gates have already been 
installed at some control points. 
  
Improving operation at offtakes 
 
Almost 50% of the offtakes at the entrance of secondary canals have not been installed 
with gates which could be considered as un-gated and open flume offtake structures. 
Although in other offtakes gates had been installed but the gates are very old and critically 
broken. This is the reason why the operation at offtakes has not been fully satisfactory with 
some exemptions in few areas where offtakes had been newly installed with gates and thus 
perform very accurately. Some form of illegal interventions (bribery and political 
influence) also decreases the proper operation of the offtakes which could have been 
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minimized if only laws have been properly enforced by local WUAs and FOs. Leakage 
from the broken structures is also another issue which should be disclosed. Proper repair 
and maintenance of these structures could improve the efficiency of the water services 
delivery as well. 
 
Although, it is tough but is not completely impossible to improve the operation of offtakes 
with more efforts exerted to fix the broken structures. Most importantly, seriousness of the 
concerned institutions in performing their responsibilities is therefore called for. The 
offtakes with high sensitivity values like those in Azmat Shah and Chakku distributaries 
among others should be provided with some forms of physical interventions together with 
frequent monitoring to reduce sensitivity and thus eventually improve their operations.   
 
Proposal for further investigation  
 
At this juncture, it is proposed that further investigations should be carried out with respect 
to the detailed operational performance of the secondary and tertiary level canals as well as 
at offtake points by applying the MASSCOTE analysis. It was also noted that after the 
implementation of institutional reforms in 2004 at the Burala Canal, many secondary level 
canals have been lined, rehabilitated and equipped with measuring gauges at least at their 
head and tail reaches. Together with such information, other supporting data should 
therefore be compiled such as cropping patterns, and results of soil and underground water 
mapping among others, for future modernization plans of the Burala Canal. 
 
B. Upper Pakpattan Canal (GMIS) 
 
Major change in service in water deficit situation  
 
In a situation where there is low or deficit flows in the main canal head, the following 
suggestions would ensure flexible and equitable water deliveries throughout the main 
downstream canal. During the MASSCOTE survey, it was observed that the IPD adopts a 
rotation technique for operating the water flows to secondary canals. The weekly-based 
rotation process means that water is delivered for one week to all the secondary canals on 
the right side of the main UPC while the left side canals are closed for that week, and vice 
versa for the succeeding weeks.  
 
Moreover, another form of rotation procedure is also being adopted in case the deficit 
flows is high. The main UPC is divided into three sections and water is delivered to each 
section for one week normally following a sequence with some forms of rotation being 
applied in secondary canals. When there is full supply or when water flows is partially low, 
the prescribed rotation is not applied and water is diverted to the secondary canals taking 
into consideration the trend of the available flows. However, some infrastructural and 
official weaknesses were also reported and observed during the strict implementation of 
the rotation processes.  
 
Management setup 
 
The water flows of the main, secondary and tertiary canals of UPC are operated (controlled 
and diverted) by the IPD. Meanwhile, the detailed situation with respect to the 
management units is as discussed earlier in the section on management units. 
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Service from UPC main canal to secondary canals 
 
Improving operation at the regulators 
 
Operation at the regulators can be improved by controlling the flows throughout the length 
of the UPC, which can be achieved by initially adopting correct and precise operational 
procedures in terms of sensitivity, frequency of checking and monitoring, tolerance, 
targets, and modalities of adjustments as given in Table 6.12. However, in the modalities 
of intervention in Table 6.12, new gates have not been installed in the case of the UPC. 
 
Improving operation at the offtakes 
 
Unlike in the Burala Canal, some offtakes at the entrance of secondary canals in UPC are 
un-gated and are open flume offtake structures. Although most offtakes had been installed 
with gates but are noticeably very old and broken resulting in the unsatisfactory operations 
at the offtake points. Some kinds of illegal interventions (bribery and political influence) 
had also been known that contributed to the decreasing level of the proper operation of the 
offtakes which could have been minimized if only laws were properly enforced by the IPD. 
Leakage from the broken structures is also noted and worth disclosing. Proper repair and 
maintenance of these structures should therefore be undertaken as this can improve the 
efficiency of water deliveries in the UPC. 
 
Similar to BC Irrigation Scheme, improvement in operation of offtakes; little fixation of 
broken structures, and most importantly seriousness of institutions is needed. The offtakes 
with high sensitivity values like 1-BR and Jiwan Shah distributaries among others; some 
physical intervention along with frequent monitoring is needed to reduce their sensitivity in 
order to improve their operation.   
 
Proposal for further investigation  
 
Considering the aforementioned situation, it is proposed that further detailed investigations 
of the operational performance of the secondary and tertiary level canals and at the offtake 
points should be undertaken by applying the MASSCOTE analysis. Other supporting 
information should also be measured and compiled as these are important and should be 
incorporated in the future modernization plan of the UPC, such as cropping patterns, 
results of soil and underground water mapping, among others. 
6.10 Conclusions and lessons from MASSCOTE application 
As recommended in the references, aggregation of all possible operational options at the 
irrigation system level should focus on consolidating and designing an overall cost-
effective information scheme to support the activities of a service-oriented management. 
However, this concern can only be addressed after the previously mentioned suggestions 
and recommendations have already been considered and efforts had been undertaken 
towards fulfilling the overall irrigation water requirements. 
 
It is in this regard that the adoption of the MASSCOTE approach should be considered as 
the results could point towards the areas in irrigation schemes where improvements should 
be made especially in terms of effective irrigation water deliveries. MASSCOTE is an 
iterative process that proceeds in a step by step and turn by turn manner. Nevertheless, 
with the limited investigations made, it may not be possible at this point to conclude what 
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management setup should be adopted, what services that the units created would be 
considered and what operation techniques should be implemented to attain the objectives. 
 
Nonetheless, the application of the MASSCOTE analysis to the Burala Canal and UPC 
Irrigation Systems was considered in this study, as an attempt towards diagnosing the 
performance of the said irrigation systems. The results of the analysis could be used for 
modernizing the irrigation systems’ operations and management. Since MASSCOTE 
provides a well-structured analysis of an irrigation system, it can be applied for the 
modernization of surface canal waters in many countries, especially in Pakistan although 
with certain modifications taking into account the specifities of local conditions. Moreover, 
as the concern of water scarcity is becoming acute due to climate change and increasing 
water demand for agricultural, industrial and other purposes, there is strong need for 
integrated water resource management. This is where the adoption of the MASSCOTE 
approach is essentially needed and extended at broader scales of natural hydrological units. 
In the adoption of the MASSCOTE approach, it is however necessary that stakeholders’ 
participation and collaboration is enhanced as this is crucial for the effective application of 
the MASSCOTE analysis. Furthermore, MASSCOTE tools such as rapid appraisal 
procedure and diagnosis of external and internal performance indicators are also essential 
in designing the practical solutions for improved management and operation of the 
irrigation systems to increase their efficiencies. In view of the foregoing and taking into 
consideration the experience of the researcher of this study, the following aspects and 
concerns are therefore presented and further discussed:  
 
1. In determining the values of the internal indicators, the use of a scale where the 
minimum and maximum values take the numbers from zero to four, should be considered 
in accordance with the MASSCOTE approach. In addition, for particular internal 
indicators such as for example the “indicator on water delivery services to individual 
ownership units”, using the MASSCOTE analysis would require the sub-division of such 
indicator into four sub-indicators, i.e. “measurement of volumes to individual units”, 
“flexibility of individual units”, “reliability to individual units” and “apparent equity to 
individual units”. Moreover, in order to assign the specific value for each sub-indicator 
based on the MASSCOTE approach, the criteria are ranked in the form of multiple 
exclusive options. For example, under the sub-indicator “flexibility of individual units” the 
following ranking criteria were developed in accordance with the requirements of the 
MASSCOTE approach. 
 
4 – “Unlimited frequency, rate and duration but arranged by user within a few days”. 
3 – “Fixed frequency, rate and duration, but arranged”. 
2 – “Dictated rotation, but it approximately matches the crop needs”. 
1 – “Rotation deliveries, but on a somewhat uncertain schedule”. 
0 – “No established rules”. 
 
However, based on the aforementioned ranking criteria, it looks like there would be no 
consistency in assigning the values as there are more than one item in the ranking criterion 
while there is no uniformity of such items which serve as the basis for the comparison. For 
example, the criterion on “dictated rotation but approximately matches the crops’ needs” 
may not be suitable under Pakistani conditions because there are some dictated rotations 
which do not match the crops’ needs. Furthermore, “rotation deliveries but on a somewhat 
uncertain schedule” would not also work in a situation where there are rotation deliveries 
where the schedule is almost certain.  
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2. The MASSCOTE approach had been developed for modernizing a complex irrigation 
canal operation with the close collaboration of irrigation engineers and managers. 
However, it appears that the involvement of many other stakeholders such as the farmers 
and other water users have been overlooked especially in the development of the said 
approach. Basically, emphasis has been made only on efforts of the staff of the Irrigation 
Department to obtain information about the various items needed to critically evaluate the 
irrigation systems. Therefore, it is likely that the information generated could be biased 
since the other stakeholders had been ignored in the information collection process, and 
thus, the information compiled could represent only the viewpoints of particular 
stakeholders, i.e. the Irrigation Department. In Pakistan, for example, it has been reported 
that tampering of the outlets is done with the knowledge of some staff of the Irrigation 
Department. In their effort to make additional money, lower level staff of the Irrigation 
Department (of course with the confidence of higher ups) had been continuously changing 
the size of the outlets that affected the water distribution. Cheema et al. (1997) reported 
that 42 percent of the farmers are of the view that the unequal distribution of irrigation 
water is due to the involvement of some officials of the Punjab Irrigation Department in 
unscrupulous activities. Since the Irrigation Department is the major source of information 
in the MASSCOTE approach, it is possible that the staff concerned had not provided the 
appropriate information necessary for the analysis. For example, even if tampering of the 
outlets may not be a problem on the part of the said staff but when the farmers are asked to 
identify and rank their problems, it is possible that such problem would come out as the 
most important concern. Thus, in order to get accurate information about the problems and 
subsequently ranking such problems, information should be obtained from all stakeholders 
including the farmers, farmers’ organizations, other water users, Punjab Irrigation 
Drainage Authority, and others. 
 
3. Mapping the costs of operations against the services rendered is an important step in the 
MASSCOTE approach. It is well recognized that estimation of the costs of operations is 
very significant for setting up the service levels, fees for use of water to be charged to 
users, and for improving the performance and cost-effectiveness of the irrigation system. In 
this regard, various cost items could be identified, i.e. personal expenditures for salaries, 
energy consumption, communications, transportation, equipment, investments, and 
miscellaneous costs. However, the procedure to be used in estimating and valuing the total 
costs of operations, fixed costs and variable costs had not been outlined in MASSCOTE 
methodology. As a result, the estimations of such costs which serve as inputs for the 
MASSCOTE analysis could be varied. 
 
4. A number of problems are confronting the farmers especially at the tail-enders, which 
require the immediate attention of irrigation authorities and for them to address such 
problems in a very serious way. For example, in Pakistan water theft and tampering of the 
outlets by influential farmers are among the serious challenges that adversely affect water 
availability at the tail-enders. Issues on how to handle such concerns and the corresponding 
institutional reforms that should be introduced should also be addressed in the 
MASSCOTE analysis. 
 
5. Some of the questions such as those related to the effectiveness of the irrigation water 
delivery system with respect to demand-based irrigation scheme, should match with the 
requirements for the MASSCOTE analysis. However, in the case of Pakistan where its 
canal irrigation system is entirely supply-based, all the questions to be fed into the 
MASSCOTE approach should therefore be formulated from such angle. Therefore, this 
essentially necessitates that information to be used in the MASSCOTE analysis, should be 
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obtained and the corresponding spreadsheet developed in accordance with the actual 
situation in the fields.    
 
6. In order to diagnose the problems facing the irrigation systems, various internal and 
external indicators should be established using the RAP. However, the values determined 
for the various indicators seem not useful in identifying the areas where actions should be 
taken in the first step of the MASSCOTE analysis, in order to improve the situation. For 
example, the value of various internal indicators is uniformly close to 1.0, i.e. for actual 
water delivery services to individual ownership units, communications for second level 
canals, social “order” in the canal system operated by paid employees, and so on. 
Similarly, there are also different values for the other indicators. The question is how to 
identify the most important problem, the next important problem and so on, taking into 
account the values of the indicators. Meanwhile, considering the information on the 
indicators, the next step would require proper identification and ranking of the problems in 
order that appropriate actions could be taken. Moreover, in order to determine the causes of 
the poor performance of canal irrigation systems, a problem-cause diagram should be 
constructed with the active participation of various stakeholders such as the farmers, other 
water users, staff of the Irrigation Department, farmers’ organizations among others. 
 
7. According to Renault et al. (2007), the RAP can be completed in two weeks. However, 
it this study it seemed that the time required for RAP is generally more than two weeks 
because of the non-availability of the required data and non-cooperation of some 
respondents in providing the necessary data. Considering that it could be extremely 
difficult to obtain data from various stakeholders in such a short time since sometimes it 
would be important to establish first a good relationship with respondents for this purpose, 
therefore sufficient time should be allocated for undertaking the RAP.   
 
8. It had been a very difficult task to sit from morning until evening in the offices of the 
Irrigation Department in order to obtain the desired information and in many instances 
such efforts had only attained little progress. The same is true during the field visits of the 
entire commands at various canal levels, which had been quite intensive and laborious 
particularly due to the unavailability of reliable transportation services, e.g. lack of full 
access to each section of the canals by roads. It is therefore necessary that cooperation with 
providers of information be enhanced while the ways and means of accessing the entire 
commands in the irrigation systems be established, i.e. providing adequate transportation 
and related facilities. 
 
As the MASSCOTE approach consists of many steps and each step requires a variety of 
data. In the field, collection of these data is very difficult job. In this study most of the data 
collected from the Irrigation Department. The staff of the department was not very 
cooperative in providing the desired data. Generally they hesitate in providing the data 
regarding water fees, operation and maintenance expenditures and tempered outlets. Unless 
one has some connections, one cannot obtain data from the staff of Irrigation Department. 
Further the office records are not properly maintained. For example, the registers regarding 
water fees assessment before the formation of Farmers’ Organizations were misplaced and 
nobody knew about those records.  
 
9. The MASSCOTE approach requires lots of data as inputs for the different steps. 
Generally however, the availability of accurate data in developing countries is still a big 
problem, e.g. for the estimation of indicators related to crops productivity and economics, 
as well as the data required for the RAP spreadsheet especially those related to 
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groundwater, crop yield, and cropped areas, among others. However, it seemed that 
accurate data are generally not available in many cases. Meanwhile, collection of data on 
crop yields, cropped areas and the like, from the farmers could also be very time 
consuming. 
 
10. The use of the MASSCOTE approach is a good option towards modernizing the 
irrigation systems in this part of the world as it evaluates the different aspects of the 
irrigation system. However, self-understanding of this approach would require about two 
to three weeks. It is a fact that most irrigation engineers working in offices generally have 
no time and more often than not, are not also interested in any changes in the operations 
due to the complexity of the new processes. Moreover, the sub engineers who are mostly 
involved in the fields for canal operations receive some kind of diploma degree only in 
local language, making it quite difficult for them to understand this new approach. 
Therefore, in order that the MASSCOTE approach could be fully understood and 
implemented in the irrigation systems in developing countries like Pakistan, it is necessary 
that some training workshops should be conducted to raise the awareness of all concerned 
on this new concept and more especially create a better understanding of the importance of 
improving the efficiency of irrigation canal operations.  
 
11. Finally, in order to make the best use of the MASSCOTE approach, a checklist of the 
necessary information should be prepared and discussed with the various stakeholders to 
ensure that no important information is left out for the analysis. This will facilitate the 
collection of all the information relevant to the analysis, the results of which are critical for 
the improvement and modernization of canal irrigation systems.  
 
12. MASSCOTE approach is detailed and interesting tool which diagnosis and highlights 
the attention demanding issues but it does not suggest the curement of problems. 
6.11 Main findings 
The salient results of the analysis using the MASSCOTE approach revealed the declined 
performance by both irrigation schemes (FMIS and GMIS); where the values of most 
internal indicators had been lower than the average. However, comparing both irrigation 
schemes, FMIS appeared to attain better performance than the GMIS, particularly in terms 
of actual water delivery services from the main canal to second level canals, as well as to 
the most downstream points. Moreover, operations of the main, second and third level 
canals, and the general conditions, communications and operations of the second and third 
level canals, had been relatively much better in the FMIS. Nevertheless, GMIS showed 
better status of communications at the main canal level only, while on the external 
performance indicators, GMIS gave better performance in its cost recovery ratio at 0.67 
and revenue collection at 0.85, as well as in the output per unit command and irrigation 
area. Meanwhile, FMIS gave better performance in MOM, maintenance cost to revenue 
ratio, and staffing. In addition, the offtake structures of FMIS were more sensitive to the 
change in water level in the main canal with high demanding targets and thus, require 
special attention and monitoring. While the GMIS had more equity in supplies to second 
level canals, the FMIS had more equity at the secondary and tertiary canal levels. In terms 
of farm level services, FMIS showed better performance in terms of flexibility, reliability 
and equity compared with the GMIS. On the overall, about 80% of the annual budget of 
both irrigation schemes had been allocated for salaries and allowances while the FOs 
allotted 55% of its annual budget for the same purpose. While FOs spends 22% of its 
annual budget on repairs and maintenance, this was much higher than that of the IPD. 
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FMIS is facing deficiency with respect to its technical staff at the FOs level but the GMIS 
is faced with deficiency in terms of well-trained field monitoring staff. Moreover, higher 
and un-matched number of management units (FOs) had been spotted in both schemes. 
Indicators of water balance in the FMIS showed better monthly water supplies against the 
irrigation water requirements per unit of irrigated area. Nonetheless, there was a 
remarkable gap in the supplies of and requirements for irrigation water in the FMIS. In the 
case of the GMIS, pumping of groundwater had been highlighted as a main contributor to 
nail the water supply-demand gap. 
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Chapter 7  
Performance and Efficiency Analysis at Farm Level 
At the beginning of this chapter, the overall socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of farmers in the two case study schemes are discussed. Later, focus is given 
on the assessment and quantification of the performance of irrigated farms. Main sections 
in this chapter include farm typology, farm diversification and multivariate analysis, 
descriptive statistics and farm performance analysis, and farm technical efficiency analysis, 
the results of which are presented according to farm typology. In the last section of this 
chapter, irrigation water requirements which had been assessed are presented as a whole 
scheme. This chapter discusses the objective 3. 
7.1 Socio-economic characteristics of farmers 
Water is a critical resource for sustainable economic development of Pakistan and with 
such perspective, irrigated agriculture is of great importance in the socio-economic life of 
the people in the country. In order to understand the demographic and economic 
characteristics of farmers in the two irrigation schemes being studied, major parameters 
such as age, education, livelihood systems, farming experience, and farm tenancy status 
were assessed.  
 
Table 7.1 features some socio-economic traits of farms in the two schemes, namely FMIS 
and GMIS. Overall, farmers are younger in FMIS than in GMIS although their ages are 
more spread in FMIS while in GMIS a large central group aged between 36-45 years old 
was noted, which could be considered mature age for experience and decision-making. 
Although 52% of the farmers in FMIS have more than 10 years of farming experience, 
another 17% of the farmers are very young in the farming profession with less than 6 years 
of farming experience. This implies that FMIS farmers are less experienced considering 
also their relatively younger age compared with those in GMIS where almost 70% of the 
farmers have more than 10 years of farming experience. Also, farmers in FMIS show 
significantly higher education level and less illiteracy than those in GMIS. While 15% of 
farmers in FMIS are illiterate, 60% have 10 or more 12 years of schooling which could be 
a possible reason for the existence of more government jobs as livelihood opportunities in 
FMIS than in GMIS. However, private businesses and jobs are more common in GMIS 
than in FMIS. Nevertheless, farming as a single livelihood involves more farmers in FMIS 
(nearly 70%) than in GMIS (62%). Furthermore, different land tenure situations were 
noted in both schemes where in FMIS, a large majority (more than 92%) of farmers uses 
only their own land with a few using both owned and rented land. In GMIS, renting land is 
more common where about 65% of farmers use only their own land and more than 30% 
use owned and rented land, while a small number of farmers who do not own any irrigated 
land have to rent land for crop farming. 
 
Such socio-economic indicators manifest the potentials of farmers to invest in their farms 
and to mobilize their farm resources in the most efficient way. Even if socio-economic 
characteristics may not be directly associated with governance structures and features of 
the two irrigation schemes, but such scenario could help in identifying the opportunities 
and weaknesses in the socio-economic systems which should be properly addressed in 
order to improve performance at farm level.  
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Table 7.1. Overall socio-economic characteristics of farmers in the case study schemes 
Characteristic 
Unit 
 
FMIS  GMIS 
N=126  N= 82 
%  % 
Age  Year    
     <26  2.4  2.4 
    26-35  34.1  26.8 
    36-45  31.7  45.1 
    46-55  20.6  20.7 
    >55  11.1  4.8 
Education (schooling) Year    
    Illiterate  15.1  26.8 
    5  25.4  28 
    10  45.2  32.9 
    12 and above  14.3  12.2 
Livelihood system Type    
  Farming  69  62.2 
  Farming and government job  18.3  9.8 
  Farming and private job  5.6  11 
  Farming and private business  7.1  17.1 
Farm tenancy status Percentage    
   Owned  92.1  64.6 
   Owned and rented in  7.9  30.5 
   Rented in  -  4.9 
Farming experience Year    
    <6  16.6  9.7 
    6 – 10  30.9  20.7 
    >10  52.4  69.5 
7.2 Typology of farms 
Since farmers in both irrigation systems have different characteristics in terms of socio-
economic and strategic farming variables, and keeping in view the importance of all these 
variables, the farmers could be categorized into different groups in a typology. Thus, a 
typology of farms was developed based on farm size considering that in the agricultural 
statistics and irrigation policy documents of Pakistan, irrigation farming systems are 
classified based on size of the farm lands. In addition, farm size seems to be a key factor 
used in assessing agricultural performance in Asia as confirmed by Fan and Chan-Kang 
(2005). Moreover, all local stakeholders including farmers usually put a lot of emphasis in 
this factor when discussing the reasons for success or failure in the irrigation systems of 
Punjab.  
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Figure 7.1. Farm size classification used for farm typology 
As shown in the results, farm size has indeed contributed to the successful farm 
differentiation in the two case study schemes. The distribution of farms according to size in 
both schemes is shown in Figure 7.1. As discussed in Chapter 3, farms that are less than 
2.5 hectares are considered as “small farms”, 2.5 to less than 12.5 hectare farms as 
“medium farms”, while farms greater than 12.5 hectares are “large farms”. 
7.3 Relationships between farming systems’ variables 
In investigating the relationships of the variables, the pair-wise correlation analysis 
revealed that the variables representing the factors of production are closely linked with 
positive high correlation that reflects coherent intensification strategies. For instance, the 
cost of chemical inputs (i.e. fertilizer and pesticides) was highly and positively correlated 
with the cost of seeds with Pearson’s r2 values of 0.819 in GMIS and 0.521 in FMIS which 
indicate significant correlation at P value of 0.01. With such pattern, the interdependent 
variables (fertilizers, pesticides, land rental, pumping, and seeds) were regrouped into one 
item as production costs for the multivariate analysis.  
 
The pair-wise correlation matrix established (also reported partially in Tables 7.2 and 7.3) 
per scheme revealed important strategic and operational features of the farming systems. It 
must be highlighted here that all costs and income are reported on per hectare basis, and 
only significant correlations (Pearson 2-tailed test at P=0.01) are hereinafter reported. 
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Table 7.2. Correlation matrix of selected variables in FMIS (2-tailed Pearson test). 
Variables 
% 
land 
under 
wheat 
% 
land 
under 
cotton 
% 
land 
under 
rice 
% 
land 
under 
maize 
% land 
under 
sugarcane 
Farm 
size 
Production 
cost 
Machinery 
cost 
Labor 
cost 
Annual 
income 
Number 
of crops 
% land under cotton -.270* 1          
% land under rice -.141 -.308* 1         
% land under maize -.244* .139 .257* 1        
% land under sugarcane -.032 -.595* .123 -.251* 1       
Farm size .051 -.022 -.085 -.029 -.056 1      
Production cost -.329* -.050 .230* .268* .188 .326* 1     
Machinery cost -.026 -.251* .031 .006 .420* -.244* -.085 1    
Labor cost -.358* -.153 .551* .342* .226 .212 .877* -.052 1   
Annual income -.343* -.023 .227 .389* .274* .356* .806* .018 .801* 1  
Number of crops -.453* .142 .396* .587* -.010 .204 .738* -.064 .804* .842* 1 
Cropping intensity .222 .222 .488* .373* .122 -.107 .130 .073 .290* .264* .336* 
* Highly significant correlation (at P=0.01, Pearson 2-tailed) 
 
In FMIS, high positive correlations were noted among the socio-demographic variables 
(experience of head, family size, and number of family workers at farm) although 
education level of heads showed negative correlation with the other three variables. Also, 
only the number of family workers was related to operational features, correlating 
negatively with percentage of land under rice cultivation and labor costs. Overall, the 
socio-demographic traits did not conflict much with the operational features. As shown in 
Table 7.2, farm size only correlates positively with production costs and total annual 
income (both expressed on per hectare basis). Thus, the bigger the farm is, the higher 
income per ha could be obtained but would require more inputs per hectare. Interestingly, 
farm size showed no correlation with any crop of choice, where the percentage of farm 
land under wheat for example, correlated negatively with production costs, labour costs, 
farm annual income, and number of crops grown. Wheat farming seems to be specialized, 
is non-intensive but is a low-income farming strategy. Similarly, the percentage of farm 
land cultivated for cotton showed strong negative correlation with the percentage of farm 
land for rice and sugarcane, therefore cotton cultivation could be an alternative cropping 
strategy exclusive of rice and sugarcane. The percentage of farm land for sugarcane 
positively correlated with machinery costs, while the percentage of farm land for rice 
positively correlated with labour costs, number of crops, and cropping intensity. Since rice 
farming uses more labour while sugarcane uses more machinery, rice farming fits well 
with crop diversification strategies. The percentage of farm land for maize was the only 
crop variable that positively correlated with farm income, and also positively correlated 
with labour costs and the number of crops grown. This implies that maize could be a 
profitable crop, and its farming in terms of labour use fits well with any diversification 
strategy. Finally, it should be noted that labour costs correlated positively with the number 
of crops grown and the corresponding annual income that could be derived. 
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Table 7.3. Correlation matrix of selected variables in GMIS (2-tailed Pearson test) 
Variables 
% 
land 
under 
wheat 
% 
land 
under 
cotton 
% 
land 
under 
rice 
% 
land 
under 
maize 
% 
land 
under 
potato 
Farm 
size 
Production 
cost 
Machinery 
cost 
Labor 
cost 
Land 
renting 
cost 
Annual 
income 
Number 
of crops 
% land under cotton .437* 1           
% land under rice -.183 -.266 1          
% land under maize -.514* -.456* .341* 1         
% land under potato -.608* -.315* .051 .465* 1        
Farm size -.166 -.167 -.143 .287* .439* 1       
Production cost -.590* -.420* .333* .595* .795* .476* 1      
Machinery cost -.446* -.239 .414* .592* .443* .011 .581* 1     
Labor cost -.547* -.529* .655* .610* .603* .221 .812* .588* 1    
Land renting cost -.387* -.237 .061 .417* .471* .315* .567* .376* .390* 1   
Annual income -.602* -.402* .370* .652* .778* .438* .933* .644* .798* .513* 1  
Number of crops -.382* -.501* .767* .554* .164 .005 .488* .518* .787* .157 .557* 1 
Cropping intensity .075 .256 .553* .448* .305* .116 .379* .377* .451* .169 .419* .387* 
* Highly significant correlation (at P=0.01, Pearson 2-tailed) 
 
Meanwhile in GMIS, similar trends were observed on the behavior of the socio-
demographic variables, where education level correlated negatively with farming 
experience, and expectedly, family size correlated positively with the number of family 
workers at farm although none of these variables showed any correlation with the 
operational or strategic features. As shown in Table 7.3, farm size correlates positively 
with total farm income and production costs. Likewise in GMIS, the bigger the farm is the 
more farming is intensified and on the overall, higher production could be obtained. Also, 
farm size correlated positively only with the percentage of farm land used for potato 
farming, with no other crop choice significantly interacting with farm size. The percentage 
of farm land for wheat correlated positively only with the percentage of farm land for 
cotton (as a typical crop rotation) while correlating negatively with the percentages of farm 
land for maize and potato, all costs of production factors (labour, machinery, land rental, 
inputs), number of crops, and more importantly, with the total farm income. The 
percentage of farm land for cotton showed similar correlations as wheat indicating that 
wheat farming goes along well with cotton farming as strategic system although it also 
implies lower income, less specialization and low inputs required. Reflecting on an 
opposite strategy, the percentage of farm land for maize showed negative correlation with 
the percentages of farm land for wheat and cotton, and positive correlations with all 
production factors (labour, machinery, land rental, inputs), number of crops, cropping 
intensity, and more importantly, total farm income. Maize cropping could be characterized 
as productive and profitable farming with crop diversification, intensification, and 
acquisition of additional land through renting, allowing for intercropping with potato. 
Thus, the percentage of farm land for potato showed similar correlation patterns as maize. 
Meanwhile, the percentage of farm land for rice positively correlated only with machinery 
and labour costs, the number of crops grown, and cropping intensity with production costs 
(fertilizers and pesticides) as well as positively correlating with all other costs of 
production factors (labour, machinery, land renting) and with total farm income. Similarly, 
the number of crops grown and cropping intensity also correlated positively with the 
percentage of farm land for rice and maize, as well as with all costs of production factors. 
While the number of crops grown correlated negatively with the percentage of farm land 
for wheat and cotton, this shows a coherence of the intensification strategy and the 
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capacity of these two commodities to promote improved production per unit area. The 
results also revealed two main opposite cropping strategies at play, one of which is 
combining high input maize with rice and potato (if land area allows) while the other is 
combining wheat with cotton in one-year rotation which requires less inputs and less crop 
diversification but ultimately giving lower farm income per unit area.  
7.4 Main factors for farm diversity within each scheme 
This part involves establishing descriptive statistics and the performance per farm, farm 
type and irrigation system. Most variables documented through the questionnaire survey 
were used for multivariate analysis (PCA) although not all, and were also mobilized to 
describe the established types and highlight the significant differences between farms, 
types and irrigation systems.  
 
In assessing the diversity, variables that characterize the farms were collected covering the 
four dimensions of the farming systems, i.e. farming potential (human capital, farm 
demography, farm size), farming strategy (number of crops grown, main crops and relative 
area), level of intensification (production costs), and farming output (farm income). Table 
7.4 provides a list of all these variables representing each system and for each analytical 
step. 
Table 7.4. Variables used in multivariate (PCA) and efficiency (DEA) analyses. 
Category Type of analysis Variables  Application domain 
Farming potential PCA 
PCA 
PCA 
PCA 
1. Years of farming experience FMIS / GMIS 
 2. Family Size FMIS / GMIS 
 3. Number of family workers at farm FMIS / GMIS 
 4. Years of education  FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA 5. Farm size (ha) FMIS / GMIS 
Farming strategy PCA 6. Number of crops grown FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA 7. % of farm land under wheat FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA 8. % of farm land under cotton FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA 9. % of farm land under rice FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA 10. % of farm land under maize FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA 11. % of farm land under sugarcane FMIS 
 PCA 12. % of farm land under potato GMIS 
Farming inputs PCA 13. Production costs (PKR/ha) * FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA 14. Machinery costs (PKR/ha) ** FMIS / GMIS 
 DEA 15. Land preparation cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA / DEA 16. Labor cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 PCA / DEA 17. Land renting cost (PKR/ha) GMIS 
 PCA / DEA 18. Harvesting cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 DEA 19. Seed cost (PKR/ha)  FMIS / GMIS 
 DEA 20. Fertilizer cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 DEA 21. Pesticide cost(PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 DEA 22. Tube well irrigation cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
 DEA 23. Post-harvesting cost (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
Farming output PCA / DEA 24. Annual farm income (PKR/ha) FMIS / GMIS 
*Variable 13 on “production costs” adds all costs incurred (biological and chemical inputs) in 
production operations, and is actually combined with variables 19 to 21 
** Variable 14 on “machinery costs” adds all costs for equipment and machinery and is combined 
with variables. 15, 22 and machinery rental costs 
 
Considering diversity in farm practices and performances, the principle component 
analysis (PCA) was used to identify the variables most involved in the differentiation of 
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farms by means of a much smaller number of variables or dimensions known as factors. 
Since PCA contributes to achieving a linear combination of the representative variables 
that generate a maximum variance for multidimensional phenomenon which are also 
uncorrelated, the initial number of variables is reduced in a smaller number of principle 
factors that explain most of the variance. Thus, PCA leads to the identification of 
indicators that most explain the variability in farms, and also provides a correlation matrix 
of all input variables that enhances understanding of the relationships of variables within 
the samples. PCA was carried out using the SPSS program after the data were checked for 
appropriateness through Bartlett’s sphericity. All factors with eigen values greater than 1 
have been ultimately retained in accordance with the Kaiser’s criteria.  
 
The PCA was performed on the same variables for both irrigation systems with some 
exception, for example, the “percentage of farm land for sugarcane” only makes sense in 
FMIS since sugarcane is not a major crop in GMIS, while the “percentage of farm land for 
potato” and “land renting cost” are common in GMIS only since potato is not grown in 
FMIS, and land renting is only practiced in GMIS. Overall, 16 variables for FMIS and 17 
variables for GMIS were used as shown in Table 7.5. Results of the PCA suggested broad 
variety of strategies, practices and performance at farm level. 
Table 7.5. Key factors with decision variables (rotated matrix) 
Decision Variables 
FMIS 
Decision Variables 
GMIS 
Factor Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 
Harvesting cost .956     Number of crops grown .953    
Annual income .942     Labor cost .897    
Production cost .888     Harvesting  cost .822    
Number of crops grown .864     Annual income .807    
Labor cost .854     Machinery cost .764    
Farming experience  .827    Production cost .763    
Family size  .818    % of farm land under 
maize 
.738    
Family workers  .712    % of farm land under 
rice 
.673    
Education  -.702    % of farm land under 
wheat 
-.652    
% of farm land under 
sugarcane 
  .883   Farm size  .822   
% of farm land under 
cotton 
  -.806   % of farm land under 
potato 
 .671   
% of farm land under rice    .851  Family workers   .902  
Farm size     .711 Family size   .837  
      Farming experience    .842 
      Education    -.776 
Eigen value 5.19 2.34 2.15 1.49 1.11  7.31 2.20 1.43 1.24 
% of variance 32.50 14.62 13.41 9.30 6.94  43.01 12.95 8.40 7.27 
% of cumulative variance 32.50 47.11 60.52 69.82 76.76  43.01 55.96 64.36 71.64 
 
Table 7.5 displays the results of PCA (rotated correlation matrix with eigenvalues and 
percentages of the variance explained). In FMIS, 13 variables showed high correlation 
coefficient (>0.6) grouped into five main factors explaining the diversity of farms, which 
in turn explained about 77% of the whole variance. A first group of five variables which 
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explains about one-third of the total variance consists of the combination of farming 
intensification level (harvesting and production costs), farming strategy (number of crops 
grown) and performance (annual income), all of which exhibited positively high 
correlation. The second factor is made up of four variables which are all related to farming 
potentials and human dimensions (experience, family size, family workers, and education) 
and explain about 15% of the total variance, all of which are highly correlated including 
education which shows high negative correlation with the other variables. A third group is 
related to farming strategy where the percentages of land for sugarcane and cotton show 
high negative correlation (reflecting the fact that in FMIS when one grows sugarcane he 
does not grow cotton and vice versa). While these three main factors explain together more 
than 60% of the total variance, a fourth factor which includes the percentage of farm land 
for rice goes along well with sugarcane in the farm strategy. Noticeably, farm size which is 
featured alone in the fifth factor, explains only about 7% of the total variance. Thus, farm 
size which ranges from less than 2.5 to more than 12.5 ha is not a predominant factor that 
explains the overall farm diversity in FMIS. 
 
In GMIS, 15 variables grouped into four main factors explain the diversity of farms. Such 
variables show high correlation coefficient (>0.6) and explain about 72% of the whole 
variance. A first large group of nine variables which consists of a combination of farming 
intensification level (harvesting, labour, machinery, and production costs), farming 
strategy (number of crops grown, maize, rice, and wheat) and performance (annual 
income), explains about 43% of the total variance. All variables exhibited high positive 
correlation with the exception of wheat (negative correlation) which is clearly featured as 
an alternative commodity where its farming is specialized and less intensified, and is a less 
performing farming strategy. The second factor is made up of two variables, namely: farm 
size and percentage of farm land for potato. Here, it is again noticeable that farm size does 
not relate with the main farm strategy or performance variables since it is only highly 
correlated with potato cropping and can be interpreted in the sense that potato is grown 
only when farmers have enough land to spare after the choice for all other crops have 
already been made. However, this second small factor explains about 13% of the total 
variance. The two last factors which combine family size with number of family workers 
(about 8%), and farming experience with education level (about 7%) have high negative 
correlation with education level and experience, as expected.  
 
As shown in the PCA results, the similarities in terms of farming systems, strategies and 
performance in the two irrigation schemes are very striking and confirm the interpretation 
of the correlation matrices, even if some minor differences could be spotted between these 
schemes. Specifically, in both schemes, higher farm annual income is related to 
diversification (more number of crops grown) and intensification (more agricultural inputs 
per unit area, higher labour required and harvesting costs). In the GMIS, the percentage of 
farm land for maize and rice also positively correlates with all other factors listed above 
while the percentage of farm land for wheat exhibits negative correlation with such factors. 
Interestingly, farming experience negatively correlates with education, and is not directly 
linked with farming strategy, intensification level or performance. Therefore, farm size 
remains an isolated factor which confirms the pair-wise correlation results indicating little 
interactions between farm size and farming strategy (crop choices). In GMIS, while larger 
land is preferred to be used for potato cropping, results of the analysis highlight the clear-
cut and mutually exclusive strategies between sugarcane-rice and cotton specifically in 
FMIS, and maize-rice and wheat in GMIS. 
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7.5 Relationship between farm size and farming performances 
In order to further investigate the relationship between farm size and farm operating 
features in both irrigation systems, farms were classified into three different types in each 
system based on farm size. The farm distribution according to size classes is shown in 
Figure 7.1. Since farm sizes are larger overall in GMIS, the distribution differs between the 
schemes under the same classification conditions. For instance, no farms in GMIS are 
below 2.5 ha but this group forms the largest size class in FMIS.  
Table 7.6. Farming variables according to farm size in the case study schemes 
Variables (averages) 
Farm types in FMIS  Farm types in GMIS 
Small 
farms 
Medium 
farms 
Large 
farms 
 Small 
farms 
Medium 
farms 
Large 
farms 
Farm size (ha) 2.0 5.8 25.0  4.0 8.3 28.0 
Wheat growers (%) 100 100 100  100 100 100 
Cotton growers (%) 26 74 79  100 100 100 
Rice growers (%) 52 57 64  50 79 74 
Maize growers (%) 10 17 21  50 70 87 
Sugarcane growers (%) 79 84 100  - - - 
Potato growers (%) - - -  0 16 65 
Number of crops grown 2.7 3.3 3.6  3 3.6 4.2 
Cropping intensity (%) 111 109 109  132 143 153 
% farmers with own 
machinery 
50 71 86 
 
31 81 100 
% farmers with own tube well 21 50 79  19 60 96 
% farmers with access to 
technical services & advise 
36 44 43 
 
31 49 100 
Seed cost (USD/ha) 233
a
 301
b
 341
b
  147
a
 338
b
 850
c
 
Land preparation cost 
(USD/ha) 
225
a
 239
a
 252
a
 
 
281
a
 326
ab
 391
b
 
Fertilizer cost (USD/ha) 588
a
 782
b
 968
b
  867
a
 1,210
b
 1,787
c
 
Pesticides cost (USD/ha) 162
a
 213
b
 296
c
  254
a
 336
b
 438
c
 
Labor cost (USD/ha) 196
a
  254
b
 284
c
  222 
a
 292
b
 362
c
 
Tube well irrigation cost 
(USD/ha) 
116
a
 176
b
 217
c
 
 
662 
a
 654
a
 802
b
 
Harvesting cost (USD/ha) 363
a
 472
b
 541
c
  382
a
 437
a
 498
b
 
Annual income (USD/ha) 4,356
a
 5,777
b
 6,844
c
  4,237
a
 5,868
b
 9,072
c
 
Values having different letters are significantly different from each other (t-test at P=0.05). 
* 1USD =75PKR in 2009-10 
Table 7.6 provides an overview of the socio-demographic, operational and strategic 
dimensions of the farms according to size in the two case study schemes. The data also 
indicate the averages calculated for selected operational variables in all farm size and in 
both systems while statistical test (t-test) was carried out to determine the significant 
differences. The only socio-demographic features that differ among the farm sizes are the 
age of head, experience, and family size which are higher in large farms in GMIS. Crop 
choices also show some differences between the schemes, where wheat remains the main 
crop (per area covered and per percentage of farmers growing it) in all schemes and farm 
sizes. Farmers in FMIS commonly grow cotton, rice, sugarcane, and more marginally, 
maize, while in GMIS, all farmers also grow cotton (in rotation with wheat) although most 
farmers grow rice and maize. Potato is significantly grown only in large farms in GMIS 
which confirms what the PCA revealed that on the overall, farm size has no relationship 
with crop choice. However, only maize and to a lesser extent, sugarcane is cropped by 
large farmers in FMIS, but potato has a special status since it is only grown by both 
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medium and large farms in GMIS. Overall, cropping intensity and number of crops grown 
tend to increase with farm size. More strikingly, private access to machinery and tube-
wells (ownership) markedly increased with farm size making almost all of the large farms 
in both systems fully equipped. As, Seckler et al. (1999) argued that access to groundwater 
is instrumental role in food security but the management of groundwater is considerable 
due to overexploitation. Also, costs of all production factors are significantly increasing 
along with farm size.  
Therefore in both systems, the larger the farms are the higher would be the intensification 
level which implies significantly higher total farm income in large farms. Thus, it appears 
that farm size is related to the intensification strategy adopted and to the available 
equipment used but not on the cropping strategy followed (crop choices). It can be argued 
that large farms have accumulated capital and higher income over the years, and thus are in 
a favorable financial position to invest in equipment and inputs. These results confirmed 
the argument of Woodhouse (2010) who cited that capital-intensive agriculture has proved 
to be more productive but its long-term sustainability is questionable in a broader context 
of political economy. He also suggested a dimension to consider with regards to efficient 
and mechanized agriculture compared with labor-intensive agriculture.  
 
Discussion and interpretation could be drawn from the aforementioned results as well as 
from the inputs of local experts and farmers compiled during the interviews. Poor 
motivation towards the cultivation of rice and maize could be due to the demanding nature 
of cultivating such crops in terms of inputs, irrigation water, skills, and experience of 
farmers. Wheat and to a lesser extent, cotton are more versatile crops as their cultivation 
requires less inputs and less irrigation water. Nevertheless, access to private tube wells has 
provided more flexibility and reliability in irrigation water supply (Shah et al. 2000), and 
led to more crop options such as maize and potato. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
potato cropping requires reliable irrigation, skills, and purchasing capacity to acquire 
hybrid seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, and specific machinery for planting and harvesting. 
 
Differences in accessing technical services and advice are most noticeable in the two study 
schemes, since only large-scale farmers in GMIS are able to gain full access to such 
opportunities. In the study area, most technical services and advice are provided by large 
national and multinational companies selling pesticides, fertilizers, hybrid seeds, and farm 
equipments. As a consequence, large farms are mostly targeted for these farms are likely to 
use more inputs, but little interest is given to small-scale and less intensive farmers for 
obvious reasons. Among all farm types in both schemes, large farms in GMIS have a 
unique status and situation as the wealthiest, most experienced, oldest farmers, and 
families with larger size, are found in the area. Full access to privately owned equipment 
makes them autonomous providing them with special social status. However, these farmers 
are also known to support smaller farmers through machinery sharing or renting. 
 
In most of the small and medium farms, fully functional sets of machinery could be hardly 
found so that the ill-endowed farmers rely on the facilities in large farms. Large-scale 
farmers also have a strong influence and grip on the local labor force available in the other 
farm groups by hiring them at strategic times. Potato and maize cropping require frequent 
and abundant labour supply and only the large-scale farmers have the capacity and status to 
hire and pay for such labour requirement, while the same group of farmers is also the 
common point of attraction for pesticide and fertilizer companies to market their products 
with incentives and at discounted rates. Moreover, even the staff and officers of public 
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agricultural extension department are also more interested in keeping in touch with this 
group of progressive farmers. 
7.6 Efficiency analysis of farms using DEA model 
After the “Green Revolution” and mechanized-intensive agriculture by large-scale farmers 
at the global level, the need to invest in small-scale agriculture was called for as means of 
improving the efficiency of resource use in farming. Along this line, assessment of 
technical efficiency at individual farm level was conducted using the DEA model. The 
variables used in the DEA model are shown in Table 7.4. In conducting the relative 
technical efficiency analysis using DEA, the set of decision-making units (cropping 
systems) are compared. Results of DEA could provide efficiency scores for individual 
farm as well as generate information about the gap between the current efficiency and 
maximum efficiency per input variable, and where areas of potential improvement are 
identified thus, providing normative guidance for management to consider. DEA input-
oriented model focuses in minimizing inputs and therefore, was selected in the research 
study since production costs proved to be a key factor in farm differentiation (as shown in 
the PCA results). BCC model which considers variable return to scale (VRS) was also used 
because it provides more possible solutions for efficiency. Each individual farm has been 
treated as a DMU to be able to process their respective relative technical efficiency. 
 
As shown in the results, the relative technical efficiency shows the capacity of a given farm 
to turn selected inputs (refer to Table 7.4 for the list of variables and Table 7.5 for the cost 
of each farming input) into total annual farm income. In the analysis, an efficiency line (or 
production frontier) could be drawn with a maximum efficiency score of 100%. Farms that 
maximize output with minimum use of combined inputs could reach the maximum score 
but other farms could only attain a much lower score. In practice, a performing farm with 
high total farm income could still exhibit poor technical efficiency if excessive amounts of 
inputs are used. Conversely, an ill-performing farm could be technically efficient if low 
levels of inputs are mobilized to get the result. Finally, high proportion of full efficiency 
scores (100%) reveals homogenous practices and performance among the studied sets of 
DMUs otherwise, wide-ranging efficiency scores with less full efficiency scores could 
imply heterogeneity. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Scales of techno-economic efficiency at scheme level 
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Figure 7.2 displays the scales and proportions of farms which achieve different classes of 
technical efficiency per irrigation system level. Overall, the proportion of relatively 
efficient farms is higher in GMIS than in FMIS. However, regardless of the farm size, 45% 
of farms in FMIS achieved full efficiency compared to only 67% in GMIS.  
 
 
Figure 7.3. Techno-economic efficiency as per farm type in FMIS 
 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show the efficiency results per farm type in FMIS and GMIS, 
respectively. Nevertheless, the data indicate that farm size has little impact on the 
efficiency scores. In FMIS, medium farms are less efficient than its other farm groups 
while such farm group is more efficient in GMIS. Also, in FMIS as well as in GMIS, no 
farms in the large size groups had attained efficiency score of less than 90%.  
 
 
Figure 7.4. Techno-economic efficiency as per farm types in GMIS 
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Figure 7.3 shows the proportion of relative efficient farms per farm type in FMIS which 
achieved different range of technical efficiency. These are the farms that mobilized their 
cost of inputs at optimum level. Other farms with less than 100% efficiency are not 
relatively efficient as their production efficiency frontier could not attain a score of 1 in 
order to get 100% efficiency. However, as shown in Figure 7.3, there is no big difference 
in the proportion of efficient farms per farm type. All farm types have efficient farms with 
scores that range from 43 to 48%, which implies that farmers are mobilizing their farm 
inputs within this range. Also, no large farms attained less than 90% efficiency score; this 
means that there are nearly 60% farms which falls very near to the efficiency frontier. In 
the whole scheme and regardless of the farm size, 45% of all farms have achieved full 
efficiency as shown in Figure 7.2. Therefore, farm size has little impact on the efficiency 
scores although small farms appear to be more efficient than the other farm groups.  
 
 
Figure 7.5. Efficiency analysis graph: fertilizer cost vs. farm income in FMIS 
 
The efficiency frontier in Figure 7.5 indicates the efficient DMUs (cropping systems) like 
37, 58, 89, and 92 in FMIS which have been efficiently mobilizing fertilizers against the 
total farm income. All other DMUs could not reach the efficiency frontier due to the 
inefficiency in terms of mobilizing fertilizers against the total farm income. Similarly, 
Figure 7.6 shows the efficient DMUs in GMIS with efficient mobilization of fertilizers 
against the total farm income, and these efficient cropping systems (DMUs) are 11, 12, 47, 
and 48.  
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Figure 7.6. Efficiency analysis graph: fertilizer cost vs. farm income in GMIS 
 
It is interesting to note that both irrigation schemes have the same number of efficient 
farms (4 each) in terms of fertilizer use only, but have different proportion at the whole 
scheme level because of the different sample sizes considered in both schemes. However, 
all inefficient DMUs (in case of fertilzer use only) in FMIS fall into specific range 
regardless of the level of income. Nonetheless, in the case of GMIS, the pattern of 
inefficient farms is more dispersed varying from low income to high income farms. The 
efficiency frontier in Figure 7.7 shows the efficient DMUs such as 34, 58, 86, and 92 
which had been efficiently mobilizing the costs of tube well irrigation against total farm 
income. The rest of the DMUs could not reach the efficiency frontier in view of their 
inefficiency in mobilizing tube well irrigation cost against total farm income. In the same 
vein, Figure 7.8 shows the results of efficienct DMUs (cropping systems) in GMIS, which 
indicate that DMUs with number 82, 78, and 48 are 100% efficient in terms of tube well 
irrigations against the total farm income. In the establishment of the efficiency frontier, the 
distance between DMU and efficient frontier defines the efficiency score. In both irrigation 
schemes, this distance decreases from the small farms to large farms particularly in the 
case of GMIS where almost all large farms have been equipped with private tube wells and 
underground water which are suitable for irrigation purposes specifically reaching the head 
and middle canals. 
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Figure 7.7. Efficiency analysis graph: tube well irrigation cost vs. farm income in FMIS 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Efficiency analysis graph: tube well irrigation cost vs. farm income in GMIS 
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The inputs considered per farm size are shown in Table 7.7 indicating the difference 
between actual average values used by inefficient farms and the optimum (target) values 
mobilized by efficient farms. The large differences form potential gains (percentage of 
input potentially savable compared to current amount used) which could help in singling 
out the specific inputs, the use of which could be optimized (reduced).  
Table 7.7. Actual value and target value for input use in inefficient farms  
* 
1 = Small farms, 2 = Medium farms, 3 = Large farms. 1USD =75PKR in 2009-10 
 
The results further suggest that the sources of inefficiencies in FMIS could be focused first 
on pesticides use, especially in large farms that unnecessarily spend too much on pesticides 
compared with the efficient farms. However, to a lesser extent, significant economies 
could also be made on tube-well costs, labour costs, and fertilizer costs. In GMIS, 
significant economies could be made on costs of land rental, of which all farm types spend 
too much compared to efficient farms in the same farm groups. Nevertheless, costs on 
pesticides, labour and land preparation could be optimized although conversely, there is 
only limited room for reducing the costs for harvesting and post harvesting in all farms as 
well as with land preparation costs in FMIS. This could be possibly due to the fixed costs 
imposed by contractors in instances where farmers do not have their own equipment, but 
there is no clear pattern about farm size and efficiency relationship in either system. 
Input variables 
Farm 
type
*
 
FMIS 
 
GMIS 
Actual 
cost 
Target 
cost 
Gain 
 Actual 
cost 
Target 
cost 
Gain 
(USD) (USD) (%)  (USD) (USD) (%) 
Land renting cost  
1 - - -  725 251 -65.3 
2 - - -  725 407 -50.8 
3 - - -  725 330 -54.4 
Land preparation cost 
1 239 213 -8.5  328 251 -19.8 
2 256 231 -8.5  371 282 -20.9 
3 258 239 -6.4  408 346 -13.9 
Seed cost  
1 299 242 -17.3  171 151 -10.2 
2 308 271 -10.7  503 393 -16.0 
3 336 321 -4.2  770 648 -17.8 
Fertilizer cost  
1 645 555 -11.8  820 724 -8.9 
2 903 699 -20.2  1395 1174 -15.2 
3 1041 888 -12.8  1762 1430 -17.1 
Pesticides cost  
1 91 69 -21.8  324 238 -18.8 
2 265 122 -41.6  393 314 -18.2 
3 268 135 -39.7  439 400 -7.7 
Tube well irrigation 
cost  
1 128 106 -14.7  709 586 -13.1 
2 191 126 -24.5  753 624 -15.3 
3 231 184 -19.4  757 716 -4.5 
Labor cost   
1 231 165 -24.3  263 204 -20.6 
2 282 216 -20.2  345 275 -19.1 
3 285 255 -9.1  380 334 -10.6 
Harvesting cost 
1 361 336 -6.3  400 372 -6.8 
2 491 454 -6.9  453 417 -7.7 
3 549 520 -5.2  512 488 -4.5 
Post-harvesting cost 
1 441 384 -11.6  210 196 -6.6 
2 496 435 -10.7  425 384 -7.8 
3 522 482 -6.9  666 630 -4.2 
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Furthermore, the observed trends actually contradict with each other between the systems 
where for instance, small farms use relatively more fertilizers or tube wells efficiently in 
FMIS while this is rather the case for large farms in GMIS. 
 
The farm efficiency analysis also shows that on the overall, farms in FMIS are less 
efficient than those in GMIS although no effect was noted of the farm size on the technical 
efficiency. The results should therefore be carefully considered especially that the analysis 
included only few input factors reflected by some production costs, and is strictly limited 
to the efficiency in mobilizing these inputs towards optimum farm income. Actually, large 
farms benefit more from the enabling and supportive environment including extension 
services and technical advice as well as in exchanging farmers’ own experiences and the 
like. Those factors have not been taken into account in the technical efficiency analysis 
using DEA. Therefore, the two systems can hardly be compared with each other 
considering that farms in GMIS seem to benefit more from such amenities.  
 
The questions about tube wells are crucial and far too many. Subsidizing tube well-based 
irrigation system would only lead to overexploitation of the groundwater, and in fact some 
parts (head and middle) of FMIS are already extracting saline groundwater. Although tube 
wells seem to bring higher individual performances at farm level (as shown in the above 
results), such impact could be temporary since salinization and resource depletion are 
already looming. Also, such ‘atomistic’ technology could only lead to the artificial 
privatization of resources, where many farmers could be disengaged from such collective 
action since this remains an absolute necessity for only those who have canal water. 
Finally, tube wells could also introduce much inequity in the system, since only large and 
better-off farms could have access to such facilities.  
 
This study confirms with the local empirical evidences in the findings of Fan and Chan-
Kang (2005) which emphasized that low productivities of small-scale farms in Asia could 
be addressed through crop diversification of high-value commodities, which can play an 
important role to improve the small-scale farms’ economic performances. Further, the 
results of this study also support the argument of Griffin et al. (2002) that redistribution of 
farms through land reforms could improve the production from small-scale farming. 
Therefore, this study calls for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to 
institutional reforms in the irrigation systems of Punjab.   
7.7 Water supply-demand situation and cropping strategies  
This section presents the water supply-demand situation at farm level in both irrigation 
schemes (FMIS and GMIS). Crop irrigation water requirements are calculated under 
diverse cropping systems and then results are linked with canal supplies. Pumping of 
groundwater (volume) is also estimated and further, cropping strategies of farmers are 
discussed under water deficit situation.  
  
Irrigation water requirement estimation at crop level 
 
For assessing the irrigation water requirement by each crop at field-level of both irrigation 
schemes, CROPWAT software was used, the results of which are shown in Table 7.8, 
which also indicates the irrigation water requirement (IWR) by each crop in the farms in 
FMIS for a period of one year including those for multiple cropping. The cropping 
calendar shown in Table 3.7 can be linked with the crop irrigation requirements where 
three crops such as wheat, rice Kharif, and sugarcane are the highest irrigation-demanding 
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crops in FMIS as shown in Table 7.8. Sugarcane and gardens are annual-based cultivated 
commodities which also require irrigation throughout the year. Some other crops such as 
rice
1
 and maize
3
 are cultivated in late Rabi or Spring season but harvested in Kharif season 
which result in increased requirement for irrigation water due to the rising temperatures in 
May, June and July. Figure 6.9 confirms the highest irrigation requirement during these 
months compared to water supplies in FMIS. Furthermore, the details on water supplies 
compared with irrigation water requirements are discussed thoroughly in Section 6.4 of 
this document on water balance.  
Table 7.8. CROPWAT based irrigation water requirement for crops in FMIS 
Crop 
IWR  
(mm) 
IWR at scheme level  
(MCM) 
Wheat
2
 235.8 140.84 
Cotton
1
 630.9 64.90 
Rice
1
 853.8 296.48 
Rice
3
 982.7 64.47 
Sugarcane 1410.7 894.76 
Maize
3
 557.6 22.40 
Pulses
1
 319.7 0.16 
Pulses
2
 152.1 0.10 
Foddar
1
 434.8 87.40 
Foddar
2
 207.9 32.99 
Garden fruits 730.2 82.05 
Tobacco 554 0.39 
Oilseed
2
 147 1.07 
Vegetables
1
 579.7 26.87 
Vegetables
2
 294 5.41 
Miscellaneous 387.86 0.80 
1
 means Kharif, 
2
 means Rabi, and 
3
 means Spring cropping season 
 
In the case of GMIS, the per hectare irrigation requirement is higher than that of FMIS as 
shown in Table 7.9 which is due to the higher ETo values and less rainfall (refer to Figures 
3.7 and 3.8). Cotton leads all other crops in GMIS in terms of the highest irrigation 
requirement of 811.61 MCM of water at the whole scheme level. It should also be noted 
that there is early and long cropping calendar of cotton in GMIS compared with that of 
FMIS. In the same context, Svendsen and Huppert (2003) reported that an early cropping 
calendar has been achieved for this commodity as a result of reforms in the irrigation 
system of the State of Andhra Pradesh in India, although such findings could not be 
confirmed in this case study of the FMIS. The monthly water requirements in FMIS are 
shown in Figure 6.8 and in FMIS, monthly irrigation water requirements are given in 
Figure 6.9. 
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Table 7.9. CROPWAT based irrigation water requirement for crops in GMIS 
Crop 
IWR  
(mm) 
IWR at scheme level  
(MCM) 
Wheat
2
 310.3 199.20 
Cotton  1642.6 811.61 
Rice
1
  1112.7 211.01 
Rice
3
  1384.5 119.54 
Sugarcane 2083.4 107.05 
Maize
1
  548.8 109.40 
Maize
3
  697.2 68.26 
Pulses
1
  755.1 25.13 
Foddar
1
  617.5 101.19 
Foddar
2
 213.6 24.71 
Garden fruits 1159.9 80.76 
Oilseed
2
 211.6 8.14 
Vegetables
1
  845.8 61.81 
Vegetables
2
  394.3 57.45 
Vegetable
3
  240.9 27.85 
Miscellaneous  654 52.64 
1
means Kharif, 
2
means Rabi, and 
3
means Spring cropping season 
 
Supply-demand situation and role of groundwater at farm level  
 
The total water inflow for Burala Canal (FMIS) in 2009-10 was 1029 MCM (million cubic 
meter) at the point of entry or at diversion used for irrigation purposes which could reduce 
further after conveyance losses to farm gate level. Unreliable water delivery and too many 
fluctuations in water supply in the canals (see Figure 6.4), where in most times the 
available water volume is not enough to fulfill the requirements of current cropping system 
which is 1721 MCM annually for multiple cropping. Considering that the Burala Canal 
was initially designed to meet the irrigation requirements for only 65% of cropping 
intensity, now that intensity has increased up to 110%, it has become difficult for Burala 
Canal to supply the water demands. Monthly details of water supplies and demands can be 
seen in Figure 6.8. However, crop wise water requirements are given in Table 7.8. In this 
water deficit situation, groundwater availability and its usage for irrigation has been 
discussed earlier in section 6.4 on water networks and water balances. 
 
Irrigation requirement per unit of irrigated area in the command of Burala Canal is 8311 
cubic meters however, canal supplies only cover 4558 cubic meter as shown in Table 7.10.  
Similarly in GMIS, the designed capacity of UPC 81.51 m
3
.s
-1
 and its annual peak flow in 
2009-10 was 72 m
3
.s
-1
. The total water allocated for UPC canal in 2009-10 was 1702 
MCM. However, only 1456 MCM was available at the point of entry or diversion to be 
used for irrigation purposes which is reduce further due to conveyance losses in 156 kilo 
meter long main canal, then secondary canal and then in tertiary canal levels. However, 
these supplies are far less to meet the requirements of 2066 MCM by multiple cropping 
systems in GMIS. In order to meet these farm level deficiencies of irrigation water, farmers 
use groundwater as a supplementary source which is extremely expensive because of 
issues highlighted in section 6.4.   
 
Strikingly, this supply is in the canal head which decreased further upon reaching the farm-
gate level. This issue gives rise to another issue which deals with governance and 
managerial problems. In view of the sodic quality of underground water, it can support 
only requirements up to a certain limit. Improvement in the delivery performances and 
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governance indicators therefore could provide the solution on one hand and improvement 
in field irrigation efficiency is another option. At any rate, the current water supplies are far 
beyond less than the water requirements for irrigation taking into account the present 
cropping patterns. 
Table 7.10. Annual situation of water balance at farm level 
Water balance indicators FMIS GMIS 
Total annual IWR (m
3
/ha) 8311 12079 
Total annual canal water supply (m
3
/ha) 4558 5567 
% coverage of demand by canal 54.8 46.1 
Annual groundwater pumped (m
3
/ha) 860 2538 
% coverage of demand by tube wells 10.4 21 
Annual deficit water (m
3
/ha) 2893 (34.8%) 3974 (32.9%) 
 
Table 7.10 shows the water balance situation at farm level on annual basis under multiple 
cropping systems in both irrigation schemes. Based on the actual situation of cropping 
diversity at individual farm level, Table 7.10 might not depict the accurate situation of 
water balance. However, these results show an overall and general picture of water supply 
and demand. Based on the canal supply situation, both irrigation schemes are water deficit 
(3,753 m
3
/ha in FMIS and 6,512m
3
/ha in GMIS) on annual basis with multiple cropping 
(refer to cropping calendar Figure 3.6). In both irrigation schemes, groundwater contributes 
a major proportion to cover this deficiency of irrigation water. At scheme level in FMIS, 
178 MCM (860 m3/ha) groundwater is pumped annually which share up to 10.4% to meet 
total requirements. However in GMIS, share of groundwater is 434 MCM (2538 m3/ha) 
which accounts 21% of total irrigation requirements.   
  
Major reasons of more pumping of groundwater in GMIS are; 1) more water demanding 
crops such as cotton, vegetables, potato and maize, 2) area allocated to these crops is 
higher, 3) cropping intensity has been increased from 65% to 150%, and 4) 
evapotranspiration rate is higher. However, after all this, both irrigation schemes are water 
deficit as discussed earlier, which impact on the crop diversification and productivities. At 
the time of cultivation, farmers decide which crop should be grown and how much area 
should be allocated to each crop. These strategic cropping decisions are made based on the 
access to groundwater. If farmers do not have access to groundwater, they will not select 
crops to grow such as potato, maize etc. Example of small farmers depicts this situation 
accurately when they have to wait for rental groundwater for many days. This situation of 
groundwater markets is true in both irrigation schemes.  
7.8 Main findings 
The main socio-economic features of farmers that differ in both irrigation schemes are 
farm size, livelihood and land tenure system. Farmers in GMIS are more experienced in 
farming, and although with lesser formal education yet they engage in more diverse 
livelihood and land tenure systems (land renting, access and large sizes). On the farm level 
performance in both irrigation schemes, some key features that could be highlighted 
include: (1) farm size positively correlates with diversification (more crops), intensification 
(cropping intensity, inputs), and ultimately higher farm income per ha; (2) diversification 
relates to higher inputs (intensification) and higher income per ha; (3) wheat cropping (in 
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FMIS) and wheat-cotton rotation (in GMIS) are strategic choice but quite specialized, and 
exclusive of the others systems, requiring low inputs and ultimately providing low income; 
and (4) maize and rice cropping (and potato in GMIS) fit well in the diversification and 
intensification strategies leading to higher farm income per ha. Nevertheless, the 
inadequate financial support and extension services for small farms do not support 
intensification. Although there is a striking positive link between farm size and 
diversification, smaller farms grow only limited number of crops which are mostly the 
least profitable ones. Even if on the overall, farm size has no effect on technical efficiency, 
farms in FMIS are observed to be less efficient than those in GMIS. Sources of 
inefficiency in FMIS could be influenced by the costs for using pesticides, tube well 
irrigation and high labour while those in GMIS by the costs of land rental, land 
preparation, as well as from the use of fertilizers, pesticides and tube well irrigation. Small 
farms are not performing well with respect to total income from farming and are not more 
efficient than the large farms in mobilizing inputs to achieve even a meager result. Farms 
in GMIS seem to benefit more from the enabling and supportive environment including 
extension services and technical advice, and exchanging farmers’ own experiences. A 
structural difference between the both irrigation schemes has therefore been found. 
Moreover, it seems that the farming intensification-diversification threshold has not been 
met by small farms (less than 2.5 ha). A clear positive relationship between irrigation water 
availability (access to private tube wells) and farm size has been established which support 
and sustain the intensification-diversification process leading to increased income from 
farming. However, based on the cropping calendar, locally prevailed climatic conditions, 
and biophysical conditions; the irrigation requirement by each crop in GMIS is higher than 
that of each crop in FMIS. Based on the high cropping intensity in GMIS, groundwater is 
pumped (2538 m
3
/ha) which is much higher than FMIS. Yet, both irrigation scheme are 
water deficit to fulfill the irrigation requirements. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations 
Irrigated agriculture is one of the most important economic sectors of Pakistan. It is 
primarily supported by the country’s vast and historic canal irrigation network, notably in 
Punjab. Irrigation systems have been performing well-below expectations and capacity 
over the years, in institutional, management, and operational terms. Water requirements are 
not met by delivery systems. Insufficient financial basis of management and operation 
systems leads to limited services. Groundwater is being used to fulfill the deficit canal 
deliveries which have a certain farm-level implications such as expensive groundwater 
markets, access to pumping technology, and salinization. These issues result in low 
farming performances, with low crop productivities. This study constitutes a documented 
and quantified investigation of performances, efficiencies, and their factors at both 
irrigation scheme level and farm level performances in Punjab. It is mostly based upon on 
primary data collected in two irrigation systems under contrasted governance arrangements 
(Government-, and Farmer-Managed Irrigation Scheme). A combination of analyses is 
used at three key levels of irrigation governance, management and operation. MASSCOTE 
approach was applied under contrasted governance system at scheme level. A detailed farm 
operation analysis including multivariate analysis, performance and technical efficiency 
analysis is carried out by using DEA. This methodology can be generalized to other parts 
of irrigated agriculture in Pakistan and elsewhere if conditions meet. Findings of this study 
are helpful for local and international policy makers, irrigation managers, and for 
agriculture development agencies for sustainable management of irrigation and agriculture 
sectors in order to meet the food demands.  
 
The first objective of this study was to describe overall institutional settings existing in 
these two contrasted governance systems (FMIS and GMIS). Institutional reforms in 
Pakistan have been implemented with well-defined laws, rules, and administrative 
structures.  
 
In FMIS, the newly established institutions like AWB, FOs and WUAs in FMIS have 
specific, pre-defined and documented boundaries of functions and roles under the PIDA 
Act of 1997 and by various legal frameworks, rules and regulations issued from time to 
time. Compared with head and middle reaches, tail-end farmers have been given more 
representation in the general bodies and management committees of FOs and WUAs. 
Under such revised governance structure, farmers were found to be very motivated and 
inspired especially in terms of monitoring water theft and outlet tampering, as well as in 
carrying out inspection procedures and ensuring responsiveness, providing moral and self-
respect, and facilitating decisions to be taken by the authorities of FOs and WUAs. 
However, many farmers have also reported weak governance especially in terms of 
imposing fines and penalties as well as cost-recovery (due to poor recovery of irrigation 
services fees), ineffectiveness of capacity building and training, and also in conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
 
In the case of GMIS, there had been no amendment or new rules and laws in the Canal 
Irrigation Act of 1873, although since that time there was only one amendment on 
irrigation service fees. Farmers in GMIS also reported low transparency, high level of fines 
and penalties imposed, and inefficiency of authorities to increase recovery of irrigation 
service fees. Farmers also mentioned poor monitoring and checking against water theft and 
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outlet tempering, poor provision of moral support and overall disrespectful attitude shown 
to farmers by officials and staff of IPD, weak decision-making and poor responsiveness. 
 
Overall, the empirical assessment shows that farmers in FMIS are getting better services, 
with institutional settings that are more favorable and supportive, with emphasis on water 
delivery, social aspects, monitoring of water resources and infrastructure. However, 
irrigation governance system and institutional settings under FMIS could perform even 
better if FOs could become the legitimate level to deal with water theft and outlet-
tempering, and defaulters of irrigation service fee. The main issue is that the main canal 
remains under public authorities’ control and management. 
 
The second objective of this study was to assess and analyze the performances of both 
irrigation systems in terms of water supply system and service delivery to users. Using the 
MASSCOTE approach, the current performances, weaknesses and capacity to support and 
orientate modernization of irrigation system have been highlighted under the two 
governance systems in Pakistan. 
 
Several common features were identified such as the old age (more than 100 years) of 
irrigation structures, wide variations in the availability of water, very low per ha allocation 
of water, increase in cropping intensity beyond designed capacities (from 65 at 
construction time to about 150% nowadays), deposition of silt in distributaries and minor 
canals, deferred and poor maintenance programs, very low water fee compared to MOM 
cost, widespread water theft, unavailability of water to tail enders, un-gated irrigation 
structures particularly at secondary canals, tempered outlets, damaged canal banks due to 
human activities and livestock movements along the canals, among others. 
 
The physical hydraulic infrastructures at main and secondary canals in FMIS have been 
largely improved and some engineering works are still in progress to meet the irrigation 
water requirements at farm level. Overall, the system performance, as shown by the 
internal indicators (i.e. water delivery service, operation of the canal, turnout, 
communications and general conditions at different levels of canals) seems better in FMIS 
than in GMIS. The values of the internal indicators of the main canal in FMIS remain low 
compared to what could be expected in similar conditions (e.g. values observed in Jaunpur 
Branch Canal in India; Kumar et al., 2010). Also, its secondary and tertiary canals could 
operate better.  
 
It is observed that the values of most internal indicators are below average, indicating the 
current poor performance of both irrigation schemes. However, overall performance shown 
through external indicators (i.e. financial, agricultural productivity and economic aspects) 
is better in GMIS than in FMIS.  
 
Agricultural output per unit of irrigated area with multiple cropping is slightly higher in 
GMIS.  There is no significant difference in the output per unit of irrigation water supply, 
while potential in FMIS could provide opportunities to improve water productivity. The 
cost recovery ratio in FMIS is 0.33, and water fee collection performance is 0.62. In GMIS, 
the cost recovery ratio is 0.67, and water fee collection performance is 0.85. On an annual 
basis, water fee collection performance of FOs in FMIS decreased from 83% in 2004-05 to 
26% in 2008-09 which is contradictory with the findings of McKay and Keremane (2006) 
that increase in fee collection could be a result of PIM. This results for a mismatch 
between service level and fee level, as perceived by farmers, who are dissatisfied with the 
system. Sensitivity of irrigation structures was also noted to be higher in FMIS than in 
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GMIS. About 78% offtake structures in FMIS and 35% in GMIS show high sensitivity, 
producing large variations in the discharge of the distributaries when subjected to given 
changes in the upstream head. These offtake structures with high sensitivity have been 
pointed out as the high demanding targets to improve water delivery services in both 
irrigation schemes. Services to users had also declined from upstream to downstream in 
both irrigation schemes while a large-scale inequity existed at the secondary and tertiary 
canals in GMIS.  Results from the better service delivery in FMIS orientate the improved 
performance of IMT. As for the strength of staff, 27% positions of various ranks in FMIS 
and 26% in GMIS are still vacant affecting the level of monitoring which had considerably 
declined. In addition, inadequate technical staff prevails in the FOs. Moreover, the budget 
breakdown of IPD and FOs showed that major portion goes to salaries of staff, where 
about 80% of the budget of DoI and 55% of the FOs were spent on salaries in FMIS and 
71% in GMIS. The total MOM cost per unit area in FMIS was 5 US$/ha and 4 US$/ha in 
GMIS in 2009-10. The study also reveals that the operational and maintenance 
expenditures are higher than the total amount of water charges being collected. Moreover, 
water balance indicators showed a significant gap between the canal supplies and irrigation 
requirement at the whole system level in both schemes. Results therefore confirm the 
argument that new farming systems require demand-driven water supply, not supply-
driven as is currently widely practiced. 
 
As a conclusion to investigations on objectives 1 and 2, it must be emphasized that while 
internal indicators (i.e. water supply system indicators in MASSCOTE jargon) and overall 
institutional setting indicate a better situation in FMIS, external indicators (i.e. sub-systems 
interacting with water supply: production, finance, economics) illustrate a better situation 
in GMIS. The sharp decline in irrigation fee recovery in FMIS might result from farmers’ 
frustration and declining motivation, in view of poor farm performance, overall limited 
water supply (not matching demand) and poor management of water conflicts and theft. 
 
In order to further investigate the interactions between farm and system levels, the third 
objective of this study was to assess and analyze the operation, performance and efficiency 
of the irrigation farms. 
 
The overview of the socio-economic traits in both schemes showed few critical 
differences; only differences could be observed in farm size, livelihood and land tenure 
systems. Farmers in GMIS are more experienced in farming, and although with lesser 
formal education but with more diverse livelihoods and land tenure systems that those in 
FMIS. Such socio-economic differences could not have been affected by the difference in 
governance, since it had only been few years since the institutional reforms took effect. 
Results of the pair-wise correlations analyses, PCA and descriptive statistics per farm type 
concur and confirm the fact that the socio-economic variables hardly interact with the 
technical factors.  
 
More strikingly, land access and tenure are different. FMIS farmers only access own land, 
which means operating only in limited area, while many GMIS farmers also rent extra 
land, which allow them to pursue diverse strategies (e.g. diversification) and to strengthen 
their financial basis (e.g. for investment in tube-well, hence higher and more reliable water 
supply). As a result, average land size is bigger in GMIS than in FMIS.  
 
The results of the farming performance analysis concur with general documentation and 
knowledge, and may be summarized as follows: the larger the farm the larger the financial 
investment, leading to increased access to reliable irrigation (through groundwater access), 
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inputs, land (renting), labour, and machinery eventually resulting in increased production 
and more diversification towards skill-, water- and input-demanding crops (sugarcane, then 
rice, then maize) and risky but high-input crops (potato). The clear positive relationship 
between irrigation water availability (through access to private tube-well) and farm size 
had been established. The bigger the farm, the more likely is the ownership of private tube-
well. Insufficient reliable irrigation water in all farms, especially for small farms with no 
access to private tube wells, explains the measures taken by government to guarantee the 
price of grains.  
 
Small farms usually grow only limited number of crops (specialization instead of 
diversification), which are also mostly the least profitable commodities. There is a 
strikingly higher allocation of land for wheat cultivation in small farms; wheat being less 
demanding in irrigation water, yet also being a less profitable crop.  
 
There is no clear effect of farm size on technical efficiency but smaller farms appear to be 
not performing well in terms of total farming income, and are also lesser efficient than 
large farms regarding input use. Also, inadequate financial and technical support to smaller 
farms hinders profitable strategies such as diversification (e.g. small farms do not benefit 
extension). 
 
It appears that the starting point to a virtuous loop leading to profitability remains the farm 
size. As discussed above, this is the main structural difference between the two systems, 
where the farming intensification-diversification threshold is not met by small farms (less 
than 2.5 ha). Access to groundwater is also a contributing factor to efficiency since canal 
irrigation only cannot sustain an intensification-diversification process required to attain 
improved income. As a result, tube-well irrigation is resorted to as a solution that supports 
intensification and diversification and for reliable, timely and adequate supply of irrigation 
water. Through this private tube-well option, irrigation becomes atomistic and 
individualistic rather than a collective venture. Agricultural development has then little to 
do with pure collective action and scheme-level institutional arrangements. Under such 
conditions, it is understandable that IMT and the setup of FMIS do not readily show 
improvements at the farm level, compared to GMIS. 
 
Whether under farmers or government management, irrigation systems in Punjab will 
continue to be confronted with concerns related to water – land – farming strategy nexus. 
Although recent reforms are mostly if not exclusively aimed at changing ways and patterns 
of canal management, the design of the country’s canal irrigation system was after all not 
meant for all-farms’ intensification and diversification. Therefore, even if service-oriented 
and improved management could help in securing more reliable, timely and water delivery, 
change in irrigation governance at scheme level could only provide one part of the 
solution. Conjunctive use of groundwater has proven its significance as life security of 
irrigated agriculture in Punjab. Meanwhile, questions surrounding tube wells are many and 
crucial because of groundwater governance and its linkages with livelihood (Prakash, 
2008), possible environmental impacts (salinization and declining water table) and 
farmers’ lack of interest in collective actions, and in the end would not be cost-effective. 
Nonetheless, the future of irrigation in Punjab still lies on its historical assets: canals and 
groundwater. Supporting to the arguments of Levine (1977) and Coward (1980), the 
findings of this study calls for strong linkages and assistance from bureaucracy to farmers 
as farmers cannot emerge spontaneously. In contrast to global successful examples, IMT in 
Pakistan can only give better results if other surrounding issues are fixed such as farm size, 
perturbation in canal supplies, agricultural extension services, and education and capacity 
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building of small farmers, proper jurisdiction for revenue collection and conflict resolution, 
credit and marketing system etc. Therefore, newly established local institutions through 
IMT (Area Water Board, Farmers’ Organizations and Water Users’ Associations) in 
coordination with public agencies will develop new grounds as basis for sound collective 
actions and small farmers will also be able to get equal services and benefits.  
 
Recommendations 
 
The recommendations of this study are given as follows: 
 
 Proper jurisdiction and enforcement system of Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) for 
collection of revenues and conflict resolution should be revisit and improved while 
FOs should be more empowered to implement rules and laws in more strict and 
transparent manners. Alternatively, recovery of revenue can be given back to 
irrigation Department, just similar to GMIS. 
 FOs with deficit technical staff (e.g. engineers, gauge readers, patwaries etc) should 
ensure the recruitment of technical field staff as per requirement to conduct regular 
monitoring of high sensitive offtake structures.  
 In FMIS, potential areas for improvement for specific sources of inefficiency in 
farming performance are cost of pesticides, costs of tube wells, labour and 
fertilizers which could be significantly addressed. In GMIS, prudence could be 
made significantly on the costs of land rental and marginally on the costs pesticides 
and land preparation. Awareness campaigns and capacity-building trainings of 
farmers by Agricultural Extension Department, Agriculture Marketing and 
Information Service Department and PIDA jointly can play an important role 
towards efficient, service-oriented and cost-effective mobilization of farm inputs 
and can facilitate farmers for quality production and its non-monopolized 
marketing so that all types of farmers can access services and can get equal 
benefits.   
 Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) can only be one part of the solution. There 
is still the shared role of both State and local FOs, and WUAs in transferring 
irrigation schemes for better, timely and equitable services for all types of farms. 
Reform in the irrigation system of Punjab should be accompanied with land reform 
and increased farm size, possibly through facilitating arrangements towards tenure 
flexibility and land renting, as well as reforms of public institutions in order to help 
small-scale farmers and enable them to have access to credit, extension services, 
marketing, and farming technology.  
 Policy makers should also consider the access to and management issues of 
groundwater in the future strategies of IMT. 
 
For Future Research 
 
As an emerging issue of groundwater depletion because of continuous deficit canal 
supplies, a detailed study should be carried out in a multi-dimensional context of water 
balance, diverse cropping situation, access to groundwater and land.    
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APPENDIX-A                                                                          Questionnaire number [       ] 
Date of interview [--------/ ---------/2010] 
 
Questionnaire Survey 
 
INVESTIGATING IRRIGATION SYSTEMS’ PERFORMANCE UNDER TWO 
DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE SITUATIONS: CASE STUDIES IN PUNJAB, 
PAKISTAN 
 
Respondent Information 
Respondent name  
Address  
 
 
Contact No.  
 
 
 
 
This survey is being conducted to examine socio-economic and physical impacts of 
governance changes on the water users by the institutional reforms under PIDA act. 1997 
in irrigation sector in Pakistan; moreover, this survey is also a part of doctoral research 
being conducted by the researcher.  
 
(All the information you will provide would be purely used for academic purposes and will be kept in secret) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asian Institute of Technology 
School of Environment, Resources and Development 
Thailand 
December, 2009 
  
1
7
0
 
QUESTIONNAIRE: The questionnaire deign is comprising of different sections (mentioned in left column). Each section contains questions 
both in open and close ended format. For ease in data processing, coding has been done shown in [ ] format. Brief description of each section 
has also been provided for facilitating the respondent. The questionnaire will be printed on legal paper size for more clarity and space. 
 
 
Section 1 
 
 
Members Gender Age 
Education 
level 
Main occupation 
Nature of 
Farm activity (skills) 
Experience 
of farming 
Demography 
 
This section 
focuses to 
investigate the 
demographic 
information 
about farmers 
Key code 
[1] Male 
[2] Female 
Years [1]  Illiterate 
[2]  Primary 
[3]  Secondary 
[4]  Graduate 
[4]  Above 
[1]  Farming 
[2]  Farming & Govt. job 
[3]  Farming & private job 
[4]  Farming & private 
business 
 
[1] Sowing/harvesting 
[2] Cropping practices 
[3] Irrigation 
[4] Marketing 
[5] Others 
Years 
Head       
Spouse       
Others 1)       
2)       
3)       
4)       
5)       
6)       
7)       
8)       
9)       
10)       
  
1
7
1
 
Section 2 Crop Area Yield (Monds+Bags)/acre 
Crop 
production 
 
This 
section 
gathered 
information 
to quantify 
the farm 
production 
 
(Acre) 
2009 Price 
(PKR) 
2008 Price 
(PKR) 
2007 Price 
(PKR) 
Best 
Yield 
recorded 
Expected/potential 
yield if all 
conditions met Max Mini Max Mini Max Mini 
Cotton             
Wheat             
Rice             
Maize             
Sugarcane             
Cucumber             
Potato             
 
Why there is a difference between potential best yield and actual yield, what do u think? 
 
1) Water shortage   2) Input supply problem 3) Post-harvest problems   4) Unfavorable weather conditions   5) Any other……………… 
 
 
Section  
2A 
Type of 
Input 
Commercial 
Name 
Wheat Cotton Rice Sugarcane Maize Potato Market price 
Crop budget 
 
This section 
seeks the 
information 
about the 
under-
practice 
inputs per 
crop and their 
market prices. 
 bags/acre  bags/acre  bags/acre)  bags/acre  bags/acre  bags/acre PKR/unit 
Fertilizers 
Urea        
DAP        
SSP        
Potash        
Farm-manure        
Zinc        
        
Agro-
chemicals 
 Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre  
Pesticide        
Insecticide        
Fungicide        
        
        
  
1
7
2
 
Section  
2A 
Type of 
Input 
Commercial 
Name 
Wheat Cotton Rice Sugarcane Maize Potato Market price 
Crop budget 
 
 
  Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre Number/acre PKR/unit 
Land 
preparatio
n 
Tillage        
Disc plough        
Leveling        
Ridger        
        
Tube well irrigation 
no hr/irri no hr/irri no hr/irri no hr/irri no hr/irri no hr/irri  
             
Harvesti
ng 
Harvesting cost        
Threshing cost        
Post-
harvesti
ng 
Packaging/bagging        
 Storing        
 Transportation        
 
Section  
2A 
Crop Task No of people No of hours Cost 
 
Labour 
Wheat 
Seed broadcasting    
Fertilizer    
Irrigation    
Chemical application    
Threshing    
    
Cotton 
Sowing    
Fertilizer    
Irrigation    
Chemical application    
    
    
  
1
7
3
 
Task No of people No of hours Cost 
Rice 
Irrigation    
Fertilizer    
Chemical application    
    
Sugarcane 
Seed broadcasting    
Fertilizer    
Irrigation    
Chemical application    
    
Maize 
Sowing    
Fertilizer    
Irrigation    
Chemical application    
Threshing    
    
Potato 
Sowing    
Fertilizer    
Irrigation    
Chemical application    
Harvesting    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
7
4
 
Section 
3 
Cropping Calendar 
 Land preparation + Manuring [1] Insecticides spray [4] Harvesting [7] 
Sowing [2] Irrigation starts [5] Drying/threshing [8] 
Weeding/herbicides spray [3] Irrigation ends [6] Marketing [9] 
 
Crop Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Wheat             
            
Cotton             
            
Rice             
            
Sugarcane             
            
Maize             
            
Potato             
            
Cucumber             
            
Pulses             
            
Fodder             
            
 
Which are the main kinds of higher expenditures and for what? 
(1) For buying farm-inputs (2) For tub well irrigation (3) Farm labour (4) Any other (please specify)……………………………………… 
Please mention months with highest income……………………………….and month with lowest income…………………………………... 
Please mention months with highest expenditures…………………………and months with lowest expenditures……………………………. 
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Section 5 
 
Physical & 
natural 
capitals 
 
This section 
seeks the 
information 
about the 
physical 
capital of the 
water users 
Means of 
communication 
[1]  Landline 
[2]  Mobile 
[3) Any other……. 
Utilities 
[1]  Electricity 
[2]  Gas 
[3]  Telephone 
[4]  Water supply 
Landholding size 
(acre) 
[1]  < 1              
[2]  1 to 2.5      
[3] 2.5 to 5     
[4] > 5 to 12.5   
[5] > 12.5         
Availability of 
farm machinery 
[1]  Tractor and trolley 
[2]  Tiller 
[3]  Leveler 
[4]  Ridger 
Status of farm 
land 
[1]  Rented…..acres 
[2] Owned…...acres 
Status of farm 
machinery 
availability 
[1]  Rented 
[2]  Shared 
[3]  Owned 
Location of farm 
[1]  Head 
[2]  Middle 
[3]  Tail 
Means of 
Transportation 
[1]  Private      [2]  Rented        
[3]  Others 
Tube well 
 
[1]  Rented 
[2]  Owned 
Type of farm to 
market roads 
[1]  Katcha  
[2]  Pacca 
[3]  Others 
How do you report the quality of soil in the area?   
                                                                                     
 [1] Very good         [2]  Good                [3]  Fair      [4] Bad 
How do you report the availability of surface water? 
 
 [1]  Very good        [2]  Good                [3] Fair       [4] Bad 
How do you report the quality of underground water? 
 
 [1]  Very good         [2] Good                [3]  Fair       [4] Bad 
 
How do you report the quality of roads?  
 
[1]  Very good           [2]  Good               [3]  Fair         [4]  Bad 
 
How do you report the physical conditions of main water channels? 
                                                               
[1]  Very Good          [2]  Good               [3] Fair          [4] Bad 
 
How do you report the physical conditions of farm water channels? 
                                                               
 [1] Very Good           [2]  Good               [3]  Fair         [4] Bad 
 
Section 4 
 
Source of 
income 
This section 
focuses to 
investigate the 
major sources 
of income and 
its regularity 
and 
sufficiency 
What are the main 
sources of 
household income? 
[1]   Agriculture                             
[2]   Salary                                     
[3]   Pension                                   
[4]   Rent                                                          
[5]   Others, specify [                                   ]                                              
What is average 
total HH income per 
month?  
[                   ] PKR Income regularity     [1] Yes, [2] No, if no 
please give reason? 
…………………………………………..… 
………………………………………..…… 
 
Does the present HH income is sufficient against your expenditures? [1] Yes, [2] No, if no 
please give reason? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Section 6 
 
Social capital 
 
This section 
access the 
impact of 
governance 
change in 
term of 
participating 
in community 
level 
activities 
 
Are you a member of any WUA organization? [1] Yes or [2] No.  
If yes then as a [1] Executive member [2] Member as a water user 
 
What kind of contribution you 
render to this organization? 
 
 
[1]  Operation & maintenance 
[2]  Planning 
[3]  Meeting organization 
[4]  Others, please specify 
[                                      ]                                               
How often you participate in 
O&M activities? 
 
 
[1]  Every time 
[2]  Mostly 
[3]  Some time 
[4]  Never, Why? [                    ]                                                                       
How often you participate in   
What is your level of 
participation in planning and 
training? 
 
[1]  Very low 
[2]  Low 
[3]  High 
[4]  Very high                                                                          
What is your level of 
participation in training 
organized by WUAs? 
 
 
[1]  Very low 
[2]  Low 
[3]  High 
[4]  Very high                                                                                         
What is your status of 
participation in trainings and 
meetings? 
[1]  Just as a silent member 
[2]  Active member  
 
How many training you have attended?  [                                              ] 
 
Do you have any affiliation with political party? [1]  Yes , [2]  No  
 
Number of political dispute resolve?  [           ] 
Number of farm workers?    Male      [            ] 
                                             Females [             ] 
Do you get support from your friend and relatives? [1]  Yes , [2]  No 
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Section 7 
 
Coordination 
among the 
water users, 
WUA and 
external 
environment 
 
This section 
focuses to 
investigate the 
major sources 
of income and 
its regularity 
and 
sufficiency 
Do you have 
access to credit? 
[1]  Yes 
[2]  No 
 
How many credit institutes 
present in the area?         [           ] 
 
Do you have any 
borrowed loan?  
[1]  Yes 
[2]  No 
 
If yes, then how much amount is 
outstanding towards you?  
[                       ]                  
Does do you get the pre-season 
announcement of support price of 
farm product?  
 
[1]  yes                                              
[2]  no 
 
Do you have any savings?  
 
[1]  yes                                        
[2]  no 
 
Do you have access to the extension services? [1]  Yes [2]  No 
 
Do you have access to the weather data? [1]  Yes [2]  No 
 
Do you plan your farm activities according to weather forecast? [1]  Yes 
[2]  No 
 
What type of farms goods marketed in the local markets? 
 
 
 
 
Section 8 
 
Occurrence 
level 
This section 
will 
incorporate  
the 
respondent’s 
level of 
occurrence on 
different farm 
level activities 
and  societal 
response 
 
Read the statement and cross (X) against the number that is closely depict your 
occurrence level regarding the statement presented. 
 
Statements 
Level of occurrence 
[1] [2] [3] [4] 
Mostly Sometimes Occasionally Never 
Water sharing     
Technology sharing     
Casual meetings with 
relatives & friends 
    
Collecting marketing 
of farm inputs and 
outputs 
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Section 9   
Governance What does u think about the 
transparency of your irrigation system 
in financial and organizational 
matters? 
[1] Highly transparent 
[2] Less transparent 
[3] Not transparent 
What is the level of fines & penalties 
imposed on farmers by authorities 
against illegal actions? 
[1] Too much fine 
[2] Little bit fine 
[3] No fine at all 
What is the level of recovery of fines 
& penalties imposed from farmers? 
[1] Recovered always 
[2] Partial recovery 
[3] No recovery 
What is the level of responsiveness by 
authorities regarding complaints and 
actions? 
[1] Quick response & action 
[2] Delayed response & action 
[3] No response & action 
What is your satisfaction level by the 
decision taken by authorities? 
[1] Satisfies 
[2] A bit satisfied 
[3] Not satisfied 
What is your opinion about provision 
of self-respect and moral support? 
[1] More respect 
[2] Less respect 
[3] No respect 
What is your opinion about the level of 
monitoring & check by authorities 
against water theft & outlet tempering? 
[1] Excellent 
[2] Good 
[3] Bad 
What is your opinion about the level of 
effectiveness of capacity building 
trainings? 
[1] Very informative & useful 
[2] Somewhat useful 
[3] Wastage of time 
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Section 10 
 
Problems, 
needs, and 
suggestions 
 
This section 
will find out 
the major 
problems 
being faced 
by the 
farmers’ 
family and 
will access 
their 
immediate 
need and 
asks for 
suggestion 
for future.  
 
 
What are the main problems you are facing after the policy 
intervention? 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
What are your immediate needs that you prefer to avail in order to solve 
these problems? 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
Any suggestion for the improvement of our irrigation system? 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
 
……………………………………………………………………………
… 
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Appendix-B 
 
Checklist for Interviews 
 
Government and NGO officials 
 
1) What is the main functionality of your office? 
2) How do you perceive the policy of institutional reforms in the water management 
sector? 
3) Do you agree that water management institutions are more stronger after 
institutional reforms? 
4) Do you agree that water management institutions are technically performing better 
after institutional reforms? 
5) Do you agree that water management institutions are economically performing 
better in terms of revenue collection and budgeting after institutional reforms? 
6) What are the main lacking things (social, economic, technical and institutional) that 
are required for the proper operation of irrigation system? 
7) Do you believe that Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) and Water Users’ Associations 
(WUAs) are successful in terms of ensuring water at tail-ends? 
8) How often and regularly, your office is organizing trainings, workshops and 
meetings for farmers’ awareness? 
9) How do you perceive about the farmers’ participation in water management? 
10) What is the level of satisfaction of farmers about irrigation system performance? 
11) Do you think, farmers are happy and enjoying the services provided by your office 
after institutional reforms? 
12) Do you think that ratio of water related conflicts are decreasing after the transfer of 
water management powers to farmers? 
13) What are the major proses and cons of PIDA Act. 1997? 
14) Do you think that transfer of water management powers to farmers is 
feasible/successful in Punjab? 
15) What are the procedures and mechanisms you adopt to handle the water related 
issues? 
16) What are the main problems you face while handling the water related issues? 
17) What do you suggest to tackle these problems? 
18)  What do you suggest to improve the overall performance of the irrigation system? 
 
Politicians 
 
1) How do you perceive the policy of institutional reforms in the water management 
sector? 
2) According to your opinion, what are the major proses and cons of PIDA Act. 1997? 
3) Do you think that transfer of water management powers to farmers is 
feasible/successful in Punjab? If not then why? 
4) What necessary steps government should take for the better management of our 
irrigation system? 
5) What necessary and immediate actions your office takes in case of any water 
related issue at local level? 
6) What would you suggest to improve the performance of our irrigation system? 
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Lawyers 
 
1) How do you interpret the policy of institutional reforms in the water management 
sector? 
2) How do you perceive about the farmers’ participation in water management? 
3) What type of water management related services your office is providing to water 
users?  
4) What are the legal implications of PIDA Act. 1997 on the water management, 
water allocation, O&M and related conflicts on local level?  
5) Do you think that ratio of water related conflicts are decreasing after the transfer of 
water management powers to farmers? 
6) What would you suggest to improve the performance of our irrigation system? 
 
Intellectuals (Academicians) 
 
1) What is the main functionality of your office in irrigation system management? 
2) How do you interpret the policy of decentralization in water management sector? 
3) Do you think that transfer of water management powers to farmers is feasible in 
Punjab? How is future of PIDA? 
4) Does your office coordinate with department of irrigation and farmers? If yes then 
how? 
5) Does your office conduct trainings and courses for capacity development of 
students, farmers and staff of irrigation department? 
6) What is the scale of research under your research centre? 
7) What is the nature of research going on under your office? 
8) Have your office introduced any course on IWRM, Water Governance and PIM? 
9) What would you suggest to improve the performance of our irrigation system? 
 
Village heads 
 
1) How do you perceive about the farmers’ participation in water management? 
2) Are farmers are more organize in terms of farm activities? 
3) Is this system of management is facilitating the farmers in terms of water 
distribution, O&M activities and revenue collection? 
4) What are the main advantages and disadvantages of this system at local level? 
5) Do you think that ratio of water related conflicts are decreasing after the transfer of 
water management powers to farmers? 
6) Do you think, farmers are happy and enjoying the services provided by Farmers’ 
Organizations (FOs) and Water Users’ Associations (WUAs)? 
7) What are the main lacking things (social, economic, technical and institutional) that 
are required for the proper operation of irrigation system? 
8) What is your opinion about the crop productivity after institutional reforms? Is 
there any change? 
9) Do you think that the livelihood status of farmers is being improving after 
institutional reforms? 
10) What would you suggest to improve the performance of our irrigation system? 
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Appendix-C 
 
Existing Management Unit at secondary canals of Burala Canal   
Name of Farmer Organization CCA (ha) 
Dulchi Distributary 2,454.3 
Nopewala Distributary 5,855.1 
Ranjiana Distributary 2,640.1 
Duravan Distributary 3,397.6 
Pithorana Distributary 3,077.3 
Naurang Distributary 4,510.1 
Arif Distributary 3,126.7 
Obhal Distributary 3,400.4 
Pervaiz Distributary 3,425.1 
Tandlianwala Distributary 27,415.8 
Bhalak Distributary 23,076.9 
Balouchwala Distributary 3,282.6 
Munianwala Distributary 3,004.0 
Killianwala Distributary 27,232.0 
Samundari Distributary 6,423.5 
Farooq Distributary 5,078.9 
Bhoja Distributary 17,066.0 
Ditch Distributary 2,388.3 
Waghi Distributary  8,382.2 
Kamalia Distributary 5,425.1 
Gharak Distributary 1,415.8 
Kabirwala Distributary 20,810.5 
Kallar Distributary 6,897.2 
Kallera Distributary 4,594.7 
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Appendix-D  
MASSCOTE framework 
Mapping…….... Phase A - Baseline information 
1. Rapid diagnosis This involves diagnosis and performance assessment through 
RAP. The objectives are (a) to identify systematically key 
indicators of system in order to prioritize modernization 
improvement (b) to mobilize actors for modernization (c) to 
generate a baseline against which progress can be measured. 
2. System capacity and 
sensitivity 
Assessment of the physical capacity of irrigation structure and 
their ability to perform the function of conveyance, control, 
measurement etc.   
(b) Assessment of the sensitivity of irrigation structures (offtakes 
and regulators) identification of singular points, mapping the 
sensitivity.  
3. Perturbations Causes, magnitudes, frequency and options for coping 
perturbations. 
4. Water networks and 
water balances 
Assessment of hierarchical structures and the main features of 
irrigation, water balances at systems and subsystem levels 
considering both surface and ground water along with 
opportunities and constraints related to them. 
5. Cost of O&M Current costs related to operation techniques and services, 
disaggregating the cost into its elements, costing of various levels 
of services with current and improved techniques.  
Mapping........... Phase B - Vision of SOM & modernization of canal operation 
6. Service of users Range of services to be provided to users 
7. Management units Division of irrigation and service area into homogenous subunits 
8. Demand for operation Assessment of resources, opportunities and demand for improved 
canal operation of entire service area/subsystem unit 
9. Canal operation 
improvements 
Identifying improvement options for each management unit (a) 
water management (b) water control (c) canal operation 
10. Integration of options Aggregating options at the system/subsystem level, design of 
overall information management system for supporting operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  184 
Appendix-E 
 
Details of data required for RAP and MASSCOTE approach 
 
Steps Purpose Data Specification 
RAP To assess the current 
performance of the system 
 Volume of water available at 
user level 
 Seasonal water supplied or 
delivered 
 Rainfall 
 Evaporation 
 Irrigated area 
 Command area 
 Total management, operation 
and maintenance cost 
 Total revenue collected 
 Total no. of employees engaged 
in a particular canal and their 
costs 
 Value of agricultural production 
 Financial, Agricultural and 
economic indicators  
 
System sensitivity To analyze the sensitivity of 
irrigation structures 
 Water level 
 Discharge  
Perturbation Reason of perturbation, 
magnitude and frequency 
 Daily water level data  
 Daily discharge data 
Service to users To analyze the existing 
service and other possible 
options of services 
 Flexibility 
 Reliability 
 Equity 
 Adequacy 
 
Cost of operation To assessing the cost of 
present operation techniques 
and services, cost of 
improved services and cost 
of management, operation 
and maintenance (MOM) 
 Cost data related to MOM 
 Budget of Irrigation Department 
 Budget of Farmers organizations 
 Cost of groundwater abstraction 
 
Demand for canal operation 
services   
To analyze the opportunity 
and demand for canal 
operation 
 Sensitivity of cross regulator 
 Tolerance on water level control 
 Discharge data 
Partitioning of management 
units 
Divide the command area in 
subcommand areas 
 Existing management committee 
at different levels of canal and 
their service area etc. 
Canal operation improvement Identification of 
improvement option by 
considering water 
management, water control 
and canal operation 
 Analysis of all previous step 
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Appendix-F 
 
Some selected photos captured during field surveys 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A discussion with large farmers 
 
A discussion with small farmers 
 
A view of a broken outlet at tertiary canal 
 
An offtake structure at main Burala Canal 
 
A structure for livestock water drinking  
at main Burala Canal 
 
A view of a newly lined secondary canal 
in Burala Canal Irrigation Scheme 
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Head regulator of main UPC at  
Sulemanki Headworks 
 
Broken banks and silt condition in a 
secondary canal of UPC Irrigation 
Scheme 
 
 
A view of mechanized wheat threshing   
 
Woman labor sowing cotton crop on  
furrows as a water saving technique  
commonly in UPC Irrigation Scheme 
 
A tube well pumping groundwater from a  
depth of more than 300 feet 
 
A view of water deficit maize crop  
